The New York Times lately published a story on the flotilla raid, by Ethan Bronner and Sabrina Tavernise. Finkelstein’s interpolations are in shaded segments:
In Israel, ideas on how to halt the boats — sabotage of propellers or engines, the use of ropes or chains — were examined, military officials say, but all were rejected as dangerous or impractical. Disabling a huge boat like the Mavi Marmara could lead to its sinking or to days of towing it to shore.
How could disabling the vessel’s propeller have caused it to sink?
The best option, they asserted, was a takeover of the command of the boats, something Israel had done a year ago during an attempt by a smaller vessel. This time, though, because the lead boat was so large, the Israelis would have to descend by helicopter rather than approaching only by sea, costing them the element of surprise.
The Israeli navy contains no “large” boats that could have pulled up alongside the Turkish vessel?
Some American naval experts interviewed agreed that as long as Israel insisted on stopping the Mavi Marmara, its best option was a takeover.
The formidable Israeli navy, which patrols Israel’s Mediterranean coast and now has three nuclear submarines in the Gulf, couldn’t have physically impeded the vessel’s passage?
But Israel, committed to enforcing a blockade, did not consider alternatives like searching the cargo before unloading it in Gaza — a decision that has prompted criticism that Israel was too quick to choose confrontation and fell into a trap set by the activists.
Israel’s inner cabinet of seven ministers approved the plan and the Israeli Navy Seal units began training for what they expected to be passive resistance. “We had in mind a sit-down, a linking of arms,” a military spokesman said.
If the Israeli navy expected only “passive resistance…‘a sit-down, a linking of arms,’” why didn’t it just board the vessel in broad daylight and pilot it to Ashdod?
On the morning of the raid, confusion ruled. The first soldiers who rappelled down the ropes appeared disoriented and frightened, Dr. Coskun, the Turkish witness, said, slipping a bit on the dewy deck and calling out in English, which Dr. Coskun said few Turks understood.
Is it credible that before they faced any resistance the “first soldiers who rappelled down the ropes” were “disoriented and frightened,” when “The Naval Commando is today the best fighting unit in the IDF” (Ben Caspit, Maariv), and “The Naval Commando drilled taking over the ships for weeks” (Nahum Barnea, Yedioth Ahronoth)?
