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Total number of comments: 41 (since 2011-09-26 01:03:21)

emanresu

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  • Jewish substitution and the white gaze
    • emanresu February 8, 2012 at 4:30 pm

      In light of the reaction I elicited, I am sorry to admit that, yes, it was facetious.

    • emanresu February 8, 2012 at 3:57 am with 19 replies

      Actually, it is no problem for me that Zionism did not have the exclusive or superior claim to the land, annani. There are many colonial-settler states in the world, including my own.

      But how can you live with yourself? Don't you know that I adhere to the following rule: each taunting comment directed at me on MW results in my buying a container of Sabra hummus? And I don't even like the stuff.

    • emanresu February 7, 2012 at 8:25 pm

      Possibly, but in practice, the work of individual professionals and cultural workers is deeply intertwined with state-affiliated institutions for the basic reason that such institutions are a primary funding source. It is hard for me to determine-- in practice, maybe not in theory--who is exempt from the boycott's "general overriding rule," that I quoted below--especially since the rule specifies guilt through silence, and guilt until proven otherwise.

      I am a public sector employee, as I noted. My agency has received grants from the Department of Homeland Security, as I noted. Would a PD conference, sponsored by my agency, be an approprate target for a BDS campaign against American war crimes? How about a conference on water desalinization or the development of medicine, sponsored by a state-funded University? How about a ballet performance, where half the troupe are peaceniks, but that is funded by a grant from the National Endowment for the Arts? (I believe that the NEA refers to "civic pride" in its mission statement--is that "whitewashing" or "diverting attention."?) How about boycotting the internet--a product, largely, of the US military? I am unwilling to participate in imposing punitive measures on Israelis that I would not impose on citizens of my own country.

      I do want to make clear, however, in case these sound like the words of an apologist, that I really am appalled by the occupation, the settlements, the recent Gaza horror show, and the use of the alleged security wall to illegally confiscate Palestinian land. As I said, I would be hard-pressed to oppose a reasonable "D" or "S" proposal.

    • emanresu February 7, 2012 at 4:56 pm

      ". . . cases of age-related cerebral deficiency."

      Are you dissing Phil Weiss's mom?

    • emanresu February 7, 2012 at 4:25 pm

      From your third link:

      "Before discussing the various categories of cultural products and events and as a general overriding rule, virtually all Israeli cultural institutions, unless proven otherwise, are complicit in maintaining the Israeli occupation and denial of basic Palestinian rights, whether through their silence or actual involvement in justifying, whitewashing or otherwise deliberately diverting attention from Israel’s violations of international law and human rights. Accordingly, these institutions (mainly major state and public entities), all their products, and all the events they sponsor or support must be boycotted."

      It seems to me, and I could be wrong, that the "sponsor or support" phrase encompasses those who draws grants or salaries from the public sector. I note that the guidelines apply the standard of "complicit until proven otherwise," which an inversion of the traditional burden of proof, and a guilt-through-silence phrase, which is an inversion of the ancient common law rule.

    • emanresu February 7, 2012 at 3:52 pm

      delete "non-Jewish Israelis," substitute "non-Israeli Jews."

    • emanresu February 7, 2012 at 3:23 pm with 3 replies

      I know, Shmuel, it is restricted to scholars and artists who receive grants or salaries from the Israeli government.

      That distinction does not persuade me. As a public defender, my whole salary comes from the government. Even though I am not a federal employee, my office has received grants from the federal govt., including the Department of Homeland Security. Should I, therefore, be boycotted by persons protesting US government policies? I don't think so--the connection between my work and the criminal conduct of the US government is too attenuated.

      P.S.: Disagreement aside, I appreciate your comments and they are a major reason for my occasional visits to the MW comments section.

    • emanresu February 7, 2012 at 3:07 pm with 5 replies

      Three negatives in one sentence, you've got me a little confused too!

      IMO, participating in a cultural boycott does not acknowledge a cultural connection but, rather, severs it. I am not prepared to do that. I also think that if non-Jewish Israelis participate in a cultural boycott, it will reduce our effectiveness in trying to persuade from within.

    • emanresu February 7, 2012 at 2:29 pm with 93 replies

      Beautifully written, Phil Weiss!

      I, personally, will not join the “B” in “BDS.” I feel that non-Israeli Jewish individuals can be most helpful if we acknowledge a cultural connection to the Jews of Israel, though making it clear that we have zero political loyalty to the government of Israel, and try to persuade from within. I would not boycott a distant family member if he or she were behaving disgracefully. And boycotting scholars and artists just because they are Israeli would feel that way to me.

      I would be very receptive, however, to supporting “D” and “S,” proposals, until the occupation ends and the settlements are dismantled.

