It is not likely that Avigdor Lieberman plans to allow them to retain their citizenship and move to some other location within Israel.

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

Lawrence of Cyberia has a comprehensive post which lists a large number of attacks on Arab civilians in Jaffa by Jewish terrorist groups starting from January 1948 through April 1948 as reported by the British.

There is a book available online called the Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem by Issa Nakhleh. In that book he cites British records on Zionist violence and terrorism in Palestine from 1946 onward, much of which was directed at the British, but a significant portion of which was directed at Arab civilians. Its clear from the British records that violence started long before the UN Partition Plan, and that the Zionist terror groups bear the brunt of the blame for that violence.

Devinette: guess the maximum percentage of expellable Palestinians that at any given time were actually expelled-ran for their life(or as someone once replied to me “or were called away”).
I could make some mistakes here, don’t have time to look things up now. The estimate can easily be improved.
UNRWA numbers in 1950 talk of 150.000 palestinians inside Israel, of which 50.000 were internally displaced.
So 100.000 were at home. Should we subtract the druze because there was no intention to expel them? 15.000 or so. Subtract the Christians around Nazareth, because it was politically too sensitive to chase them away? I don’t recall the number. Say it’s 10.000. Subtract part of the 30.000 that had just been added with the little triangle after the armistice with Jordan? I don’t know how many of those 30.000 had been expelled by 1950, but in all I thought in the 3 years after the war the same number 30.000 were expelled from several areas. By 52 the situation was more or less frozen by giving identity cards to the Palestinians inside. Let’s take half, 15.000.

Subtract a small number that had been expelled but had managed to deviously sneak in back to their homes? That’ll be negligeable, probably most ended up as present absentees.
But a guess of 60.000 ‘non-expelled expellables’ inside Israel proper at some point before the armistice, is easily over 90% expelled expellables. That’s pretty thorough for ‘shit happening’.

You can’t just list a quote, and imply the rest. That’s weak and unconvincing. In fact, it’s a common tactic in this debate.

In the UN report, the team acknowledges a article in which some Hamas spokesman was quoted as saying that the Palestinians have become good at being human shields or something. The guy is a moron, and what he said was moronic. This rhetoric is comically idiotic. However, there was no evidence of human shields.

Anyways, I can see that quote mattering if you build some context around it. Provide some evidence toward making your point. Thus, that quote would be a compelling side-note, contributing to an already substantiated argument.

Here are some excerpts from various books, on the Nakba:

(All found, in the foot-note section of ‘Understanding Power’ by Chomsky.)

Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities, New York: Pantheon, 1987, pp. 81-118. An excerpt (pp. 42, 83-84, 132):

In April 1948, forces of the Irgun penetrated deep into Jaffa, which was outside the borders of the proposed Jewish state. [...]Ben-Gurion, despite harsh pronouncements against the dissidents [i.e. the Irgun and other terrorist squads], waited until after the establishment of the state to force them to disband. He could have done this earlier had it suited his purposes, but clearly it did not. The terrorists were very successful in extending the war into areas not officially allocated to the Jews.

Between 600,000 and 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were evicted or fled from areas that were allocated to the Jewish state or occupied by Jewish forces during the fighting and later integrated de facto into Israel. During and after the exodus, every effort was made — from the razing of villages to the promulgation of laws — to prevent their return.

According to the partition plan, the Jewish state would have had well over 300,000 Arabs, including 90,000 Bedouin. With the Jewish conquest of areas designated for the Arab state (western Galilee, Nazareth, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramleh, villages south of Jerusalem, and villages in the Arab Triangle of central Palestine), the Arab population would have risen by another 300,000 or more. Zionist leaders feared such numbers of non-Jews would threaten the stability of the new state both militarily – should they become a fifth column for Arab armies, and socially, insofar as a substantial Muslim and Christian minority would challenge the new state’s Jewish character. Thus the flight of up to 700,000 Arabs from Palestinian villages and towns during 1948 came to many as a relief.

