News

Marc Lynch warns against the U.S. escalation in Syria

The drumbeat to increase American involvement in the war in Syria continues, spurred on by that painful photograph of 5-year-old Omran Daqneesh covered with blood and dirt. Steve Coll, a normally cautious New Yorker reporter, is the latest to join in. He writes,

“[U.S.] aid has helped to keep the rebels in the field but it has not been enough to defeat Assad, or to deter his forces from employing unconscionable tactics, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that this caution has enabled the apparent war crimes of Assad and his allies.”

Marc Lynch is one of the few experts who has over time been proven right about Syria, and his informed warnings must be taken seriously. Lynch, a professor of political science at George Washington University who also tweets as @abuaardvark, recently published The New Arab Wars, one of the best of the recent books about the Mideast. Lynch notes, in sorrow rather than pride, that he “was among the minority of analysts who vocally opposed the militarization of the [Syrian opposition], because I feared precisely the disaster which would soon unfold.”

Marc Lynch
Marc Lynch

Lynch is certainly no apologist for the Assad regime. He reminds us that the original 2011 uprising in Syria was nonviolent, and “involved almost unbelievably heroic popular participation in the face of extreme state violence.” But he is also realistic. He explains that, in contrast to Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the Syrian regime did not become totally isolated:

“Asad retained considerable support among wide sectors of the Syrian citizenry, including not only minority communities but also much of the urban Sunni elites who had benefitted from his rule and feared change.”

Once the Syrian civil war got started, you needed a flow chart to depict the extraordinary complexity of the violence. Here is a rough census of the protagonists: the Assad regime; the Syrian nonviolent opposition; the Syrian armed resistance, divided among jihadist forces, former Syrian military, ISIS; and Hezbollah militias, who crossed over from Lebanon. The outside actors include: the U.S.; Russia; Turkey; Iran; Saudi Arabia; Qatar — all of them supplying arms to one faction or another. By contrast, the warring Balkans in the years leading up to World War 1 were a model of simplicity. Lynch has followed the story closely, and he notes that “the complexities of this debate, mostly in Arabic, were often lost on a Western discourse framed around a simpler story of a united Syrian people against a reviled dictator.”

What’s more, Lynch reminds us that America is already stoking the many-sided conflict with weapons: “The United States remained publicly cautious about arming the insurgents, but rapidly developed a covert program to arm and support vetted rebel groups.” He explains that escalating the violence, especially in a conflict with so many armed actors, can never bring peace, but only promote what he calls “a dynamic stalemate.” He elaborates: “As rebel groups began to take up arms in response to the Asad regime’s brutality, they found ample sources of funds and weapons from abroad to support their insurgency. When they began to demonstrate too much success, Asad’s backers ramped up their own support to the regime.”

Lynch gives President Obama credit for digging in his heels against the more extreme interventionists, some of whom are in his own administration. That could change on January 20, 2017, if the more hawkish Hillary Clinton takes office.

So far, most U.S. interventionists have not called for American troops in large numbers. They insist, against the evidence of the past 5 years, Lynch states, that ratcheting up pressure with no-fly zones and other aggressive measures will force Assad and his patrons to back down. Lynch is (excessively) polite with the hawks, but he does note wryly, “It baffles me that the lesson most of Washington learned from the tribulations of the Libya intervention was that Obama should also have intervened in Syria.”

Among ordinary Americans, that awful photograph of 5-year-old Omran Daqneesh understandably prompted calls for action (although the failure of the West, including the United States, to do more for Syrian refugees is a big part of the problem). For those who ask, What should we do? Lynch’s answer is, First do no harm. American policymakers are supposed to be better informed. They should understand that promoting more violence, even with ostensibly humanitarian intentions, can make a bad situation even worse. After endless wars across the Mideast for what feels like an eternity, the foreign policy establishment should know better. But for many of them, auditioning for a ranking job in the Hillary Clinton administration must be more important.

62 Comments
Most Voted
Newest Oldest
Inline Feedbacks
View all comments

Thanks. We need but won’t get a press corps that could be this straightforward in its analysis of the situation. You acknowledge the brutality of the regime while also pointing out the obvious– outside forces have kept this war going.

In fairness to Coll’s New Yorker piece, he did have a sentence or two about the rebels shelling civilian areas, obviously meaning to sow terror, plus he also mentions the alliance between the ” moderates” and Al Qaeda. But several paragraphs later Coll seems to have forgotten what he had written and regrets that we haven’t supplied the rebels with more weapons in the passage you cited.

As for the foreign policy establishment, they make their living advocating for war. At one time I thought that was a bit simpleminded but that was faux sophistication. There are enthusiastic partisans amongst ordinary people who might swallow the liberal humanitarian argument, but the think tank world provides cushy jobs for people who say we need to spend billions bringing democracy to benighted foreigners.

Marc Lynch is one of the few experts who has over time been proven right about Syria, and his informed warnings must be taken seriously.

not to toot our own horns but lots of mondoweiss commenters have also been proven right about syria (saying this stuff for a long long time even before lynch), which one could easily witness in the long comment thread (100’s) following the highly controversial 2013 article by Ramah Kudaimi we published here title “Do’s and don’ts for progressives discussing Syria” http://mondoweiss.net/2013/08/dos-and-donts-for-progressives-discussing-syria/

well, we might have been proven right if the comment section wasn’t erased that is. this is why our commenter archives are so important. the arguments went on for days supported by many many links and supporting docs.

