Gershom Gorenberg at the American Prospect has a good realist take on how the Arab Spring has already disciplined Israel, following the Eilat killings.
Then there was an unexpected paroxysm of restraint. Netanyahu told his cabinet he would not rush into a new military campaign. Fragile ceasefires were declared and fell apart. Nonetheless, the effort to stop the escalation requires explanation.
Decision-makers in both Israel and Gaza, it appears, are caught between the desire to have the last word, to fire the last shot, and knowing that they have nothing to gain by returning to battle. Besides that, the year of Arab uprisings may have put more missiles on the black market, but it has also made Egypt a less reliable—and therefore more influential—partner for both Israel and Hamas. The transitional rulers of Egypt are demanding quiet. There’s half a chance they will get it…
Good sense, though, would stand even less a chance were it not for Egyptian pressure. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has had immense benefits for both countries, freeing them of military burdens and allowing their economies to develop. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces that has ruled Egypt since Mubarak’s fall wants to preserve the peace agreement. Unlike Mubarak, it has to pay attention to public opinion—and the Egyptian public is strongly pro-Palestinian. An Israeli government that began a military campaign in Gaza, says Meital, “endangers the peace treaty.” According to the usual semi-reliable leaks General Hussein Tantawi, head of Egyptian military council, has conveyed that message directly to Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak.
Egypt is also leaning on Hamas to crack down and stop the rocket fire. Egypt is Gaza’s tie to the outside world, and in a year of drastic changes, Hamas is estranged from its former patrons in Syria and Iran. This gives Egypt more leverage.
In the best case, if a ceasefire finally holds, it will be a short-term fix. Hamas still needs to disarm its pyromaniac rivals in Gaza. It could escape its isolation if it wiggled free of outdated ideology and recognized Israel. Israel, for its part, could put much more diplomatic pressure on Hamas—and improve its ties with Egypt – if Netanyahu was willing to negotiate realistically for a two-state settlement.
Since none of these things is about to happen, Egypt is left to try to impose calm. Strangely enough, its current rulers are making that effort because they are not absolutely in control, because the public now matters, because the old Middle Eastern game is over and the new one hasn’t yet been designed.
