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Nakba is the root of the conflict and makes ’67 negotiations meaningless — ‘NYRB’

An important piece by Nathan Thrall in the New York Review of Books is titled “What future for Israel?” Important because it is broaching in the pages of our leading liberal intellectual journal, beloved by motheaten Zionists, the paradigm shift that has been forced by young idealists and activists: a shift from the ideal of partition to the ideal of human rights. From the ideal of preserving a Jewish state (the 67 borders and all the failed negotiations and demographic/racist baggage of that ideal) to the idea of equal rights. In a word: 1948 replaces 1967. The grievances inherent in the establishment of a Jewish state have come to the fore. The Nakba, committed by socialist Zionists, must be acknowledged at last– the Nakba now embodied in colonization of the West Bank. And when those ethnic undertakings/crimes are openly discussed, how many American Jews will not begin to question “What future for Israel?”

Maybe Tony Judt was too abrupt for this same audience 10 years ago when he said that Israel was an “anachronism.” Thrall has a lighter touch, but it amounts to the same news. Though we’ll probably have to wait another ten years for it to sink in.

Some excerpts:

Israel’s turn away from the Palestinians has brought an overdue shift in focus from the borders of the state to what lies within them. Jewish identity was a central issue of the 2013 election; indirectly, so too was the place of minorities in the Jewish state. Among Israeli citizens, Jews but not Palestinians have collective rights to land, immigration, symbols such as their own flag, and commemorations, particularly of the Nakba, the catastrophe of Palestinian defeat and expulsion in 1948. Jews and non-Jews cannot legally marry. Current residents of Jerusalem homes that were abandoned during the 1948 war have been evicted to make room for former owners and their descendants—but only when the deed holders are Jews.

The inequality of Jews and non-Jews within Israel’s pre-1967 borders—in which Palestinian citizens and residents lived under military rule from 1948 until the end of 1966—prepared the ground for still more unequal arrangements in the West Bank after the 1967 war. Both were created by the Ashkenazi Labor Zionist elite that now criticizes the settlers for dynamics it set in place. On what grounds, [author Yehouda] Shenhav asks, is the idea of Jewish settlement in ruined Palestinian villages within the pre-1967 borders—formerly inhabited, in many cases, by Palestinian citizens internally displaced by war—considered more moral than Jewish settlement on Palestinian agricultural lands of the West Bank? The former, he argues, involved far more human suffering. [Author Asher] Susser, indeed any Zionist, would surely object to comparisons that would cast doubt on Israeli claims to its pre-1967 territory. But he offers strong support for the underlying premise that the root of the conflict is not east of the Green Line but in the more than century-old project of Zionist settlement itself.

The fading importance of the pre-1967 borders means a breaking with illusions and a return to the true nature of the conflict: a struggle between two ethnic groups between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea….

Israel, Susser argues, almost certainly will not achieve an end of conflict, much less recognition of a Jewish state, without meeting Palestinian demands to admit responsibility for the flight and expulsion of refugees of the 1948 war…

Many Israeli leaders believe that any such acknowledgment of responsibility or acceptance of Palestinian claims to return would shake the very foundations of the state, undermining its international legitimacy and upending decades of Zionist teaching by conceding that Israel was responsible for forcibly dispossessing large numbers of Palestinian civilians from their land and homes at its birth. Netanyahu understands the size of this obstacle, or once did, yet is moving with Kerry to renew talks based on the foundering 1967 model.

Kerry, like his predecessors, has concentrated on 1967 issues such as borders and security, showing few signs that he has learned from past failures. One hopes that he is not under the mistaken impression that Olmert and Abbas were inches away from a real agreement. Those talks did not come close to resolving even the 1967 issues. What’s more, compared to Olmert, Netanyahu is less desperate, less willing to compromise on 1948 issues, and is making calculations in a region that has become less stable and forgiving of risk.

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If you want to talk 1948 or try a rematch you might not like the result.
Just a thought.

Yes, this is obvious. One of the discouraging things about the post-911 era has been how knowledge of the original context of the I/P issue has practically disappeared. Everything now is about the 1967 borders, if one’s awareness goes back that far. But in fact Israel’s origin – the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate, the UN’s handling of statehood – undermines its basic legitimacy. You can see why Israel and its supporters are so touchy about this.

I have to say that I haven’t succeeded in squaring the circle in my own mind. How to reconcile the sketchy origins of Israel with the living presence of millions of Jews – many of them now fourth generation or later on the land.

At least the question of the occupied territories is clear. There’s no Balfour Declaration or Resolution 181 for them.

Great piece in the NYRB, although I would quibble over the accuracy of a few of its points. Phil’s link to the article goes straight to page 3. I would suggest linking to the very start of the piece here:

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/what-future-israel/?page=1

Phil,

I read this article carefully, one sentence after the other in order, and came away with a very different message than you did. Nathan Thrall seems to be arguing that Israeli society is moving ever farther to the intransigent right and that there is nothing anyone can do about it:

Israel’s new government represents well the rightward shift in mainstream Israeli thought. Like Netanyahu and Lapid, most Israeli Jews say they would accept a two-state solution, but the terms on which they are willing to do so are hardly realistic.14 Many of those further to their right, by contrast, are rather more clear-eyed—or perhaps simply honest—about what peace would entail. In a veiled attack against Netanyahu and Lapid, Naftali Bennett recently said, “Some say they are against the division of Jerusalem but they are in favor of a Palestinian state. And I ask, where exactly would the Palestinian capital be? In Jericho? In Bethlehem? In Berlin?”

The right has strengthened as the arguments of the left and center have been discredited. Promoters of negotiations have failed to convey how high a price a peace agreement would exact. They have told themselves and the public that the outlines of a peace deal are well known and they have asserted that agreement exists where it does not. Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, a veteran of the Carter and Clinton administrations and co-chairman of the board of the Jewish People Policy Institute, writes in The Future of the Jews that it is “commonly understood that the largest settlement blocks would remain under Israeli control in any final peace agreement.” Israelis similarly speak of “consensus” settlements, but the common understanding of which Eizenstat writes is shared only by Israelis and their supporters. Leaked Palestinian transcripts from the Annapolis talks of 2007–2008 record the two sides fighting fiercely over the future status of what Israelis consider one of the most “consensus” settlements of all, Ma’ale Adumim, east of Jerusalem, with some 40,000 residents.

It’s nice to see something like this slip through the cracks, though Silvers’ NYRB remains in the zionist camp along with the remainder of our major print and broadcast media.