He explains that, in contrast to Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the Syrian regime did not become totally isolated:

“Asad retained considerable support among wide sectors of the Syrian citizenry, including not only minority communities but also much of the urban Sunni elites who had benefitted from his rule and feared change.”

– See more at: http://mondoweiss.net/2016/09/against-escalation-syria/#comment-854051

i’ve read several times over the years assad’s supported by the majority (over 50%) of the population. i touched on this topic in this march 2013 article i wrote: “In Iraq, and now Syria, US seeks secular outcome by… promoting sectarian division” – See more at: http://mondoweiss.net/2013/03/promoting-sectarian-division/#sthash.b9JT9voy.dpuf

(and here’s the version w/the comment thread btw: http://staging1.mondoweiss.net/2013/03/promoting-sectarian-division)

(bold added)

Let’s listen to Tom Friedman’s recent New York Times op ed about Syria, Caution, Curves Ahead:

There is a strong argument for everyone doing more to end the Syrian civil war before the Syrian state totally collapses and before its sectarian venom and refugees further destabilize Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan…..

Why has he been able to hold on so long? Russian and Iranian military aid certainly help, but so does the support he still enjoys in key communities. Assad’s Alawite minority sect, which has been ruling since 1970 and constitutes 12 percent of Syria’s 22 million population, believes that either they rule or they die at the hands of the country’s Sunni Muslim majority (74 percent). The Syrian Christians, who are 10 percent, and some secular Sunni Muslims, particularly merchants, have also thrown in their lot with Assad, because they believe that either he rules or chaos does. None of them believe the rebels can or will build a stable, secular, multisectarian democracy in Assad’s wake. Why do we think they are wrong?

Some secular Sunni Muslims, eh? How many? Friedman tells us the Syrian Sunni Majority is 74%, the Syrian Alawite community is 12%, and Syrian Christians are 10%. But that hardly explains the basis of Assad’s support. Friedman describes the secular Sunni Muslims who support Assad as “merchants.” Friedman ignores the fact that Syrians, like Iraqis before our invasion, lived, primarily, in a secular society.

Assad’s regime is secular. Saddam was also a secular dictator. The US supports and empowers sectarian actors, while claiming to seek democratic secular results. Why do we do that? Friedman won’t tell you.

– See more at: http://staging1.mondoweiss.net/2013/03/promoting-sectarian-division#sthash.KKODhjwE.dpuf

at the time i thought it was curious that friedman gives us detailed percentages of minorities supporting assad, mentions the sunni majority percentage (74%) and then just skips the percentage of this category of sunni “merchants”. so by the time you add the 12% alawite and 10% christian it really does matter what percentage of sunnis support assad, but he doesn’t tell you. they wouldn’t need all these foreign fighters if the majority of the country wanted to oust assad.

Another good source of actual information on Syria:

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/

A) “The outside actors include: the U.S.; Russia; Turkey; Iran; Saudi Arabia; Qatar …” – See more at: http://mondoweiss.net/2016/09/against-escalation-syria/#sthash.4hMS4Lpn.dpuf

Israel didn’t make the list for providing military and medical support for Nusra/al Qaeda/whatever they’re called now?

B) That photo of the kid is very likely a fake. Are a few hundred thousand MORE human beings now going to die because of a fake photo that reinforces a preconceived notion based on an imperial aim osmotically implanted by endless media cheerleading that is now grudgingly embraced by former “skeptics” thus removing all obstacles to a few hundred thousand MORE dead human beings and the lucky ones living in a fiery hell of our making? The self-enforcing death circle/spiral is as astounding as it is obvious. Even as it plays out in this article.

Fake photo: http://www.moonofalabama.org/2016/08/the-wounded-boy-in-orange-seat-another-staged-white-helmets-stunt.html

C) I hate to use a movie cliché to sum it up, but that’s where we’re cartoonishly at on this intervention death-cult sickness – grudging or otherwise: “The only way to win is not to play.” Period. That’s the starting point and the ending point. The “anti-Nike” motto: “Just DON’T do it!”

There were and ARE ways to get rid of Assad (if that’s the honest objective) without turning the lives of 25M human beings into a hellish mess. Apparently it is NOT the honest objective because we did not (and are not) pursuing those diplomatic/non-violent methods. So using Assad as a rationale for death and destruction is the sign of either a dupe or a naif.

D) Democracy (or just stable and/or consensual political institutions) has to be organically developed. Without that organic basis the inevitable result of intervention and destabilization is a worse outcome. Rule #1. Failure to heed this rule results in an argument – witting or unwitting – FOR the worse outcome.

E) The principal, long-term, and perhaps unrecoverable disaster of this election is that voters who would normally oppose Clinton’s perpetual war fetish/freak are now going to vote FOR that option. Again, no more obstacles to killing anybody any time for any reason in any quantity. The cost to the planet (and the US) will be extreme and enduring.

I hope I’m very wrong.