It wasn’t until April 30, 1948, two weeks before the end of the [British] Mandate, that Arab chiefs of staff met for the first time to work out a plan for military intervention. Under the pressure of mounting public criticism, fueled by the increasingly desperate situation in Palestine – the massacre of Deir Yassin, the fall of Tiberias, the evacuation of Haifa, the collapse of the Palestinian forces, the failure of the A.L.A. [Arab Liberation Army], and the mass flight of refugees – the army chiefs of the Arab states were finally compelled to discuss the deployment of their regular armies.

See also, Avi Shlaim’s The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, New York: Norton, 2000. An excerpt (p. 31):

Plan Dalet, prepared by the Haganah chiefs in early March, was a major landmark in the development of this offensive strategy. During the preceding month the Palestinian irregulars, under the inspired leadership of Abdel Qader al-Husseini, cut the main road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and started to gain the upper hand in the fighting with the Haganah. After suffering several defeats at the hands of Palestinian irregulars, the Haganah chiefs decided to seize the initiative and go on the offensive.

The aim of Plan D was to secure all the areas allocated to the Jewish state under the U.N. partition resolution as well as Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors leading to them, so as to provide a solid and continuous basis for Jewish sovereignty.

The novelty and audacity of the plan lay in the orders to capture Arab villages and cities, something the Haganah had never attempted before. Although the wording of Plan D was vague, its objective was to clear the interior of the country of hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements, and in this sense it provided a warrant for expelling civilians. By implementing Plan D in April and May, the Haganah thus directly and decisively contributed to the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem.

Plan D was not a political blueprint for the expulsion of Palestinian Arabs: it was a military plan with military and territorial objectives. However, by ordering the capture of Arab cities and the destruction of villages, it both permitted and justified the forcible expulsion of Arab civilians. By the end of 1948 the number of Palestinian refugees had swollen to around 700,000. But the first and largest wave of refugees occurred before the official outbreak of hostilities on 15 May.

On the extent of the Zionist-controlled territory and the number of Palestinian refugees through May 1948, see for example, David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, pp. 123-143. An excerpt (pp. 136, 138-139, 142):

The rise of the State of Israel — in frontiers larger than those assigned to it under the Partition Plan — and the flight of the native population was a cataclysm so deeply distressing to the Arabs that to this day they call it, quite simply, al-nakba, the Catastrophe.

[...]Deir Yassin was, as Begin rightly claims, the most spectacular single contribution to the Catastrophe. [Interjection: Deir Yassin, an Arab town that had in fact refused to be used as a base for operations against the Jewish Agency by the foreign Arab volunteer force, was the site of a massacre of 250 innocent Arabs by the Jewish terrorist groups Irgun and the Stern Gang in April 1948.]

In time, place and method it demonstrates the absurdity of the subsequently constructed myth [Interjection: that Arab leaders had called on the Palestinian refugees to flee]. The British insisted on retaining juridical control of the country until the termination of their Mandate on 15 May; it was not until they left that the regular Arab armies contemplated coming in. But not only did Deir Yassin take place more than five weeks before that critical date, it also took place outside the area assigned to the Jewish State. It was in no sense a retaliatory action.

[...]In reality, Deir Yassin was an integral part of Plan Dalet, the master-plan for the seizure of most or all of Palestine. [...]Nothing was officially disclosed about Plan Dalet [...] although Ben-Gurion was certainly alluding to it in an address [on April 7, 1948] to the Zionist Executive:

Quote:
“Let us resolve not to be content with merely defensive tactics, but at the right moment to attack all along the line and not just within the confines of the Jewish State and the borders of Palestine, but to seek out and crush the enemy where-ever he may be.”

According to Qurvot (Battles) of 1948, a detailed history of the Haganah and the Palmach [the Zionist fighting forces], the aim of Plan Dalet was “control of the area given to us by the U.N. in addition to areas occupied by us which were outside these borders and the setting up of forces to counter the possible invasion of Arab armies.” It was also designed to “cleanse” such areas of their Arab inhabitants.

[...]When the war ended, in early 1949, the Zionists, allotted 57 per cent of Palestine under the Partition Plan, had occupied 77 per cent of the country. Of the 1,300,000 Arab inhabitants, they had displaced nearly 900,000.

There are lots more where that came from.