Trending Topics:

The death by drone memos (Part II)

US Politics
on 2 Comments

The following is an update of Remi Brulin’s earlier Mondoweiss article The death by drone memo: a throwback to U.S. terrorism in Nicaragua.

On September 30, 2011, Anwar al-Aulaki, a radical Islamist cleric and an American citizen, was killed in a targeted drone strike in Yemen.

Among the many legal questions raised by such an act, a most important and intriguing one relates to the legal status of certain CIA activities given the existence of 18 U.S.C. § 956 and 18 U.S.C. § 1119. The first federal statute makes it a crime to conspire within the United States to commit, outside the United States, any act that would constitute the crime of murder (or kidnapping or maiming) if committed in the United States. The second specifically prohibits the (actual or attempted) murder of an American citizen by another American citizen outside of the United States.

A few months ago, following a Freedom of Information Act by the New York Times and the ACLU, the Obama administration released a July 16, 2010 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum (PDF) where David Barron, the former head of OLC (and now a federal appelate judge), provided the legal rationale for the strike against al-Awlaki.

Yesterday, Jason Leopold and Vice News released yet another memo, drafted on May 25, 2011, and which deals specifically with the question of the legality of actions by the CIA.

In the pages made available to the public (several remain redacted), the DoJ argues in favor of a “public authorities justification,” and insists that federal statutes prohibiting murder and other crimes cover acts by individuals but not those by officers, such as CIA agents, duly authorized to undertake such acts on behalf of the government.

In both memos, the administration’s lawyers bolster their argument by referring to an older OLC opinion, 8 Op. O.L.C. 58 (1984). While not central to the Obama administration’s case, the fact that this specific memo could even be cited here is very revealing once one realizes the context in which it was drafted.

Indeed, 8 Op. O.L.C. 58 argued for the legality of CIA actions in the context of one of the most controversial acts of the Reagan years, the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors in April 1984, an act condemned by the International Court of Justice and which countless Democrats considered at the time to amount to “state-sponsored terrorism.” (PDF)

Immediately upon entering the White House, President Reagan started dealing with what he repeatedly described as the “communist” and “terrorist” threat posed by the Sandinistas, who had taken power in Nicaragua in 1979, by giving covert aid to the so-called Contras.

As revelations in the press pulled his “secret war” from the shadows, many in Congress started questioning the morality and legality of such support. In response to such inquiries, the Executive systematically hid behind “secrecy” claims presented as necessary in the interest of “national security.”

In early April 1984, the nature of the United States’ involvement in that country changed drastically as several boats docked in Nicaragua’s harbors, including a Soviet tanker, were hit by mines, leading to severe material damage and several lives lost.

While the Contras claimed responsibility, to the Sandinistas such actions bore all the hallmarks of the CIA. Immediately, they lodged a formal complaint before the International Court of Justice.

For its part, the State Department assured it had “no further information on the incident,” adding: “We have received a protest from the Soviet Union charging U.S. responsibility, and we reject that charge.”

On April 8, unauthorized leaks revealed that the CIA (specifically, its so-called Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets or UCLAs) had in fact been directly involved in laying these mines. As shown by a March 2, 1984 secret memorandum written by Oliver North, the agency had made prior arrangements asking the Contras to “take credit for the operation” to cover up its involvement.

In an eerie parallel, following a missile strike on a small village in south Yemen in December 2009, President Saleh immediately insisted that his air force had struck an Al-Qaeda training camp. In 2010, a cable published by Wikileaks exposed the existence of a secret agreement between Saleh and Washington aimed at covering up the US’sinvolvement in the strike, which reportedly killed forty-one people.

Following the revelations about the CIA mining, the late Senator Barry Goldwater wrote to Bill Casey, the Director of the CIA. Not mincing his words, the old Cold Warrior rhetorically asked the DCI “how can we back [the President’s] foreign policy when we don’t know what the hell he is doing?” and added: “Mine the harbors in Nicaragua? This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war.”

On April 9 and 10, countless Democrats and Republicans took to the floor to condemn these covert activities, while the Senate adopted a resolution (84-12) explicitly banning further funding for such practices by the CIA.

For many Democrats, not only were such policies immoral and illegal but they amounted to “terrorism,” thus putting the lie to the Reagan administration’s claim to be “fighting terrorism” in Central America.

In the House, David Bonior (D-MI), Theodore Weiss (D-NY) and George Miller (D-CA) insisted that the CIA mining had amounted to “state-supported” or “state-sponsored acts of terrorism.” Similarly, Ron Dellums (D-NC) stated that “mining ports is an act of terrorism,” adding: “to engage in state-sponsored terrorism is dangerous, it is immoral, it is unethical, it is unbecoming of one of the great superpowers of this world.”

