especially interesting that it was the october 2000 shootings of the 13 demonstrators that tipped the balance for you. i wouldn’t have guessed it in advance. but then i’ve never viewed zionism “from the inside” as you have.>/blockquote>

I guess the final myth that needed shattering, the one that so many progressive Zionists can’t let go of (see the recent thread on Bernard Avishai’s “democratic state with a Jewish character”), is the one enshrined in Israel’s declaration of independence, the belief that it is possible for a Jewish state to treat all citzens equally, “regardless of creed, race or gender” (almost a mantra in Israel). Until October 2000, I still believed it was possible to change discriminatory laws but keep the basic Zionist structure of a Jewish state. The violence of the police and the murder of the 13 shocked me into realising that non-Jews would always be second class citizens as long as the state continued to be defined as Jewish, that the discrimination was intrinsic. Once I had realised that, I began to see even the consistent underfunding of Palestinian municipalities, education, etc. in a different light – not as something to be corrected in the next budget (always the next budget), but as a symptom of a much bigger problem.

Thanks for the question and the spirit in which it was asked. I agree that it is important to understand the mechanisms of such seemingly radical changes of position – hopefully, to be able to duplicate them. I’m not sure how much help my personal experiences will be, but here goes.

I had somewhat further to go than your average secular Israeli, because I was raised in a right-wing, religious environment (although my parents were never especially right-wing). My first jump was to leave that environment – motivated more by theology than politics – and to begin to develop as a secular liberal. It is not uncommon for the “newly secular” to become cultural left-wingers, as the left wing is the natural bastion of secularism and rationalism. Zionism was a given, but so was liberalism (perhaps a secular revaluation of the religious ethics I had been taught), including a commitment to peaceful resolution and human rights. I went to Peace Now demonstrations (even while I was in the army – as did many other soldiers), joined the Meretz party, supported negotiations with the PLO and a two-state solution. I was aware of some internal contradictions in my point of view – particularly between my support for a Jewish state, support for Israel being a “state of all its citizens” (get rid of rabbinical control AND be fairer to Palestinian Israelis, all in one fell swoop!) and support for a two-state solution – but felt that I could live with these contradictions. I demonstrated against the construction of Jewish settlements in Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, joined the Israeli Committee against House Demolitions and went to protest and help rebuild demolished Palestinian homes in the West Bank. Contacts with right-wingers and even moderates became increasingly problematic (especially within the family), but I felt pretty good about myself. I was already part of a relatively radical minority, but still defined myself as a Zionist and sought a two-state solution to the “conflict” – seeing the occupation as the source of virtually all of the country’s problems. It was a minority, but not an extremely small one, especially among the intelligentsia.

Then came the Second Intifada, and I was shocked to the core – especially by the way in which the Israeli police had responded to demonstrations by Palestinian Israelis, shooting and killing 13 demonstrators. These were Israeli citizens, theoretically protected by the law, but they were not treated like Jewish demonstrators – even violent Jewish demonstrators. They were treated and spoken of like an external enemy. It then dawned on me that it wasn’t really about the occupation of the WB and Gaza. At about the same time, I started to hear about the Palestinian Right of Return, as one of the subjects (maybe the most important one) that had led to the failure of talks between Arafat and Barak at Camp David. I started to read about the refugees and the ROR, and found myself unable to reconcile the sympathy I felt for them and my understanding of their just demands, with my belief in the justness of, and need for a Jewish state. If the ROR were implemented, it would mean the end of the Jewish state, and maintaining the Jewish state would mean that ROR would be impossible. On the other hand, the refugee issue (as we had seen at Camp David) could not just be swept under the rug (as even Arafat would seem to have done for far too long). At about that time, I started to read Edward Said, and became convinced of his assertion that any solution that did not seriously address the refugees and the status of the Palestinians of 48 (Palestinian citizens of Israel), as well as the occupation of the WB and Gaza, would end in failure. I joined the Al-Awda Right of Return Coalition mailing list to hear what Palestinians had to say. I read and I argued and some of the posts made me livid, but slowly, I became convinced that my internal contradictions were untenable and I had to choose between liberalism and belief in intrinsic human worth, and a fundamentally racist ideology. So, I went from Zionist to non-Zionist (I didn’t find post-Zionism particularly appealing) to anti-Zionist. Along the way I met some incredible Palestinians with whom I had far more in common in terms of core values than I did even with left-wing Zionists, and became convinced of the idea of equal rights within a single, democratic state.

By this time, living in Israel had become unbearable, and so my wife and I decided to leave the country, but took our commitment to justice in Palestine with us.

The Israeli-Egyptian spying relationship, though not reported in the media, have long history. In fact, one of “Israel’s spy hero” happens to be Gamal Nasser’s son-in-law Ashraf Marwan.

Israel’s Egyptian Spy Hero
link to rehmat1.wordpress.com

Scary thought, huh?

Doesn’t this put Hamas at the same level as Israel (i.e. they are both legitimate governments) Is this the backdoor to international recognition?