  • The Ron Paul moment-- bad and good
    • emanresu December 22, 2011 at 6:51 pm with 7 replies

      Why can't an ordinary liberal, moderate, or conservative politician advocate an end to imperial wars? Why must this honorable position be advanced by a libertarian mad hatter who wants to end social security, medicare, medicaid, federal R&D spending, aid to the states, national parks, food stamps, FDA, EPA, and OSHA?

      I will not vote for Paul. A four year halt to U.S. imperialism is not worth the destruction of American society, at least not to me.

  • 'If we lived in any other country we'd be honored for this work' -prisoner Ghassan Elashi of Holy Land Foundation
    • emanresu December 14, 2011 at 8:32 pm

      I am no sympathizer with Hamas politics or tactics. However, the Court’s treatment of the defendants’ Confrontation Clause argument seems shallow and problematic.

      First, any analysis has to begin with the fact that the Supreme Court has expressed strong disapproval of pseudonymous testimony. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968) (“[W]hen the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth through cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is. . . .The witness' name. . . open[s] countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.”) Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated the right of the accused to be brought face-to-face with his or her accuser as secondary to his or her right of cross-examination. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990).

      Second, though witness safety is a recognized basis for permitting pseudonymous testimony, I think that it is fair to draw a distinction between an occurrence witness, who has no choice but to testify, and an expert witness, who does have a choice and who, moreover, usually receives compensation for his or her time and expertise.

      I do not doubt that Hamas encourages the targeting of witnesses against them, as the Court found. However, I feel that society has a right to impose special risks on military officers, soldiers, and police officers– and that that burden should be reflected in the balancing test between witness safety and the need for meaningful cross-examination.

      Third, it was troubling that, though Court invoked national security in upholding the use pseudonymous expert testimony, it did not indicate that disclosure of the experts’ identities would compromise the sources and methods of U.S. or, indeed, of Israeli, law enforcement. The Court merely noted that the names were classified.

      In my opinion, in the context of expert witnesses, a straight-up balancing test between the defendants’ interest in obtaining the names and the Government’s need to keep the names secret fails to embody the concerns expressed in Smith. The Government should bear the burden of showing the necessity of nondisclosure by at least clear-and-convincing evidence and, also, of showing why no non-pseudonymous expert can be substituted.

      I think there is a fair chance that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in this case. The U.S. Supreme Court’s conservative majority is quite protective of the Confrontation Clause due to its taste for original intent analysis. (There were few statutory or judicially recognized restrictions to the right of confrontation in 1789).

  • Israel isn't good for the Jews anymore
    • emanresu December 11, 2011 at 5:32 am

      And I keep on telling you to address the point I made, because I honestly do not know whether you agree or disagree. I said, and now say again: “As political rhetoric, claims of “treason” are merely toxic, having been used effectively by Senator McCarthy and his imitators to tar and to intimidate advocates of progressive and antiwar causes."

      I also said, and say again, that the fact that an Israeli politician praised McCarthy it is irrelevant to my point (and to me, personally). Kapish?

    • emanresu December 11, 2011 at 12:20 am

      The Lindh case was not a treason case, and is distinguishable on other grounds as well.

      First, and contrary to your post, the prosecution, in the Lindh case, did not cite Bush's post-911 declaration of a state of emergency but, rather, President Clinton's pre-911 Executive Order 13129, which specifically and unambiguously named the Taliban: See link to justice.gov
      ("On July 4, 1999, President of the United States William J. Clinton declared a national emergency to deal with the threat posed by al Qaeda and the Taliban. In his Executive Order 13129, the President prohibited, among other things, the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of the Taliban.") This was clear notice of the conduct forbidden by law.

      Second, Lindh was never charged, let alone convicted, of treason. He was convicted of supplying arms to the Taliban under 50 U.S.C. § 1705. Clinton's prior declaration constituted notice under 50 U.S.C. § 1701 and § 1702 which grants the President rather frightening powers "if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat." See 50 U.S.C. § 1701. (Lindh was also convicted of carrying an explosive in commission of a felony).

      Third, Lindh pleaded guilty, thereby waiving his appellate rights. Since there is no appellate decision affirming his conviction, the case has limited precedential value.

    • emanresu December 10, 2011 at 9:56 pm

      I said "or" in most of my previous posts. That "and" in my last post was not a misinterpretation, simply a misprint.

      A treason prosecution against a civilian defendant, entitled to the full panoply of due process rights, is a different matter than the court-martial of a soldier under the UCMJ. At the core of procedural due process is the requirement of "notice"-- that a citizen be given fair notice that the contemplated conduct is forbidden by law.

      I ask again: how can the US assert in a treason prosecution, with the burden of proof on the government, that a defendant has received adequate notice that he or she has adhered to and aided and abetted an "enemy," when the country aided and abetted by that defendant was considered to be ally by the President and by Congress at the time of the defendant's conduct?

      Since courts are guided by precedent or, as a non-lawyer might put it: "Courts decide the law," I ask that you cite to a single treason case under the Constitution under remotely similar circumstances to what you assert to be treason-- namely "actively prevent[ing] formal investigations" of attacks by a country "on ships of neutral or friendly states." (where, moreover, the country launching the attacks was considered to to be an ally by the US government at the time of the attacks and afterwards). Mind you: we are talking about the offense of treason, not any other alleged crime.

      You might also consider and address the implications of your analysis: that treason prosecutions against anti-war activists during wartime would have considerably more merit than prosecutions against persons who “have actively prevented formal investigations” of attacks [by Israel, on ships of neutral or friendly states], after the fact.

    • emanresu December 10, 2011 at 1:57 pm

      I said, and I repeat: "As political rhetoric, claims of “treason” are merely toxic, having been used effectively by Senator McCarthy and his imitators to tar and to intimidate advocates of progressive and antiwar causes."

      Do you agree or disagree with that statement? I honestly can't tell because you just respond with gibberish ("Psst, Manny, ix-nay on the oMc-arthy-nay! "), a non sequitur about your tribal loyalty, and I suppose, the implication that it means something to me that an Israeli politican praised Mccarthy (it does not).

      Return to my original statement, which you quoted and italicized. Do you agree or disagree?

    • emanresu December 9, 2011 at 10:28 pm

      "You originally claimed that supporters of Israel cannot be convicted of treason, but that’s simply not the case. Now you’re claiming that the entity waging war on the United States has to be another State."

      Of course, I never said either of those things. I referred to the elements the offense of treason under the Constitution and the US Code, which requires levying war against the US or adhering to, and providing aid and comfort to US enemies. I said that those elements are not met in the case of (as you put it): "people who have actively prevented formal investigations of those attacks [by Israel, on ships of neutral or friendly states]."

      First, you make the claim that a particular country can be an enemy for the purposes of a treason prosecution, even if they are not designated as an enemy or a belligerent by either Presidential decree or congressional resolution, let alone by Congressional declaration of war. I challenge you to cite a single treason case that occurred under those circumstances. It seems to me that any defendant charged with treason under those circumstances has a dead-bang due process argument that he or she was not given adequate notice of the conduct forbidden under the law.

      Second, you claim that a cover-up can constitute "levying war" even if the coverup took place after the "war" (that was never announced by the government) against an enemy (who was never designated an enemy by the government) was over. Again, I challenge you to cite a single treason case under those circumstances. And, again, the defendant would have a due process argument that he was not given notice of the conduct forbidden by law.

      Third, though you rely on the Geneva Convention and Art VI in your analysis, any 1L knows that treaties are subordinate to the US Constitution, and have the status of federal statutory law. That is what is meant by "Supreme Law of the Land."

      Fourth, other than to make the striking point that "Courts decide what the law is," you do not address the accurate implication of your analysis-- that treason prosecutions against anti-Vietnam war protestors would have had considerably more merit than prosecutions against persons who “have actively prevented formal investigations” of attacks [by Israel, on ships of neutral or friendly states] since there is no question that an armed conflict existed between the US and North Vietnam. So, too, would treason prosecutions of antiwar activists if there is a US attack on Iran. Your analysis would bring a smile to the face of John Yoo.

      Fifth, you point out that courts "have allowed people to be arrested and detained indefinitely as either privileged or unprivileged enemy belligerents." True enough, and horrible, but that has nothing to with treason prosecutions under the US Constitution. The enemy combatant cases generally involve non-US citizens on non US-soil--i.e. persons who have no Constitutional due process rights-- only the very limited rights accorded them under Constitutional or statutory habeas.

    • emanresu December 9, 2011 at 5:10 am

      I appreciate that you went to the trouble to find a definition rather than make one up, yourstruly, but you went to the wrong source. The elements of the offense of treason are set forth in U.S. Const., Art III, and in 18 USC 115 § 2381, not in the free dictionary online.

      You write: “seeing how a right-wing activist supreme court can stretch the constitution so as to permit the government to kill u.s. citizens outside america's borders, what's to prevent a different supreme court from doing a little stretching of its own on just what constitutes treason?”

      I actually have a few comments on that terrible case, Al-Aulaqi v Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), the extrajudicial killing case, before I answer your question. First, It was not a US Supreme Court case, it was a US District Court case. Second, the Court dismissed the suit on the basis of standing, holding that the father of the citizen allegedly targeted for future killing in Yemen lacked third party standing to obtain injunctive relief. A terrible case, but not quite (yet) authoritative law from SCOTUS that US citizens outside national borders have no constitutional protection against a “targeted killing” by the executive branch. Third, unfortunate as it is to say, it was the plaintiff doing the “stretching,” as Courts have traditionally used the political questions doctrine to refuse to intervene in the President’s conduct of US foreign policy, outside the contexts of habeas corpus and takings claims.

      You ask why, in light of Al-Aulaqi, what is to prevent a different Supreme Court from “doing a little stretching” to permit previously impermissible treason prosecutions. If that is indeed what you advocate, it should repel anybody who believes in the rule of law. Let me remind you, again, that if the political ball bounces in a certain direction, the cry of treason may be raised against Palestinian solidarity activists, Arab-Americans, or Muslims. And, who knows, yourstruly, those who raise that cry might cite your “a little stretching” concept in favor of such treason prosecutions.

    • emanresu December 9, 2011 at 5:02 am

      You say: "The Constitution doesn’t define the term war, any armed conflict involving the use of the uniformed military of a foreign state is certainly sufficient."

      I don't think so. Not without a Presidential or Congressional declaration that an armed conflict between the US and another power actually exists.

      You say: "if Israel has committed illegal acts against the United States during an armed conflict in the past, then any citizen who has assisted them before, during, or after the fact could be prosecuted for treason."

      Treason consists of levying war against the US, or adhering to an enemy of the US plus providing aid and comfort. If the US Government does not deem Israel to be an enemy, then assisting it can hardly be treason. especially "after the fact," i.e. after the armed conflict (that was never declared) has ended.

      I note that, under your own argument, treason prosecutions against anti-Vietnam war protestors would have had considerably more merit than prosecutions against persons who "have actively prevented formal investigations" of attacks [by Israel, on ships of neutral or friendly states] since there is no question that an armed conflict existed between the US and North Vietnam. Do you join with the extreme right-wing in regretting that no such prosecutions took place? Do you call for such prosections now (there being no statute of limitations on treason)?

      You say: "On a couple of occasions the government and the courts here have concluded that individuals and organizations have conducted espionage against the United States on behalf of the State of Israel. The United States government has spied on the Israeli Embassy in Washington. Either government could decide that those activities amount to a casus belli."

      It surprises me that you say that. If spying is regarded as a "casus belli," then we might as well prepare for World War 3 tomorrow, since most governments engage in spying on other governents. I believe that Article 51 of the UN Charter restricts legal justification for war to defense against imminent or ongoing attacks and to uses of force that have been authorized by Security Council Resolution.

    • emanresu December 9, 2011 at 1:42 am

      Every word in that post is irrelevant to the question you posed earlier, and that I answered, namely: "What would prevent the people who have actively prevented formal investigations of those attacks [by Israel, on ships of neutral or friendly states] from being investigated and convicted of treason?"

    • emanresu December 8, 2011 at 7:23 pm

      The US Constitution not only defines, but also restricts the definition of treason to the one set forth in the US Code. As the definitions set forth in U.S. Const., Art III, Sec. 3 and 18 USC 115 § 2381 are identical, either may be cited. This point must surely displease "American," who has "long said" that the definition of treason needs to be expanded. What he really favors is changing the Constitution.

      You ask what would prevent treason convictions of "people who have actively prevented formal investigations," of Israeli attacks on ships of friendly or neutral states.

      I took a gander at WestNext and could find no caselaw to suggest that any behavior approximating what you have described constitutes either levying war or adhering to US enemies. I note that much of the caselaw is quite archaic because, fortunately, there have been relatively few treason cases and none since 1951. However, a case still cited favorably in the most recent Supreme Court cases dealing with treason, even though it comes from a Vermont circuit court in 1808, explained that "no consultation or conspiracy to subvert the government or laws, however atrocious the offense, can amount to treason." U.S. v. Hoxie, C.C.Vt.1808, 26 F.Cas. 397, No. 15407a

    • emanresu December 8, 2011 at 5:03 pm

      “...whatever the legal definition, treason, traitor, treachery, these words fit them to a t.”-yourstruly.

      Sounds like you think we should disregard or discard the actual legal definition in so far as it conflicts with the definition that comes from your own personal dreamworld. You should have chosen the screen name “Humpty Dumpty,” who said: “When I use a word. . .it means just what I choose it to mean.”

    • emanresu December 8, 2011 at 12:35 am with 25 replies

      I notice that the word “treason” features prominently in your gibberish, yourstruly.

      As political rhetoric, claims of “treason” are merely toxic, having been used effectively by Senator McCarthy and his imitators to tar and to intimidate advocates of progressive and antiwar causes. You may think it is fine to shout treason at advocates of a nonprogressive cause--but consider that, if the political ball bounces in a certain direction, the accusation of treason will be leveled against American Palestine solidarity activists.

      As law of course, your claims of “treason” are simply wrong. Treason is a wartime crime, and we are not at war with Israel. Consequently, American fans of the Israeli government– of whom I am not one– cannot be convicted of treason. It might be instructive for you to consult the actual definition of treason, provided in the US Code, and quoted below, rather than consulting the definition that comes from your personal dreamworld.

      "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason." 18 USC 115 § 2381

  • Marcus warns, US Jews could abandon Israel over treatment of women (ixnay about alestiniansPay)
    • emanresu December 5, 2011 at 4:33 am

      No, Senator Lieberman's wife is not the head of Hadassah in the US. Her first name is Hadassah.

      Just a minor correction. Now back to the regularly-scheduled exposition of the traitorous Judeo-Zio stranglehold on Congress, the media, Hollywood, the financial sector, and the legal profession-- and the clear involvement of this massive fifth column in the 911 false flag operation and the assassination of JFK and RFK.

  • 'Segregated country': Israel envisions Orthodox-Jewish-only 'cities' in Palestinian area
    • emanresu November 25, 2011 at 11:05 pm

      They cannot equitably claim both, but they can be equitably compensated for both. If a person loses two homes, he or she ought to be compensated for both, not just one.

      I would hardly say that the Choctaw and Cherokee willingly and voluntarily exchanged their vast ancestral homelands in Mississippi and Alabama for much less valuable and spacious land in Arkansas (which, also, forced them to undergo the Trail of Tears, which killed thousands), especially since the US government made its intention to commit ethnic cleansing clear in the run-up to and passage of the Indian Removal Act (1830).

      You say that I have provided no evidence that 80 million dollars compensation was insufficient for the riverbed. However, the factual findings by Congress, to which you link, provided no evidence either, yet cap any potential compensation at 80 million dollars. If the goal was to adequately compensate claimants, there would have been a prior determination of fair market value by a neutral factfinder and no cap.

    • emanresu November 25, 2011 at 3:37 pm

      Choctaw Nation v Oklahoma, 397 U.S.620 (1970) did enforce treaty agreements which granted to the Choctaw and Cherokee portions of the bed of the Arkansas River, an area that these tribes actually inhabited when the case was decided. It did not address the question of title or compensation for the lands seized– or from complete expulsion of these tribes– from their historic homelands in Mississippi and Georgia. Consequently, I do not think it would win Ward Churchill’s applause, nor do I think it provides basis to distinguish US colonial-settler behavior from its Israeli equivalent.

      You link to 25 US § 1779 (eff. 2002) (authorizing the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chicasaw Claims settlements, there were other Claims settlement provisions for other tribes), but only to the prefactory findings by Congress. (§ 1779). Read further and discover that the true purpose of the provision is to extinguish tribal claims in exchange for (meager) payments. (§ 1779a-f). Note also: as in Choctaw Nation, we are talking about disputes in regards to the land to which the tribes had been moved, not disputes as their original homelands. Here are some of the highlights of § 1779 :

      * “The purposes of this subchapter are to resolve all claims that have been or could have been brought by the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations against the United States, and to confirm that the Indian Nations are forever disclaiming any right, title, or interest in the Disclaimed Drybed Lands, which are contiguous to the channel of the Arkansas River as of the date of the enactment of this subchapter in certain townships in eastern Oklahoma.” (§ 1779a)

      * Pursuant to their respective tribal resolutions, and in exchange for the benefits conferred under this subchapter, the Indian Nations shall, on the date of enactment of this subchapter, enter into a consent decree with the United States that waives, releases, and dismisses all the claims they have asserted or could have asserted in their cases. . . pending in the United States Court of Federal Claims against the United States, including but not limited to claims arising out of any and all of the Indian Nations' interests in the Disclaimed Drybed Lands and arising out of construction, maintenance and operation of the McClellan-Kerr Navigation Way. 25 US § 1779c(a).

      * The total settlement authorized for Cherokee, Choctaw,and Chkickaw claims was 80 million dollars. § 1779c(c).

      * [I]f any party other than a claimant tribe holds transferred interests in or to the Disclaimed Drybed Lands in violation of section 177 of Title 25, Congress approves and ratifies those transfers of interests. §1779f.

    • emanresu November 25, 2011 at 12:14 am

      It surprises me that you use the Indian Claims Commission (1946-1978) to distinguish US colonial-settler behavior from its Israeli equivalent. I think that the State of Israel would be perfectly happy to settle Palestinian claims according to that dubious precedent, wherein:

      * The USA assigned to itself, rather than a neutral party, the decision of whether to grant a claim and how much to pay. Moreover, payment was calculated in terms of the land’s value at the time it was taken, irrespective of any increase in the land’s value or the value of any minerals or oil extracted from the land in the intervening time.

      * The Claims Commission was permitted to offset awards by subtracting money expended by the government on police and other public services to the native claimants.

      * The Claims Commission was under no circumstances permitted to return the claimants' land itself.

      * One of the purposes of the Claims Commission was to clear title to the 35 percent of the continental US that had never even been formally seized from the native inhabitants by “treaty,” but which the US nevertheless claimed as public land.

      * The Claims Commission paid out about 800 million dollars before it closed up shop in 1978–not a bad price for the theft of a continent.

      (See Ward Churchill, Acts of Rebellion: Ward Churchill Reader).

  • Racism toward Arabs is what unifies the Zionist right, says JJ Goldberg, liberal Zionist
    • emanresu October 29, 2011 at 2:47 pm

      Of course, I have never supported Israel's "intransigence vis-a vis- a mideast peace accord." Are false assertions and insinuations a part of that lovely forthcoming Utopia that you anticipate*?

      However, I am an anti-McCarthyite, meaning that I oppose reckless accusations of "treason" even if I do not like the persons or platfrom against whom the accusation is being leveled. You need to read the definition of treason from the US Code, provided to you in my previous comment, rather than consulting the definition that comes from your own imagination. Does the behavior of US supporters of Israeli "intransigence vis-a vis- a mideast peace accord" meet that definition? I think not.

      * as in I am you, you are me, and all that blather.

    • emanresu October 29, 2011 at 12:04 pm

      "Working on behalf of another nation to the detriment of one's one" is not treasonous. That comes from a definition you* imagined or dreamed up.

      Treason is where one who owes allegience to the USA levies war against it or adheres to its enemies, or gives its enemies aid and comfort within the United States. See 18 USC 115 § 2381.

      And the "you are i, i am you" ect"? That is gibberish.

      *you as in you.

    • emanresu October 28, 2011 at 7:14 pm

      what is, or can be, foreign or treasonous when all is one*?
      *one, as in one equals one, meaning me&u, but less than two, such as all for one and one for all, ever-togethering up freedom's majestic heights, as in the you are i, i am you, we are one, ect.

  • Americans who support Palestinian cause must be willing to lose friends
  • Don't just stand there, let's get to it, strike a pose, there's nothing to it
    • emanresu October 18, 2011 at 10:36 pm with 1 replies

      I remember Gus Savage. No doubt he was hurt politically by campaign contributions to his primary opponent in 1992 by pro-Israel groups. He was also hurt by his own antics, which included trying to rape a Peace Corps volunteer in Zaire, and referring to the reporters covering him as “racists,” “race-traitors,” and “faggots.”

      I can’t speak to California politics, but in Illinois the decisive factor in Findley’s defeat was his support for Reaganomics during the brutal recession of ‘82. The decisive factor in Savage’s defeat, ten years later, was his own antics.

      Maybe I am naive, but I do not see the hidden hand of Jewry behind every electoral defeat, just as I do not see the hidden hand of Jewry in the Great Recession, 911, or the Kennedy assassinations.

    • emanresu October 18, 2011 at 11:00 am with 3 replies

      Can't speak for the others, but the main reason Findley lost was because he defended Reaganomics in the depth of the '82 recession in a strong union district. Findley's challenger, Dick Durbin, raised a lot of money from pro-Israel groups, that is true. However, Findley countered by raising a lot of money from pro-Arab groups. The two candidates were about equally matched in funding, as I recall. Findley would have won had he dared to speak out against Reaganomics.

  • Irvine 11 conviction reveals double standard and bias
    • emanresu October 13, 2011 at 4:12 am

      Though mushed together for rhetorical purposes, the original post presents two separate claims on behalf of the Irvine 11: free speech violation and selective prosecution. I address the latter.

      a. The New Orleans and Irvine protestors were not similarly situated. The New Orleans prosecutor lacked the meeting disruption statute that the D.A. in Irvine utilized to prosecute the Irvine 11.

      b. Even if you could find some local protest that was not prosecuted, a selective prosecution claim would be difficult given the applicable principles and the evidentiary burden. Prosecutors are given broad discretion in deciding against whom to focus limited prosecutorial resources, and a strong presumption of regularity supports those decisions. "Defendants bear a demanding burden when seeking to establish that they are being selectively prosecuted in an unconstitutional manner. In order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present clear evidence to the contrary.” U.S. v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000).

      c. Here there is no clear evidence, only conjecture. The Irvine 11 prosecutor could have exercised his discretion based on the number of people involved in this disruption, or on the frequency and severity of the disruption, or on the warnings from the University that the defendants chose to disregard.

    • emanresu October 11, 2011 at 10:48 pm

      1. Your statement that “foreign propagandists” have no free speech rights is false and irrelevant.

      2. It is false because the Supreme Court has recognized that “all persons” are accorded free speech rights. See e.g. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (“(F]reedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment. . . against abridgment by the United States is similarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth against abridgment by a state.”) "All persons" includes spokespersons or ambassadors (“foreign propagandists,” if you prefer). It includes the Irvine 11. It includes you and me. It includes neo-Nazis in full Nazi regalia.

      3. It is irrelevant because your characterization of Oren, even if accurate, has no bearing on the free speech issue in this case. What is at issue is the constitutionality of the particular state statute under which the Irvine 11 were prosecuted.

      4a There is a well-established analytical framework for reviewing free speech challenges to particular state statutes. If the restriction is content-based, the standard is strict scrutiny: Under strict scrutiny, the statute must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest and is presumptively invalid.

      4b. If the restriction is content-neutral, the standard is intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication

      5. There is more to be said about analyzing the statute under these tests, and about analogous caselaw. However, appellate counsel will have to argue for reversal within the established framework. He or she cannot just assert a false and irrelevant principle that sounded good on the internet. “No time for research” is an admonition you should take to heart in this instance.

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  • Harvard students: 'The decision to criminalize the Irvine 11 for their courageous action is an attack on all people who seek peace and justice in Israel/Palestine.'
    • emanresu September 28, 2011 at 8:53 pm

      1. As to the constitutionality of the statute: I have been assuming that the statute the defendants were convicted under was a content-based speech restriction, and subject to a strict scrutiny/ compelling state interest analysis.

      2a. It is likely, however, that the reviewing courts will find that the statute was content-neutral, like a noise ordinance, and therefore subject to a much more deferential standard of review. Such a reading would be consistent with the California Court of Appeals’s description of the statute in McMahon v. Albany Unified School Dist., 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 184, 189 (2002) (“Penal Code section 403 authorizes an arrest by citizens or police officers only when a person’s...activity itself—and not the content of the activity's expression—substantially impairs the effective conduct of the meeting). It would also be consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Frisby v. Schulz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute banning picketing in public streets near private residences).

      2b. Content-neutral speech restrictions may be upheld where narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. See Frisby v. Schulz, 487 U.S. at 481. Note: significant state interest, rather than compelling state interest.

      3. That said, having looked more carefully at content-based/ compelling state interest cases, I now agree that, if the federal courts do find this statute to be a content-based restriction on free speech, it will be deemed presumptively invalid and probably go down. However, as noted, the California Court of Appeals has found the law to be content-neutral.

      4. I do not think that the Courts will find the statute overbroad in light of the restriction read into it by the California Supreme Court in In Re Kay, 464 P.2d at 943 (“To effectuate section 403 within constitutional limits we interpret it to require the following showing to establish its transgression: that the defendant substantially impaired the conduct of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man should have known.”)

      5a. Aside from the issues in the criminal appeal, you refer to a possible civil action ("filing legal complaints") against the University. You are less than clear as to the cause of action, but I will assume you mean a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 because I cannot think of anything else that could possibly fit. The elements of a 1983 civil rights action are as follows: To establish a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must prove that (1) a person, (2) acting under color of state law, (3) deprived the plaintiff of a federal right. Notably, by the way, government officials have qualified immunity under § 1983, but I will leave that aside.

      5b. In my opinion, the only prospect for a successful lawsuit under this statute is if the plaintiffs establish that they were singled-out for University discipline because of their religion. I know there are suspicions and conjecture, but the plaintiffs will need proof. As noted, there are plenty of potentially valid and plausible ways to distinguish this protest from others (for instance, security considerations flowing from a speech like this or the length and frequency of the disruptions).

      5c. You suggestion that the students might have some cause of action against the University for inviting a speaker who advocates positions contrary to customary international law (your fighting words theory) is nonsense. First, what federal right did the Irvine 11 lose by virtue of Oren’s speech?-- a speech that they, moreover, attended voluntarily. Second, Oren’s speech did not target individuals, but addressed policy, and so does not fall within California’s definition of fighting words, or any definition of fighting words. It may be fighting words to assert: “You are a n----r”; it is not fighting words to say “Let's support apartheid.”

    • emanresu September 28, 2011 at 4:41 am with 1 replies

      1. "Compelling state interest" has nothing to do with the value of Oren's speech, as you or others perceive it. "Compelling state interest" is part of the analytical framework for reviewing the constitutionality of a statute that inhibits speech. The other part is that the statute inhibiting speech must be narrowly tailored to meet that compelling state interest.

      2. The California Supreme Court has found a compelling state interest in prohibiting the disruption of meetings. See In Re Kay, 464 P.2d 930 (1970) (“Freedom of everyone to talk at once can destroy the right of anyone effectively to talk at all. Free expression can expire as tragically in the tumult of license as in the silence of censorship”). The more interesting question is whether the statute was narrowly tailored to meet that compelling state interest, or whether it was overbroad. California has found the statute to be constitutional, but (I think) the federal courts have yet to do so.

      3. Constitutionality aside, there is an issue of whether the statute was properly applied in this case. In upholding the constitutionality of this statute as "narrowly tailored," the Supreme Court of California has imposed this requirement: the defendant[s] must “substantially impair[ ] the conduct of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man should have known.” In re Kay, 464 P.2d at 943.

      4. I think, without being certain, that this "customs and usage" language overlaps with your complaint about "target group." If it was the custom and usage of UC Irvine to permit this kind of disruption-- under these kinds of conditions-- then the convictions should be reversed.

      5. Appellate counsel will have to argue for reversal of the defendants' convictions under the standards that I have described. They cannot just mix and mash phrases as they please-- for instance, by taking concepts like "compelling state interest" or "fighting words" and using them in contexts where they have never been used before.

    • emanresu September 28, 2011 at 2:48 am with 1 replies

      1. I don't think the district attorney's behavior tells us anything about the fairness of the law itself. Maybe it tells us something about the fairness of the district attorney-- but that is a matter of conjecture.

      2. The law, not on its face, but according to the California Supreme Court's restrictive interpretration, recognizes that to "disturb" a meeting, the defendant[s] must "substantially impair[ ] the conduct of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man should have known." In re Kay, 464 P.2d 930, 943 (1970).

      3. The experience of JVP and previous unpunished protests at the University is relevant to the question of customs and usage, and that will be the basis of the Irvine 11's appeal, at least in the state courts. From what I have gleaned, trial counsel in this case did a good job in introducing evidence at trial that the "customs" and "usage" at UC Irvine favor raucous debate.

      4. However, I think the State will prevail in its argument that the defendants' behavior violated the "implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance of the meeting". First, because the University itself evidently issued constant warnings that disruptions would not be tolerated and then harshly sanctioned those disruptions afterwards. Second, because of the evident security considerations that flow from a speech like this. And, third, because of the frequency of the interruptions and the number of people involved.

    • emanresu September 27, 2011 at 10:47 pm

      I appreciate your response, since I figured that I was too late for this debate, but I think your analysis is flawed.

      1. Strict scrutiny is indeed the standard of review for statutes that restrict free speech (though not for the charging decisions of particular attorney generals). Strict scrutiny means that the statute must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.

      2. There is a recognized compelling state interest in prohibiting disruptions of meetings, given the potentially chilling effect of those disruptions on debate and advocacy. See In Re Kay, 464 P.2d 930 (1970) (“Freedom of everyone to talk at once can destroy the right of anyone effectively to talk at all. Free expression can expire as tragically in the tumult of license as in the silence of censorship”).

      3. The “narrowly tailored” element is more problematic. What does it mean to “disturb” a meeting? Wave a flag? Ask a tough question? Chant? In order to uphold the constitutionality of the statute, the Supreme Court of California has provided the following restrictive interpretation. “To effectuate section 403 within constitutional limits we interpret it to require the following showing to establish its transgression: that the defendant substantially impaired the conduct of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man should have known”. Kay at 943.

      4. In the California reviewing courts, the Irvine 11's appeal will turn on the question of customs and usage. However, it will not help their case that the University itself imposed a harsh disciplinary sanction, which is evidence that the disruption was a violation of the University's customs and usage.

      5a. For the sake of the Irvine 11, I hope their appellate counsel steers clear of your theory that meetings may be disrupted if the speaker advocates a position contrary to customary international law. Oren was speaking by invitation at a state university. There was nothing unlawful about the meeting.

      5b. Your related “fighting words” theory is even more far-fetched. First, the “fighting words” prohibition itself is probably unconstitutional (note: the Westboro Church decision). Second, Oren’s words, however objectionable, were not directed at any particular person. (Fighting words may be: "You are a n----r, but not "Let's support apartheid.") Third, "fighting words" can hardly apply where the “victims” sought out the speaker–i.e. by voluntarily attending his lecture .

      6. In the federal courts, one may expect a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statue as not being narrowly tailored, i.e. overbroad. There is also a related due process argument– the statute did not provide clear “notice” of the type of conduct prohibited.

    • emanresu September 26, 2011 at 8:35 pm with 5 replies

      The Harvard kids might view the disruption of Oren's speech as admirable civil disobedience, but the claim that the disruption was constitutionally protected is baseless, at least as far as I can see.

      1. Wilfully disturbing any assembly or meeting is a misdemeanor under California state law.

      2. The First Amendment to the US Constitution has never been interpreted to encompass the “heckler's veto.

      3. The District Attorney has wide discretion in deciding which cases to prosecute and which not.

      4. No evidence has been brought forth that the District Attorney was motivated by “Islamophobia” in pressing charges in this case, rather than by the duration of the disruption and the number of persons involved.

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