In the Senate, Alan Cranston (D-CA) explained that the mining “amounted to our backing terrorism” while George Mitchell (D-ME) condemned the Reagan administration for continuing “its support of terrorists engaged in killing, in industrial and economic sabotage, and in the mining of the ports in Nicaragua.”

Referring to the rejection by the Senate of an amendment sponsored by Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and which would have explicitly stated that funds to the Contras should not go to the commission of acts of “terrorism,” Ted Kennedy (D-MA) lamented: “At the moment this body refused to prohibit the use of US funds for terror and sabotage in Nicaragua, US personnel were themselves engaged in acts of terror and sabotage.”

In that extraordinarily adversarial context, Reagan’s OLC was tasked with providing a legal analysis to counter accusations that the mining represented a violation of the Neutrality Act.

The result was 8 Op. O.L.C. 58, drafted by Theodore Olson on April 25, 1984. There, the head of OLC argued that Section 5 of the Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960, which forbids the planning of military or naval expeditions against a foreign state at peace with the US, applied solely to persons acting in their private capacity but not to officials, such as CIA agents, “acting within the course and scope of their duties as United States officers.”

And so, as Olson concluded: “Neither § 960 of the Act, nor any of its other provisions, impose criminal sanctions on the activities carried on by the Central Intelligence Agency and its agents, under the President’s direction, in Nicaragua.”

On pages 34 and 36 of the July 16, 2010 “drone memo,” it is precisely to this conclusion that Barron points to argue that CIA officers involved in a strike against al-Aulaki (and therefore acting within the scope of their duties as US officers) would not be covered by 18 U.S.C. § 956 (a), a federal statute prohibiting murder overseas adopted in 1996 (and which incorporated the older § 960.)

The May 25, 2011 memo makes exactly the same argument: page 18 of this memo is taken verbatim from page 36 of the Barron memo.

Both are completely silent, however, about the historical context of Olson’s memo; completely silent about the fact that the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors was met with near universal condemnation in Washington, including from dyed-in-the-wool Cold Warriors like Goldwater; completely silent about the fact that the Senate immediately adopted a resolution putting an end to any funding of such CIA activities; completely silent about the fact that countless Democrats described these CIA acts as “state-sponsored terrorism;” and, finally, completely silent about the fact that, in July 1986, the International Court of Justice ruled that the US, in laying these mines, had acted in breach of its obligations under customary international law.

Legal analysts have noted that a major worry flowing from the United States’ practice of “targeted killings” is that they may ultimately loosen the international rules that govern the use of force, thereby making everyone, including the American people, less safe.

That the conclusions of the Olson memo could be used, in July 2010 and May 2011, to argue that CIA officers would not be covered by a federal statute prohibiting the murder of an American citizen seems to confirm, yet again, the United States’ inability to discard some of the worst practices of its past.

About Rémi Brulin

Remi Brulin received his PhD at La Sorbonne Nouvelle (Paris) in 2011. His dissertation is a historical analysis of the American discourse on "terrorism," and can be accessed and downloaded here. He has taught at New York University, George Washington University and, currently, at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. You can follow him on Twitter here: @rbrulin.

Other posts by .


Posted In:

2 Responses

  1. DaBakr
    September 10, 2014, 2:36 pm

    duly noted. and especially on the day after suspected IS infiltrator placed bombs in underground bunker and blew up up to 45 military commanders of asst. Syrian jihadi rebel militias in Syria.

  2. pabelmont
    September 11, 2014, 9:53 am

    Just asking: What shall we understand by the claim that the USA was making a “targetted drone attack”? Does it seek to distinguish something else, if so what? Did the USA previously practice “un-targetted” or “random” or “really stupid and wasteful and unlawful” drone attacks? does it seem to distinguish USA’s destructive efforts from thiose of (say) Hamas which are (or are said to be) “shots in the dark”, “un-targetted”?

    I am a bit horrified by the thought, true as it might nevertheless be, that the USA (previously) practiced un-targetted drone attacks.

    Now as to those kids sitting behid joy-sticks in Nevada, say, adn targetting these drone attacks, how “good” (accurate) are they? And how good is the information they base their targetting upon? If an Afghan’s (not too nearby!) neighbor hates him and tells the CIA that he is a terrorist, and a drone-attack results, should we call that attack “targetted”?

Leave a Reply