One of my many disappointments with the media is that in the wake of the attacks in England and Mike Chertoff’s gut-check, we have seen no Op-Eds by Robert A. Pape, the realist at the University of Chicago who knows more about suicide terrorism than anyone.
Pape’s 2005 book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism collected extensive data on suicide terrorism and concluded that suicide terrorists are cold-blooded nationalists. "We like our villains to be wild-eyed monsters." They’re not; overwhelmingly, Pape showed, suicide bombers were motivated by rage over a foreign occupation, when there was a religious difference between occupier and occupied. Absolutely, religion is a factor, but Pape showed that suicide terrorism and Islamic radicalism were two different categories; that the most fervently-fundamentalist Islamic societies had produced few suicide terrorists, while states occupied or heavily-aided by the U.S. had produced the most. (His sample included Mohammed Atta, the 9/11 bomber and son of a prosperous Egyptian lawyer, whom Pape described as "principled and meticulous, conscientious and rational." And motivated to kill himself and thousands of Americans too, by the American occupation of Saudi Arabia in the 1990s.)
Pape’s largest database, of over 100 suicide terrorists, weren’t
Islamic fundamentalists at all, but Tamil Hindus, fighting the Buddhist
majority in Sri Lanka.
Since Pape’s book came out, I bet the Tamils have been outstripped
by Iraqis. And now there is the collection of doctors in England. I am
pretty sure what Pape would say about their motivation: American
occupation, inflamed by religious differences. And I wonder whether
Pape would not say that all the suicide terrorism in Iraq now is aimed
at the U.S., rather than by one Muslim sect against another. Suicide
terrorists, he argues, are using the only weapons they have against a
heavily armed occupier.
That raises the question: If the occupier left completely, would the
most horrifying aspect of the Iraqi civil war–the suicide terrorists
who kill and maim innocents–disappear, replaced by a more conventional
battle, of militia against militia? I believe that Pape would say
that so long as the U.S. is propping up a government, suicide terrorism will continue. (Which is not to say that we shouldn’t battle Al-Qaeda…)
Rereading Pape reminds me of a conversation I had this spring at
Columbia with a freshman lately arrived from Dubai, named Rahel Aima.
Rahel is from an Indian background, her parents work on the Arabian
peninsula, she grew up there. And she says that Americans have little
idea about the everyday rage toward Americans throughout the Arab
world. Why do they hate us? Because we’ve been trying to control them.
Nobody likes that.
P.S. My friend Dan tells me that Juan Cole wrote about Pape on Salon…
That account of Atta certainly doesn't square with local descriptions of his behavior in Venice and Miami, where he lived with a stripper, snorted cocaine, drank, and frequented bars and strip clubs.
As Daniel Hopsicker and others have asked: were there two Attas?
But to answer your question, it seems, from my perspective, moot: getting our troops home would prevent THEM from being killed. Sectarian violence would persist until such a time as another regional strong man emerged, or some sort of subdivision of Iraq along sectarian lines occurred. In fact, sectarian violence is probably being fomented, as long as it doesn't spill over and degrade oil production.
Of course, ignore those 14 huge military bases being constructed in Iraq: only "boots on the ground" can guard those babies.
(unrelated)
Has anyone attempted linking the Japanese kamikaze mentality with that of Islamic suicide/homicide bombers? Kamikazes were "suicide" pilots only secondarily: their primary mission was killing U.S. ships and sailors.
Sorry, but I have to make this comment about Ms. Aima: is she going to complain about Arabs ruling other peoples-Kurds, Africans, Berbers? It seems that it is she who is the one that is very uncritical of herself and her own people. She should be more like Americans-burn their own flags in public, throw garbage in the faces of their own soldiers returning from wars, etc.
A problem here is that people are much too uncritical of the Arab and other Moslem societies. That these states may be deeply sick, more sick than even Israel or America, never seems to cross people's minds here.
Sorry to have to say this from an opponent of all the wars (not just Iraq).
Sorry, but I have to make this comment about Ms. Aima: is she going to complain about Arabs ruling other peoples-Kurds, Africans, Berbers? It seems that it is she who is the one that is very uncritical of herself and her own people. She should be more like Americans-burn their own flags in public, throw garbage in the faces of their own soldiers returning from wars, etc.
A problem here is that people are much too uncritical of the Arab and other Moslem societies. That these states may be deeply sick, more sick than even Israel or America, never seems to cross people's minds here.
Sorry to have to say this from an opponent of all the wars (not just Iraq).
also unrelated – FOR BILL PEARLMAN
You have to get yourself the Atlas Shrugs Calender. Just follow James links:
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/blogs/wolcott/2007/07/the-middle-aged.html
The attack was in Scotland! The failed attacks were in in England.
Ultimately, all of these scandals and revelations force us to confront the basic issues of why the Iraq War was launched in the first place. What do we know now or suspect to be largely true?
1. The WMD intelligence was flimsy, and there is a good deal of circumstantial evidence suggesting the inner core surrounding Bush all knew this and went to war anyway. This has as much been admitted both in the infamous Downing Street Memo and by Paul Wolfowitz.
2. Democratization and humanitarian relief only became an issue once WMDs fizzled. The president's lack of movement on Darfur also suggests 'human rights' and democracy aren't a motivating force with this administration.
3. 'Terror' – as with WMDs, there is a strong possibility this reason was knowingly overplayed by the inner core. They refused to move on Zarqawi and Iraqi Islamists, who were irregardless a minor force in Saddam's Iraq and lurking in areas of the country that Saddam could not reach them. We also know the president pulled away reinforcements from Afghanistan in order to put them in the deployment pipeline for Iraq as the now infamous as Tora Bora took place.
So, what was the reason? Consider this possibility…
The Bush/Cheney axis came to power in 2000 with an idée fixe that the primary threat to US security were traditional 'hard power' issues of national security. Thus, the pulling out of the anti-ballistic treaty and the early scuffle with China over a US reconnaissance flight in the South China Sea. (remember way back then?) There was also, importantly, a preexisting belief, especially among the neocons but really, as seen by your willingness to buy it, throughout the conservative establishment, that Iraq, but especially Iran and its offshoots were dire threats to US interests in the region.
Ultimately, those interests are two – Israel and oil. While this is not the place to discuss the influence of what some call the 'Israel lobby' in the United States, the fact remains, however, that the dominance of the religious right in the Republican party made pleasing them an important factor in any political calculation…and Israel plays an important part in the elaborate 'End Times' mythology popular among the christianist religious right.
As for oil, it is too crass to say oil profits is what motivated the invasion, but it is disingenuous to argue against the role that security of oil supplies and access to them played in the Bush/Cheney decision-making process. Indeed, access to oil and oil security has been a large part of the reason we are involved in the Middle East and stretches back to World War II when Roosevelt met with and forged a relationship with the reigning king of Saudi Arabia on an American warship off the coast of Egypt in 1945. It was the reason why we overthrew Mossadeq and backed the Shah of Iran in 1953. It’s why we intervened against Iraq in 1991. Oil and oil security have ALWAYS been at the forefront of US Middle-East policy.
This being the case, consider the geopolitics of oil supply after 9/11. We had been, first of all, been literally run out of Iran in 1979 and, after 9/11, the fact stands that the majority of the hijackers were Saudis and the man ultimately behind the operation, Bin Laden, was a rich Saudi. Saudi Arabia represents the pinnacle of Islamist autocracy and stands 100% opposed to American values – and yet we were dependent upon them for military bases to protect the Gulf’s oil assets. Couple this also with these facts:
1. World, but especially Chinese, demand for oil had been growing and continues to grow exponentially.
2. Western and western-friendly oil assets are either all in sustained decline or approaching the point of decline from peak oil production.
3. The last time world oil discovery outpaced world oil consumption was twenty years ago.
4. The remaining massive, potentially politically accessible deposits of oil left remaining available to the industrialized West were all contained in the Middle East.
Under these conditions the Iraq War makes sense geo-strategically, politically, in fact in almost every way. Regime change creates a secure client state in the middle of the world’s last remaining great oil patch at time of dwindling supplies. It protects Israel, and so satisfies the pro-Israel part of the party. Insofar as it uses the rhetoric of ‘freedom versus terrorism’ it can be spun ideologically in a way that garners support and splits the opposition – thus creating the political el dorado of Rove’s ‘permanent majority’. It provided lucrative contracts to the military-industrial complex. It gave the pro-Republican officer corps a prestige boost and something to put on their resumes. It appealed to liberal interventionists like Thomas Friedman, nauseating moralists like you, and salivating imperialists like Bill Kristol. Throw in an arrogant, ignorant president with a messianic complex and a chip on his shoulder, a subservient, politicized mass media, an incompetent opposition, and a supremely ignorant, panicked, and fearful citizenry and the question inverts itself. Under these conditions, how could we NOT go to war against Iraq in 2003?
The rest, as they say, is history.
Pape's work is the best on the subject. Even the useless U.S. Congress had him testify.
For leaNder.
Do you know what MILF means? One of my wife's female friends had to explain it to me. I am curious whether the concept even exists in German.
The Jewish Bogeyman like MILF Atlas. Ummmmmm. Me imagine sandwich with Malkin and Atlas. More ummmmm.
Thank you LeAnder.
Me also now want to have love sandwich with Newt and Horowitz. Double Ummmmmmmm.
Не пропадай!
-Jewish Bogeyman (Proud member of the Jewish Cabal doing such a kick ass job of running the world)
Dear President Bush:
I don't know if you'll ever read this letter. I've written to you on two prior occasions, but I think the Massachusetts return address had something to do with both letters being sent back to me unopened and stamped with "Return to Evolution-Mongering Abortion-Peddling Detester of America, Liberty, and God." But if you're reading this third letter, it's because you've managed to look past my treasonous postmark or because you believed me when I wrote "Free Al Qaeda Lieutenant Inside!" on the face of the envelope. I'm sorry for misleading you, but now that you're reading, I have an urgent matter to discuss.
It hurts to suggest this, but I think your legacy is in jeopardy. You're not to blame, of course. Almost every day, the liberal media rush to broadcast blood-soaked images from the latest car bombing while devoting none of their coverage to the many unexploded vehicles parked curbside. It's not fair, but these are the people writing—and editing—history. I know you promised our military an indefinite commitment to a mission that gets papered over with a brand-new mission every few months like a highway billboard, but I don't think our men and women in uniform would begrudge you a quick yet honorable solution. And I have one.
First, let me give you a little background.
It has been a couple of months since the tragic events at Virginia Tech, and though we were moved by the heroism of Liviu Librescu, a professor who blocked the door to his classroom with his own body, and by the hypothetical heroism of radio commentator Neal Boortz, who totally would've rushed the deranged gunman, we know that revulsion and grief will rule that day forever. So, we once again look to bigger issues and preventive measures. Alarmist liberals are, predictably, braying for more gun control, but I urge you to stick to your strict constructionist interpretation of the Second Amendment (except for the militia part). If the victims of Virginia Tech had been armed, maybe there would have been no need for Librescu's sacrifice or Boortz's valiant speculation. And I got to thinking: Why stop with one American college campus?
Here's what I propose for Iraq: Distribute assault weapons to every Iraqi man, woman, and adolescent with the aptitude to crook a trigger finger. After all, the insurgents are a proportionately minuscule part of the overall population, and since the bad guys get hold of weapons anyway, why not put equalizers in the hands of law-abiding citizens? That'll make any mass murderer with a death wish think twice—unless he's got a death wish or something. And just think of the relief our soldiers will feel every time their patrol encounters a dozen Iraqis stroking AK-47s at a traffic light. They'll say, "Man, maybe Al Qaeda should fight us at home, because they sure don't stand a chance here."
I suppose some of the weapons we provide could be used against us. But we all know that guns don't kill people, people kill people. All a semiautomatic does is discharge 75 poor choices per minute. Remember that so-called assault-weapons ban we had? What happened there? Thugs merely adapted and replaced drive-by shootings with drive-by pillow smotherings, and no one was any safer.
But here's the best part. The unrestricted flow of weapons will help expose the subversive element that poses the greatest threat to our soldiers and to civilized Iraqis alike: the unarmed. Think about it: Only someone who had a reason to feel protected from insurgents would feel secure not hoarding weapons. We will know our enemies by the food stashed in their pantries, the clothes cached in their drawers, and the wall tapestries concealing large areas of their walls.
I don't care if you give me credit for this idea, Mr. President, just as long as you implement it. Most Americans can't identify the people behind strategic breakthroughs like Shock and Awe or Sending Troops Into Battle With the Protective Equivalent of a Fishing Vest, but the people responsible know who they are. The quiet satisfaction will suffice for me.
Let the bullets fly. And let freedom reign.
What to think about Chechnya? The motive for suicide bombings there seems to be exactly what Pape claims it to be: getting rid of an occupying force regarded as foreign.
On the other hand according to an article by Lorenzo Vidino in the Middle East Quarterly of Summer 2005 the first Chechnya suicide bombings only came about after foreign mujahideen had joined the resistance movement and gave the mild Sufi variety of Islam there a radical turn.
Since I regard this source as somewhat suspect I wonder whether anyone else can shed light on this.
Palestinian statehood within a year
By Jerome M. Segal
Today, there is no Palestinian entity to which Israel can safely hand over the territories. Moreover, while the West Bank remains under occupation, Fatah will not engage in effective security cooperation. Were it to do so, it would be seen as ?the police of the occupation,? and its delegitimization would be terminal.
There is, however, a way to foster the emergence of a Palestinian partner. The key is to make security performance part of the process of ending the occupation, rather than a precondition for negotiations. Here is how:
1. Israel immediately opens negotiations on territorial and security issues with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, as head of the PLO. The negotiations include the future of both Gaza and the West Bank. Neither Jerusalem nor refugees are negotiated at this point. Except for Jerusalem, agreement would be sought on permanent borders (not interim borders as in the optional phase II of the "road map") and there would be mutual recognition by the two states. The agreement would be more than a hudna, but less than end-of-claims. In conducting negotiations, as president of all Palestinians, Abbas would consult with anyone he chose to, including Hamas leaders.
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2. Upon reaching agreement with Israel on permanent borders and security arrangements, Abbas submits the treaty to a referendum. He requests that Hamas permit such a referendum in Gaza as well, under the supervision of the Palestinian Elections Commission and international observers. Hamas has previously said it would respect a referendum on a PLO-negotiated agreement, but if it refuses, the referendum is held in the West Bank alone. Because the agreement does not deal with refugees, the referendum is not open to members of the Palestinian diaspora.
3. If approved in a referendum, the treaty is deemed by Israel and the PLO as "ratified," and performance-based implementation begins:
? Israel recognizes the State of Palestine as the de jure sovereign of Gaza and the agreed-upon West Bank and swapped territory. Israel immediately withdraws its military forces from that portion of the West Bank where Palestine is most able to function as a state (that is, where it can exercise a monopoly of force). This would include the Jericho area and the border with Jordan.
? Israel begins dismantling settlements in all areas under Palestinian de jure sovereignty. Both sides undertake confidence-building measures, including prisoner releases, improved freedom of movement, and an end to incitement.
? Concurrent with Israeli military withdrawal and the assumption of de facto sovereignty over the initial area, the State of Palestine is established, explicitly based on the 1988 Declaration of Independence. The PLO designates a broadly based interim government, pending future elections, including members of Hamas, but only if they accept the ratified treaty as the law of the land.
? Palestine seeks international recognition and admission to the United Nations.
? Once the State of Palestine is established, the Palestinian Authority is dissolved. The new state exercises sovereignty where Israel has withdrawn; where Israel has not yet withdrawn, it serves as the administrative authority; and it claims sovereignty over Gaza, where Hamas continues to hold actual power. Provided that there are no attacks on Israel from Gaza, Israel would treat Gaza with benign neglect.
? As the new state demonstrates its ability to function as a sovereign, Israel extends its withdrawal of forces. This demonstration of capacity to actually exercise sovereignty is the necessary precondition for further withdrawal. This means disbanding all non-state militias and disarming or integrating into the state forces all individuals presently bearing weapons. Essentially, the state would be calling on Palestinians to accept it as the sovereign. If cooperation is not forthcoming, it could use other methods. In order for this process to be credible to Palestinians, a third party (such as the United States or the Quartet) serves as the "court of appeal" should Israel and Palestine disagree over whether the state has sufficient control to trigger Israeli withdrawal.
? Once Israel has fully withdrawn from all of the agreed-upon West Bank areas, Palestine will seek Hamas' acceptance of its sovereignty over Gaza as well. If this is actually accomplished on the ground, Israel, in accord with the security provisions of the treaty, will lift the air, land and sea blockade of Gaza. Provided it accepts the treaty as binding, Hamas will be offered the opportunity to function as a political party, without any armed wing, and to participate in new elections. With Israel offering to lift the blockade of Gaza, it is likely that Hamas will accept these terms for re- establishing Palestinian unity, under the authority of the new state. If Hamas rejects this offer and retains military control of Gaza, the status quo would continue, awaiting evolution prompted by the Gazans themselves.
4. Negotiations over Jerusalem and refugees would be conducted on a state-to-state basis. They would begin immediately after the first elections in the State of Palestine, to be held shortly after Israel completes its withdrawal from the agreed-upon West Bank territory. Resolution of those issues would satisfy, in the Palestinian dimension, the requirements of the Arab Peace Initiative for normalization of relations of the Arab states with Israel, and for an end-of-claims agreement between Israelis and Palestinians.
Jerome M. Segal is director of the Peace Consultancy Project at the University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies