Commenter Profile

Total number of comments: 531 (since 2012-06-23 07:13:37)

I'm an American in living in Siberia, where I teach International Political Economy and English Philology.

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  • When will the discourse of the 'two state solution' finally change?
    • Sibiriak May 3, 2013 at 11:59 pm with 1 replies

      RoHa says:

      “Jews need their self-determination” As citizens of a state. Not as Jews.

      Like it or not, "self-determination" in international law and politics refers to whole peoples, not individual citizens.

      "Self-determination" is a collective, not individual, right.

    • Sibiriak May 3, 2013 at 11:39 pm

      Nevada Ned:

      Either the 2SS or 1SS would have to be forced on Israel.

      Bingo. Now ask yourself: would it be easier and more feasible to force Israel to give up the entire Zionist dream (1SS), or to give up just a portion of it (2SS)?

      And ask yourself: just who has the power and the will to force the complete disappearance of Zionist Israel, as opposed to just a portion of it?

      Personally, I don't see any near term solution. At best, I see a 1.5 S non-solution, leading in the med/long-run to various possible regional confederations.

  • Israel supporters use Boston bombing to call for firing of UN Rapporteur
  • Diaspora Jews must speak out against the Israeli Law of Return
    • Sibiriak April 26, 2013 at 3:27 am

      hophmi :

      the Israeli Prime Minister is on record as supporting it

      No. He supports limited-sovereignty, shrink-wrapped, non-contiguous Palestinian enclaves, aka bantustans.

    • Sibiriak April 26, 2013 at 2:07 am

      ...the Law of Return was not a statute designed to make Israel a safe haven for those who were persecuted in the past, present or future because people hated them as Jews. Had the framers of this law wished to do so, they could have placed it on a platform of humanist principle, linking the privilege of asylum to the existence and threat of anti-Semitism.

      But the Law of Return and the associated Law of Citizenship were direct products of an ethnic nationalist worldview, designed to provide a legal basis for the concept that the State of Israel belongs to the Jews of the world.

      As Ben-Gurion declared at the start of the parliamentary debate on the Law of Return: “This is not a Jewish state only because most of its inhabitants are Jews. It is a state for the Jews wherever they may be, and for any Jew who wishes to be here.”60

      Anyone who was included in “the Jewish people”—including such notables as Pierre Mendes-France, the French prime minister in the early 1950s; Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian chancellor in the 1970s; Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state at that time; or Joe Lieberman, the Democratic candidate for vice president of the United States in 2000—was a potential citizen of the Jewish state, and their right to settle there was guaranteed by the Law of Return.

      A member of the “Jewish nation” might be a full citizen with equal rights in some liberal national democracy, might even be the holder of an elected position in it, but Zionist principle held that such a person was destined, or even obliged, to migrate to Israel and become its citizen.

      Moreover, immigrants could leave Israel immediately after arrival, yet keep their Israeli citizenship for the rest of their lives.

      Shlomo Sand, "The Invention of the Jewish People" (p. 288).

    • Sibiriak April 24, 2013 at 6:44 am

      NormanF:

      Israel’s Law Of Return is neither discriminatory nor unique – Germany, Finland, Russia and Italy all have similar laws to encourage ethnic kith and kin to resettle in their homeland ....

      In the case of Russia at least, I believe that is false. Russia encourages repatriation, but not on the basis of ethnicity (or religion), as does Israel. It seems you are projecting your own ethno-nationalist mentality onto others.

      See:link to rt.com

      The Russian State Duma has suggested simplifying the granting of Russian citizenship to direct descendants of nationals of the Russian Empire who now live abroad.

      The initiative was put forward by the lower house’s Committee for Nationalities.

      Descendants of the Russian Empire which collapsed after the February 1917 Revolution – are part of “the same nation and civilization,” committee head Gadzhimet Safaraliyev told Izvestia daily.

      The descendants of the Russian Empire include a number of different ethnic/religious groups, needless to say.

  • 'Arabs, I hate Arabs!'--Independence Day and just another day in Jerusalem
    • Sibiriak April 24, 2013 at 7:18 pm

      rabbinical thought, hundreds of thousands of Torah experts down through the centuries. Wisdom and learning and praying and it all was directed towards this

      Zionism appeared late and was generally opposed by rabbinical thought.

    • Sibiriak April 24, 2013 at 7:05 pm

      1900 years of exile

      What exile?

  • Reality check-- John Kerry prepares to stick fork in two-state solution
    • Sibiriak April 20, 2013 at 4:57 am

      Ramzi Jaber:

      ... indeed 1SS is dead

      Indeed. If you list all the fundamental forces that make a 2SS impossible, its obvious that those same forces make a 1SS even more impossible.

  • 10 takeaways from the Boston University Right of Return conference
    • Sibiriak April 16, 2013 at 11:54 pm

      W.Jones:

      Is the article perhaps combining the Mizrahim and Sephardim?

      From an article linked above:
      link to academia.edu

      In English, Mizrahim are often mistakenly called Sephardim, derived from the Hebrew word, sfaradim (Spaniards). The Sephardim are descendants of the Jews who were expelled from Spain in 1492, and they constitute one group of the Mizrahim.

      Is that correct?

  • Celebrating Israel's birthday, '2 luminary philosophers' to explore whether Zionism and liberalism are 'complementary identities'
    • Sibiriak April 14, 2013 at 11:24 pm with 1 replies

      Citizen:
      link to counterpunch.org

      [Atzmon:] For the Jewish progressive discourse, the purpose behind pro-Palestinian support is clear. It is to present an impression of pluralism within the Jewish community. It is there to suggest that not all Jews are bad Zionists.

      Here we get to the heart of things. Atzmon doesn't find *anything* genuinely valuable and ethical in Jewish progressive discourse. He sees it as *entirely* self-serving to Jewish group interests. But in fact there IS pluralism within the Jewish community and not all self-identifying Jews really are bad Zionists in their core. There really are anti-Zionist Jews who hold to both universalist values and some kind of group identity--in tension, no doubt, but not necessarily insurmountable contradiction.

      Atzmon doesn't see how someone like Phil W. can genuinely have multiple overlapping identities and motivations, none of them necessarily primary, overdetermining his beliefs and actions.

      On the other hand, there ARE more than a few fake
      Jewish progressives who really are tribalists through and through. Atzmon's error is to assert the part is the whole.

    • Sibiriak April 13, 2013 at 11:30 pm with 2 replies

      Frankie P:

      If the Palestinians as a majority in the future choose to treat Jewish Israelis less fairly than brothers, would it surpise you in light of the treatment they have received?

      Removing the "for centuries" part of RJL's statement and its implied accusation of irrational Jew-hatred--a coverup of vast Zionist crimes--your argument provides a more rational basis for RJL's underlying point.

    • Sibiriak April 13, 2013 at 11:16 pm

      Donald:

      I also think it’s legitimate for 2SS supporters to say that they favor a 2SS because they are afraid a 1SS would degenerate into all-out sectarian war or some other horror, so long as the fear of this is not some racist excuse for saying that Muslims or Arabs can’t be trusted to run a democracy. Israel is essentially running a 1SS right now–remind me again who is in charge?

      Excellent post.

  • Obama White House blew off idea of celebrating Emancipation Proclamation anniversary, says leading Lincoln scholar
    • Sibiriak April 8, 2013 at 9:02 pm

      Keith:

      Obama’s latest sellout on the budget ...an attempt to win praise from ‘centrist media pundits’.

      Not to mention the fact that Obama has been a steadfast adherent of Rubinomics since day one.

  • Rashid Khalidi on the Israel lobby
    • Sibiriak April 9, 2013 at 10:51 am

      James C.: Some would have liked to have greater control over Iraqi oil--that was the point, and it stands.

    • Sibiriak April 9, 2013 at 10:45 am

      Shingo:

      So are we to conclude that the arms industry has no say in influencing US foreign policy?

      Khalidi concludes that the Israel Lobby has a *decisive* say in influencing US foreign policy in all but a few exceptional and momentary circumstances.

    • Sibiriak April 9, 2013 at 10:36 am

      Shingo:

      So deeply committed Zionists just happened to have strong influence over Truman. Are we supposed to accept that this was just a coincidence?

      Coincidence? Of course not. Khalidi demonstrates just the opposite--an enduring causal pattern.

    • Sibiriak April 9, 2013 at 10:29 am

      Shingo:

      Now explain to me how the Israeli lobby does not influence US foreign policy if domestic political calculations carry greater weight than strategy and diplomacy where Palestine was concerned?

      As those quotes show, Khalidi argues that the Lobby DOES have enormous influence. I agree.

    • Sibiriak April 6, 2013 at 1:30 am

      MRW:

      finance capitalism, controlled by the Lobby,has worked to undermine the world since Reagan took office...

      Global "finance capitalism" is controlled by the Lobby?

    • Sibiriak April 6, 2013 at 1:16 am

      MRW:

      We could have bought all the oil in Iraq many times over without going to war.

      1."We" could have bought some of the oil, but "we" wouldn't have *controlled* it.

      2. Control of oil production was only of several imperialist/neoliberal capitalist goals. The MIC had its own goals, including demonstrating military dominance, showcasing "shock and awe" technologies etc.,; imperial strategists were bent on continuing the lucrative and ideologically indispensible "global war on terror"; neoliberals jumped on the chance to destroy a remaining statist economy and impose a radical "free market" regime via Bremer's edicts etc.

      ....I'd spell it ouy in more detail i my arm were not in a cast.

    • Sibiriak April 5, 2013 at 2:25 am with 7 replies

      Shingo:

      Khalidi’s thesis is simply pathetic…

      Perhaps you could spell out this alleged thesis? You may be misconstruing him.

      In his book, Khalidi argues that domestic politics and the Israel Lobby dominate U.S. policy-making with regards to Israel. Only in a few rare and exceptional cases have U.S. decision-makers been driven by higher strategic concerns to go against the Lobby. In most cases, however, pace Walt et al., Khalidi believes Israel-Lobby-driven policies have been compatible with basic American corporate and strategic interests.

      Some quotes fromKhalidi's book:

      This is the little-understood secret of the US government’s enduring bias in favor of Israel: in the face of what since 1967 has increasingly been a Saudi-dominated Arab world, policymakers in Washington are guided almost exclusively by the pressure exerted on Congress, the executive branch, and the media by the Israel lobby, or the stubborn obduracy of Israel’s leaders in preserving their regime of colonization and occupation. Because of the Arab regimes’ disunity, futile competition with one another, and deep dependence on the United States, there is absolutely no serious Arab counterweight to balance this formidable pressure.

      …the core dynamics at work in American policymaking toward Palestine have been remarkably stable for much longer. In these dynamics, domestic political calculations have generally taken precedence, while occasionally being balanced or overridden by strategic considerations. It is striking how rarely the United States was forced by such considerations to modify its policy on Palestine over many decades.

      One would have hoped that after over twenty years in which the “peace process” had failed to secure Palestinian-Israeli peace, policymakers would acknowledge that it was utterly dysfunctional, but this sort of “the emperor has no clothes” moment is unheard of in Washington, DC. Accepting that this was the case would have required a willingness to endure not only serious friction with Israel and its lobby, something no president is eager to face.

      Where the issue of Palestine is concerned, American Middle East policy from Truman down to Obama has consistently hewn to the three patterns described in the introduction: an almost total lack of pressure from the Arab Gulf monarchies; the impact of US domestic politics, driven by the Israel lobby, and an unconcern about Palestinian rights. The preferred approach of US presidents has therefore generally involved deferring to Israel and its American supporters…

      The 1946 midterm congressional electoral defeat only reinforced Truman’s favoring of domestic political calculations over those of strategy and diplomacy where Palestine was concerned…

      Truman was strongly influenced by a coterie of advisors and friends like Eleanor Roosevelt, Clark Clifford, Max Lowenthal, and David Niles, all of whom were deeply committed Zionists. 39 In addition, he tended to listen most carefully to those like himself whose political lives had been primarily spent making domestic and electoral calculations rather than decisions about strategy or foreign policy or the national interest.

      …The final outcome regarding Palestine was thus overdetermined. Truman, supported by the strong pro-Zionist sentiments of those closest to him and of a set of core Democratic constituencies, and driven by fears that showing insufficient zeal for the Zionist cause might contribute to electoral defeat for the Democrats, in essence imposed support for Jewish statehood in Palestine from 1946 until 1948 on a reluctant Washington bureaucracy.

      However, it must be understood that appearances notwithstanding, these two relationships [U.S.-Israel, U.S.-Saudi Arabia], and the alliances that have emerged from them, are not contradictory in any essential way, thanks mainly to the extraordinary complaisance of Saudi Arabia’s rulers toward the United States’ unflagging support of Israel, combined with its unconcern in practice for the rights of the Palestinians.

      The United States has in consequence been able to align itself firmly with the basic Israeli desiderata where the Palestine question is concerned without seriously jeopardizing its far-ranging vital interests in Saudi Arabia and the other oil-producing Arab monarchies of the Gulf. The ability of the United States to have it both ways was thus an essential precondition, and indeed the groundwork, of a policy that has not changed significantly since the days of Harry Truman. This policy has consisted of providing strong support for Israel, while paying no more than lip service to the publicly expressed concerns regarding Palestine of oil-rich Arab Gulf rulers, and generally ignoring the rights of the Palestinians.

      The period between 1945 and 1948 reveals at least two more patterns in American policy over Palestine that also proved to be enduring, and which were grounded firmly in the fact that the United States could easily afford to ignore the feeble protests of its key Arab Gulf allies over the question of Palestine.

      The first was the pattern already mentioned of presidential solicitude for domestic constituencies generally taking precedence over other considerations, including ordinary foreign policy concerns, and sometimes even long-term American strategic interests. This was especially the case during presidential and midterm election years (and with monotonous regularity, these seem to coincide every two years with a crucial American decision on Palestine). We have seen the first instance of it with Truman’s handling of the Palestine issue in 1946 and 1948. This pattern operated with more or less force in different administrations and under different circumstances, but it has obtained consistently in repeated cases from the time of Truman down to the present. 46

      For all of its importance, however, the basic pattern of presidential solicitude for domestic political considerations was often disrupted by the intrusion of Cold War issues during Arab-Israeli crises, when larger strategic interests momentarily came into play.

      These were the most important exceptions to the pattern of domestic factors predominating in policymaking regarding Israel and Palestine, exceptions that generally arose in moments of high crisis with the Soviet Union, where vital American interests necessarily took precedence over all else, including domestic politics.

      Much more frequently, however, during the three decades from the early 1960s onward, Cold War considerations militated unequivocally in favor of strong American support for Israel against the “radical” Arab states, which were increasingly seen in Washington as proxies of the USSR. 61 For this entire period, Israel benefited greatly from the perception in Washington that it constituted a major Cold War strategic asset. This factor was at least as important as domestic politics, and the significant impact of Israel’s increasingly formidable lobby in Washington, in explaining the extent of Washington’s military, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic support for Israel, and the high degree of cooperation between the two countries in all these spheres.

      Barring exceptional situations like those just enumerated involving major American strategic or economic interests, US policy on Palestine and Israel has been made almost exclusively with an eye to those who, in Truman’s words, “are anxious for the success of Zionism.” Certainly this was the case wherever the Palestinians were concerned.

      As we have seen, a distorted set of American priorities— largely directed at catering to the demands of Israel and of its vocal American supporters rather than doing anything substantial to resolve the struggle over Palestine, which is the core and the origin of the Arab-Israeli conflict— has contributed significantly to producing a broad range of intractable outcomes.

      …Obama appeared to be trying a new approach to the problem of Palestine and Israel, in parallel with aspects of what we have seen that Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush senior, and Clinton had tried and failed to do. That effort lasted roughly until the Republican Party’s capture of the House of Representatives in the midterm elections of November 2010. That victory significantly changed the political situation in Washington where Israel was concerned, measurably strengthening both Netanyahu and Israel’s lobby there, and thereby effectively stymieing the president.

      Some Republicans, in close coordination with the Israeli government and its Washington lobby, are saying that a Democratic administration should follow exactly the same line as does an American ally and not allow any visible differences between the two. They are in effect supporting a foreign government over their own on questions of foreign policy, indeed on weighty questions of war and peace.

      The disaffection of some on the Right with Obama over his policies on Israel and Palestine is also partly a result of the striking rightward lurch of both Israel’s internal politics and its domestic and security policies, and of the increasingly conservative leadership of the large American lobby that supports Israel. This is as true of the lobby’s Christian Zionist evangelical wing as it is of the wing rooted in the leading institutions of the American Jewish community. 44

      Both Israel and its most outspoken American supporters have gone so far to the right that American “support for Israel” is now taken by them to mean unquestioning support for expanded colonization of the West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem; for legitimizing overt legal discrimination against the nearly 20 percent of Israeli citizens who are not Jews, and for the permanent exclusion from Israel of Palestinian refugees and their descendants, both under the rubric of “Israel as a Jewish state”; and for military actions outside Israel’s borders that are more and more difficult to describe in terms of self-defense. It is hard to reconcile the fealty to increasingly extreme positions that Israel and its supporters have come to expect from Congress and the US government since this rightward turn with traditional official American positions.

      …the bitter hostility toward Iran of both Israel and Saudi Arabia has further envenomed American-Iranian relations, largely thanks to the extraordinary impact on American public discourse and Middle East policy of Israel, its Washington lobby, and the much more discreet lobbying of Saudi Arabia.

      From the blinkered perspective of many policymakers in Washington and important lobbies there, this may not seem like a major problem: Iran is their obsessive focus anyway. In addition, the powerful warmongering pressures of the Netanyahu government, the Saudi regime, the Israel lobby, and hawkish Republicans have by now produced a constant anti-Iranian drumbeat for war that all but prevents rational discourse on these issues anywhere inside the Washington Beltway.

    • Sibiriak April 5, 2013 at 12:44 am with 2 replies

      Sumud:

      How do you explain Obama’s inability to get Netanyahu to heel on a permanent settlement freeze?

      Khalidi's explanation:

      Over this period President Barack Obama faced relentless pressure from Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu, acting in concert both with the Republican leadership in Congress (newly energized after its Tea Party– fueled victories in the 2010 midterm elections) and with the potent congressional lobby for Israel. The latter is composed of an archipelago of organizations rooted in the older, more affluent, and more conservative sectors of the Jewish community and headed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), allied with a range of right-wing Christian evangelical groups passionately supportive of Israel. 14 The tripartite pressure of Netanyahu, the Republicans, and the Israel lobby forced Obama into humiliating retreats from the positions he had staked out during his first two years in office.

      Notable among these positions, all of which had been standard fare for most of the preceding administrations, were his stress on halting the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank as a precondition for Palestinian-Israeli negotiations...

    • Sibiriak April 4, 2013 at 11:37 pm with 2 replies

      The empire’s foreign policy is set by the empire. Period. Full stop.

      Yes, but not every foreign policy issue is of central importance to "the Empire". On more marginal issues lobbying and domestic politics can play a much bigger role.

      U.S. support for Israel *in general* strongly derives from U.S. capitalist/militarist interests. But on the *specifics* of Israel's territorial expansionism, the creation of a Palestinian (pseudo) state, the apartheid occupation--here the "the Empire"'s interests are less clear and precise, and the Lobby assumes much greater power.

    • Sibiriak April 4, 2013 at 11:16 pm

      I’m in the middle on this perennial and tedious debate about exactly how powerful the Lobby is.

      So is Khalidi, actually. His views have been distorted by many in this thread.

    • Sibiriak April 4, 2013 at 11:11 pm

      Keith:

      The empire is still the empire, and it is not being run out of Tel Aviv. Furthermore, the “American” empire has morphed into the transnational corporate empire...

      That puts things into perspective nicely.

    • Sibiriak April 4, 2013 at 10:32 pm

      Kalidi’s thesis falls apart with barely a sneeze

      I just read Khalidi's book and your representation of his arguments is unrecognizable to me.

  • In 'NYT' lecture on intermarriage, Stanley Fish says religious difference is 'deep and immovable'
    • Sibiriak April 3, 2013 at 12:16 am

      Good point. Although I personally favor some cultural diversity, even if that means tolerating some rebarbative elements.

  • Obama gets it
    • Sibiriak March 23, 2013 at 10:16 pm
      A 2SS is not possible. A fortiori, so is a 1SS. A 1 and 1/2S non-solution is in the cards. Confederation with Jordan and/or other states becomes a longer-term possibility-- eventually even some kind of integration including Israel.

  • 'Decades of a failed peace process' points to inevitable one state outcome -- filmmaker Ungar-Sargon
    • Sibiriak March 24, 2013 at 9:15 pm

      There never was a peace process to "fail". And a 1SS is hardly inevitable.

      More likely a 1.5S non-solution, possibly leading to confederations in the longer run.

  • Israel should start studying South Africa, so inevitable transformation is a peaceful one
  • Dennis Ross says Israel should unilaterally take 8% of West Bank while stating 'it has no intention of expanding into future Palestinian state'
  • The false equivalence of liberal Zionists
    • Sibiriak March 2, 2013 at 4:41 am with 1 replies

      pabelmont:

      The proposed (or suggested) Jewish State would have had a Jewish majority

      An extremely thin Jewish majority--not anywhere near enough to be the basis of a Jewish state in the view of most, if not all, Zionists at the time (and now).

      BDS does not by PRoR demand the destruction of Israel nor necessarily the creation within Israel of a non-Jewish majority

      Not necessarily, but possibly (if not probably)--that's the problem from the Zionist perspective.

    • Sibiriak March 2, 2013 at 4:32 am

      OlegR,

      In the first case no democracy in the second no Jewishness. (and democracy )

      That's true. But anti-Zionists don't recognize the validity or value of a Jewish state, while the do recognize the validity and value of democracy.

  • 'State of Palestine' it is
    • Sibiriak February 1, 2013 at 2:38 am

      JeffB:

      The problem isn’t demand it is supply. Many Israeli exports are supply not demand constrained

      "Many"? Can you be more specific here? Which Israeli products are not at all subject to market demand structures? Which are? Which Israeli products currently going to Europe have a demand that is not being met in the U.S. and China due to supply constraints?

    • Sibiriak January 29, 2013 at 2:57 am

      Shingo:

      There is no limit on Israel’s exports to China and the USA, so how can you argue that there would be a greater demand for Israeli exports in China and the USA if Europe implements sanctions?

      Good point. Demand doesn't just suddenly appear in one place because it is reduced in another.

    • Sibiriak January 28, 2013 at 5:02 am

      We are a long, long way from seeing European sanctions on Israel.

      link to reuters.com

      "I don't think there is enthusiasm around the European Union ... about economic sanctions in Europe on Israel. I don't believe there would be anywhere near a consensus nor is that our approach. We continue to try to bring both sides back to negotiations," Hague said.

      "Nevertheless, if there is no reversal of the decision that has been announced, we will want to consider what further steps European countries should take," he said.

      France on Monday also dismissed the prospect of European sanctions on Israel.

      -----
      link to articles.latimes.com

      Asked if France would consider sanctions against Israel, Hollande told reporters, “We don't want to shift into sanctions mode. We are more focused on persuading. It's an important moment, but I appeal for responsibility."

      ----
      link to timesofisrael.com

      Although there was speculation that Monday’s EU meeting would produce a series of harsh sanctions against Israel, including a landmark decision to begin boycotting imported Israeli products manufactured in settlements beyond the Green Line, senior officials in the union told The Times of Israel that the meeting would merely ratify previous resolutions, “irrespective of recent decisions by the government of Israel.”

      “The European Union continues to oppose boycotts, including boycotts of settlement products,” David Kriss, the press manager for the EU delegation to Israel, said.

      -----

  • Don't believe the (liberal Zionist) hype: Israel's elections ratified the apartheid status quo
    • Sibiriak January 26, 2013 at 12:34 am

      Castellio:

      If the Palestinians are fighting for a two state – whatever that means – then the liberal Zionists will concur, delay, and covertly expand.

      Until *forced* by external and internal pressures to acquiesce to a territorially shrunken, semi-sovereign, demilitarized Palestinian "state".

      If the Palestinians demand one person one vote in a unified state then the liberal Zionists will….

      ...Categorically reject that demand, since it is incompatible with Zionism.

    • Sibiriak January 25, 2013 at 11:43 am

      Mooser:

      ...most everyone will accept that perfect justice for the Palestinians probably won’t be achieved

      Probably??

    • Sibiriak January 25, 2013 at 11:39 am

      All of these settlements are illegal under international law and effectively foreclose the possibility of a contiguous Palestinian state.

      Perhaps most "liberal [sic] Zionists" really don't believe that a Palestinian "state" has to be contiguous, and that this will do:

      annex the settlement blocks including Ariel, possibly all of Area C.

      ....Declare Area A and B independent.
      ...call A, B and Gaza a state

  • Millions disenfranchised in Israeli vote due solely to ethnicity and geography
    • Sibiriak January 24, 2013 at 6:09 am

      Amira Hass:

      link to zcommunications.org

      ...ghettoization is itself the aim, having been implemented for the past 65 years. In other words, the aim - unfolded with the advent of time -has been to concentrate the Palestinians in reserves, after most of their land had been robbed of them. And if they desert and move abroad, it's of their own free will.

      A direct planning and ideological line stretches between the enclaves in which the Palestinian citizens of Israel live and those of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

      This is the real Israeli historical compromise. It is not with the Palestinians, but with the dictates of reality and among the various Zionist ideological currents.

      The crowded, offensive reservations - the creation of which is violence, pure and simple - are a compromise between the craving to eject the Palestinians from their land and the recognition that regional and international conditions do not permit it.

      So, Israeli apartheid is both a "compromise" end in itself, since immediate, full-scale, direct ethnic cleansing is not politically possible, and also a longer-term, indirect means to ethnic cleansing via intolerable oppression.

  • Netanyahu out as PM?: Yair Lapid shocks Likud/Beiteinu in Israeli election
    • Sibiriak January 22, 2013 at 9:43 pm with 2 replies

      Woody Tanaka:

      (2 states, unattainable because israel has no interest in agreeing to it)

      I don't think Israel's current interest in agreement to a settlement plan should be the measure of its attainability.

      By that measure, a 1SS would be infinitely more unattainable.

      No matter what, Israel will have to be forced into a settlement against its will and perceived interests.

  • What is 'the helicopter on the Saigon embassy roof moment' for US and Israel?
    • Sibiriak January 22, 2013 at 10:31 pm

      And let's not forget the bigger irony-- that Vietnam embraced neoliberalism and joined the global capitalist system not long after the U.S. left.

  • Israel and the nomination of Chuck Hagel
    • Sibiriak February 1, 2013 at 9:31 pm

      Hostage:

      Kaplan doesn’t cite any anti-Semitic passages from the report of the Inter-Allied Commission.

      I thought Obsidian's point was that Crane's alleged anti-Semitism may have biased the report, not that anyone would be stupid enough to include actual "anti-Semitic passages" in it.

    • Sibiriak January 29, 2013 at 2:29 am

      dionissis mitropoulos:

      In my experience, and i don’t know if my sample is representative, most Israelis don’t open their eyes but, instead, close their ears when presented with Nazi analogies.

      1) You will have to do better than "in my experience" if you want to provide real backing for your broad, categorical philosophical assertions.

      2) Why are you assuming now that all Zionists are Israelis?

      3)If Zionists--including the majority "liberal Zionists" who are ostensibly committed to liberal democratic principles, human rights--simply "closed their ears" upon hearing "Nazi anaolgies" , then why would they be so psychological harmed as you assert? You contradict yourself, with all due respect. A more reasonable assumption would be that a Nazi analogy which is cogent, grounded in facts and logic, and morally compelling hits home in a very painful way and elicits "cognitive dissonance", and likely immediate denial. Of course, even immediate denial does not mean there cannot be a less visible longer term effect, especially in conjunction, over time, with further exposure to troubling facts and arguments.

      See, for example, this Mondoweiss story about the film "the Gatekeepers" by director Dror Moreh:

      link to mondoweiss.net

      [Moreh] gave an example about Avraham Shalom. Shalom, now 84, was the director of Shin Bet from 1980 to 1986. He told me the story of Shalom growing up during the rise of the Nazi party in Germany and being seriously beaten by kids at school because he was Jewish. Moreh said it pains him that at the end of the film when Shalom says that we treat the Palestinians as the Germans treated Jews, the story of Shalom's childhood is not in the mind of the viewer.

      Once again, we have a "Nazi analogy". Moreh says:

      My main thing was to create something that will alter the way Israelis see reality.

      Clearly, he disagrees with your suggestion that ALL Israelis (let alone, all Zionists) are completely and eternally close-minded regarding certain moral arguments.

      According to your argument, it would be immoral and indecent for any German to make such a film. I just don't see that at all. I don't see any case for "psychological harm" being done that outweighs all other considerations, (including benefits to Jewish Israelis.)

      Again, it's impossible to discuss this further in a rigorous philosophical way until you more precisely define what kind of "Nazi analogy" you are considering, who exactly the audience is, and the specific context.

    • Sibiriak January 26, 2013 at 7:11 am

      dionissis mitropoulos:

      I took for granted (though i disagree) that the Nazi analogy is true

      "The Nazi analogy"?? There is no such singular analogy. There are an number of possible analogies, some which might be true, others patently false.

      Consider this passage from a book dealing with the Nakba:

      When the international pressure subsided and Israel had put in place clear rules for dividing the spoils, the Committee for Arab Affairs also formalised the official governmental attitude towards the Palestinians left within the territory of the new state, who were now citizens of Israel.

      Totalling about 150,000, these became the ‘Israeli Arabs’ – as if it made sense to talk about ‘Syrian Arabs’ or ‘Iraqi Arabs’ and not ‘Syrians’ or ‘Iraqis’.

      They were put under a military regime based on British Mandatory emergency regulations which, when they were issued in 1945, none other than Menachem Begin had compared to Germany’s 1935 Nuremberg Laws.

      These regulations virtually abolished people’s basic rights of expression, movement, organisation, and equality before the law. They left them the right to vote for and be elected to the Israeli parliament, but this too came with severe restrictions. This regime officially lasted until 1966, but, for all intents and purposes, the regulations are still in place.

      The writer is drawing an analogy between Israel and Nazi Germany in that passage.

      Are you claiming that it would it would immoral or indecent for a person with German genes to write that, but just fine if a person without German genes did so?

      That would be the conclusion according to your extremely broad deontic formulation:

      Germans are allowed to criticize Israelis, but not with Nazi analogies.

    • Sibiriak January 26, 2013 at 6:33 am

      Woody Tanaka:

      And the only way that her action could produce “too much harm” (and who, by the way, judges how much harm is produced by a speaker? the speaker or the person with the interest in shutting up the speaker?) is if one makes her an exemplar of her ethnicity and, in doing so, strips her of her individuality.

      Excellent point. If a Jew is offended/hurt by a statement simply*because* it is stated by a German (even if the statement is true, and even if the particular German has committed no moral offenses herself), that Jew is indeed stripping that German of his/her individuality and moral uniqueness.

      That Jew's sense of offense, hurt or indignation doesn't have a rational basis; it derives from an morally deficient ethnocentric worldview.

    • Sibiriak January 26, 2013 at 5:45 am

      dionissis mitropoulos:

      ...Why use a term (“concentration camp”) that is bound to be perceived as anti-Semitic, if uttered by a German?

      The truth won’t just hurt, but won’t even be taken seriously.

      So it won’t be a beneficial truth, the patient will (most likely) refuse to swallow the pill.

      I don't think you can generalize on this point, as you are doing. It depends on which German, on the nature, quality, and validity of the "Nazi analogy", and on the particular Zionist.

      You can't just assume that any "Nazi analogy" voiced by any German will have no positive effect in all cases.

      To carry your argument further, you would need to define all the elements of the situation. Trying to derive some moral rule that applies to ALL Germans, uttering any kind of Nazi analogy to ANY Zionist just does not work. It's just too easy to come up with possible exceptions.

      For example, suppose the German is a well-respected writer with a pristine record of moral integrity, impartiality, and intellectual rigor; suppose he puts forward a detailed, cogent, eloquent "Nazi analogy"; suppose this German is an expert on Nazi practices and shows in a convincing fashion deep insight into certain Zionist activites via the analogy; suppose the Jewish Zionist listener is one deeply concerned that Nazi-like activities never again be allowed to go unchallenged, and that this Zionist has the moral and intellectual honesty to criticize fellow Jews if the facts demand it; suppose that the German's analysis powerfully resonates with arguments and facts coming from other sources which have already been partially or wholly accepted by the Zionist; suppose this Zionist already has deep doubts about many Zionist practices and foundational dogmas. In such a case, I don't see how you can simply *assume* that the German's speech act could never have a positive impact.

      I need to insist on that: even if the analogy is true, it won’t succeed in altering the Zionist mindset

      Argument by insistence is not particularly compelling, imo. Two points.

      1) You have not shown why it is impossible that a compelling argument involving a Nazi analogy could not contribute to opening a "Zionist mindset" to new ideas. You simply assume that all Zionist minds are completely and eternally closed. I don't buy that.

      2) You assume that the only audience for the German is Jewish Zionists. But if the German's arguments have positive effects elsewhere, these must be weighed against any potential negative effects on Jewish sensibilities. One cannot say in advance, without looking at all the particularities of the case, whether positive effects outweigh negative ones.

      On the other hand, yes, one could well envision a situation in which a German would do well to take into consideration the nature of his Zionist interlocutor and avoid certain references in order to be more persuasive and avoid uneccessary offense.

      Each case has to be judged on its own terms-- morally, no general rule can be asserted, imo. (And legally, we agree, there is no basis for any limit on freedom of speech in this case.)

      I see no problem in regulating my speech according to the listener.

      Either do it. Depends on the situation. And you haven't defined a concrete situation.

      And would the political speech be unduly restricted if a German decided (on her free will) to say "Israel's lethal nuclear arsenal is the biggest threat to world peace", instead of comparing it to "the gas chambers of Hitler"?

      You say that you are assuming the "Nazi anaolgy" to be true, yet the actual concrete examples you give--e.g. references to "gas chambers"-- are in fact patently fallacious.

      You are putting forward strawmen, in other words.

      thought that Nazi analogies can be translated to Nazi-free speech with no loss of factual content.

      There is no basis for assuming that to hold true in all cases.

      1) It assumes there are no unique and positive insights that can be made by historical analogies, such as those to Nazi Germany. 2) It ignores the potential positive benefit of the emotive power of such analogies. If Zionists are indeed committing horrendous crimes against humanity, it may well be that drawing Nazi analogies would be a very effective way of opening eyes and challenging consciences in people to whom the Nazi experience is of the deepest intellectual, emotional, and spiritual importance. That's a practical question that must be judged on an individual basis.

    • Sibiriak January 24, 2013 at 5:36 am

      dionissis mitropoulos :

      But i think that the offended has the moral right to criticize as an immoral action the Nazi analogy speech.

      You seem to think that one can morally evaluate the Nazi analogy speech act without having to make any determination of the validity of the analogy.

      That's not possible, imo.

      Basically, you are making a consequentialist argument. One of the consequences (effects) of a German making a Nazi analogy regarding Zionism, you claim, is psychological harm done to Jews.

      Two problems arise with this (without going into general issues involving consequentialism):

      1) It's impossible to assess the harm done to Jews without first assessing the validity (truth-value) of the specific Nazi analogy in question. Why is this? Because it makes all the difference in the world if the analogy--and the general criticism of Zionism it represents--is true or not.

      If the Nazi analogy and general critique of Zionism it represents are valid, then, as I argued previously, one could easily argue that Jews would benefit--not be harmed-- by being exposed to such truths, *even if* they might experience emotional pain and indignation. The "medicine" might be bitter, but be highly beneficial in the long run.

      On the other hand, if the Nazi analogy is false, then the harm done to Jews would be much more easily demonstrated.

      Thus, there no getting around the question of truthfulness when it comes to a moral assessment of harmfulness of a certain speech.

      Your own statement implies this:

      But hurting feelings gratuitously and unnecessarily need not be such a condition.

      There is no way to judge if hurtful speech is "gratuitous'" or "unneccessary" without first assessing the truthfulness of that speech.

      2) If you are going to judge an act based on its consequences (effects), then you must look at ALL the consequences, short term and long term, direct and indirect. You have not done that; you have only considered the immediate short-term effect on Jews to the exclusion of all other possible effects.

      You need to also consider:

      *The effects on Palestinians and other groups impacted by Zionism.
      If Zionism is an evil to be combated, one must consider the effects of not fully engaging in that battle.

      *The long run effects of setting a precedent of the (self-)suppression of speech on the basis of a particular group's sensibilities (due to past persecution or not).

      Again, these effects (and others) cannot possibly determined without first determining the validity of the Nazi analogy in the first place.

      Truth counts.

    • Sibiriak January 24, 2013 at 4:36 am

      dionissis mitropoulos:

      But i have heard it said a trillion times that a lot of Germans embraced Nazism and i have taken it since as a corroborated fact.

      "A lot of" is not the same as "all"; "a lot of Germans" is not the same as "the Germans". Valid philosophical argument requires rigor and precision.

      I have concentrated on the effect that the application of the Nazi analogy is bound to have on the psychology of many contemporary Jews (and Zionists).

      Yes, that does seem to be the core of your argument. I find it highly dubious--pernicious, in fact. I believe in freedom of speech as an individual right. There are limitations of course, but I don't think causing "offense or hurt feelings" can possibly be one of them.

      If "hurt feelings" or "negative psychological effects" on a group were a legal or moral test for free speech, especially political speech, the ensuing limitations on that speech would be so great as to render the notion of freedom of speech to be practically meaningless.

      The harmfulness of such a limitation would only compounded if it were to be were selectively applied to individuals based on an ethnic or other group identity, as you suggest.

      I have mentioned emotional pain and indignation (in tandem) as the harm done by a German’s use of the analogy.

      But how do you prove that harm? Emotional and intellectual growth-- arguably good things-- may entail bouts of emotional pain and indignation. If an individual or group of individuals are forced to face certain painful facts, that pain is not necessarily harmful.

      Concretely, to even begin to make your case, you would need to show that Jews would not in reality *benefit* from being confronted with facts about Zionism, no matter how painful or indignation-inducing those facts might be in the short run. You have completely failed to do that.

      (You would also need, of course, to take into consideration the real harm that might be done to others through the suppression of free speech regarding Zionism.)

      A German individual should not be restricted from saying something others are free to say simply because he/she is German and because a German saying certain things might offend/cause psychological hurt to another group (Jews in this example).

      Many people feel hurt or offended by the truth as much as by falsehoods.

      Suppose certain Nazi analogies are valid. You are saying that truthful speech should be suppressed simply because members of a certain group find those truths hurtful. That's absurd, with all due respect.

      And how would we know if those analogies are valid? The only way is through rational debate--and that debate cannot occur if those topics are not allowed to be discussed, or if certain individuals, because of their ethnic identity alone, are barred from the debate.

      People have a right to express their opinions, even ones that cause offense to others. No one has a right to be free from speech--especially political speech-- that may cause them emotional pain or indignation. (Yes, there are exceptions here--sexual harassment, libel, incitement to violence, and so on-- but I don't think I need to spell out all that out.)

      Modern Germans would be acting inappropriately if they used the analogy, because of what they would be doing to the present-day Jewish brains, not because of what their grand parents did to WW2 live Jewish bodies

      I don't find that at all persuasive. Freedom of speech requires a critical distinction between mental and physical harm. In fact, that distinction is a foundational one to liberal, pluralistic, democratic society.

      And again, who is to judge the real harm done, as opposed to subjectively felt hurt or indignation? The truth often hurts, but is rarely harmful.

      To the extent that Jews have been the most consistently persecuted group in history, i find the indignation fully justified.

      You seem to be singling out Jews for special group rights--the right as a group not to be offended or emotional hurt by others' political speech. Following your logic, there would have to be some entity that assesses and ranks human groups in terms of persecution, and assigns speech rights based on those determinations. That's as absurd as it is unworkable, imo.

    • Sibiriak January 22, 2013 at 11:40 pm

      dionissis mitropoulos :

      a member of a group (Germans, in my example) that has unjustly persecuted another group

      The concept of "a group" in your premise is fallacious, imo.

      The "group" that persecuted Jews (as a group) was NOT /Germans and their descendants/.

      1)Only a specific subset of Germans (however large)--a group of specific individuals-- persecuted Jews.

      2) The descendants of those Germans did not inherit any guilt for the actions of their ancestors. There is no genetic transmission of sins or sinfulness.

      To suggest otherwise is to embrace an irrational form of tribal/ethnic essentialism.

  • Hagel prostrates himself before the lobby, gets votes
    • Sibiriak January 17, 2013 at 3:30 am

      seafoid:

      Soon it won’t even be a Jewish democracy

      True. The Jewishness of the Israeli state could radically change in 2-4 generations.

    • Sibiriak January 17, 2013 at 3:18 am

      sardelapasti :

      Is anyone here seriously thinking that bringing Hagel (and, don’t forget, the Abominable Kerry as his teammate) may change anything wrt Hilary and Gates and, first and and foremost, Obama and his bosses?

      Wishful thinking abounds here, imo.

    • Sibiriak January 17, 2013 at 3:16 am

      seanmcbride:

      At the moment Obama is patiently waiting for the opportunity to flip the current the US/Israeli relationship — and history is on his side. The Israel lobby is on the verge of writing itself out of the American script.

      I see at most only a slight moderation of the bi-partisan pro-expansionist-Israel policy; and the Greater Jewish-Israel lobby will still have a major role to play.

  • 'Beyond Tribal Loyalties' -- new volume spotlights awakenings of 25 Jewish activists
    • Sibiriak January 17, 2013 at 7:46 am

      yonah fredman:

      Point taken.

      Although the “some” aspect gives true believers an out and call Muhammad a realist rather than a hater, but “some” does not really let him off the hook.

      Why not? Just curious.

      Since Morsi was quoting a Jew hating verse it is natural for people to attribute Jew hating to the comment rather than merely anti Zionism.

      That assumption seems to flow naturally if one accepts the Jews/Judaism= Zionism equation.

      It doesn't explain, though, why the Obama administration assumes the Morsi remarks on Zionists were about the Jewish *religion*.

      In any case, the Obama administration asked Morsi to "clarify"--not repudiate--his remarks.

      And Morsi did so:

      On Wednesday, Morsi told a visiting U.S. Senate delegation led by Republican John McCain that a distinction must be made between criticism of what he called the "racist" policies of the Israelis against the Palestinians and insults against the Jewish faith, Morsi's spokesman Yasser Ali said.

      "President Morsi assured the delegation that the broadcast comments were taken out of an address against the Israeli aggression against Gaza," Ali told reporters. "He also assured them of his respect for monolithic religions, freedom of belief and practicing religions."

      So, that clears things up. :-) Except the "monolithic" thing (Cf. Mooser).

    • Sibiriak January 17, 2013 at 3:59 am

      seanmcbride:

      How many of them have worked to eliminate any meaningful distinctions between Judaism and Zionism?

      Excellently posed question. I await Mooser's reply. -:)

      Btw, Judaism (the religion) and Zionism are synonymous, it seems, for the Obama administration. Case in point: the recent condemnation of a three-year old statement by Egyptian President Morsi.

      ... in September 2010, Morsi was a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood. In the video, he refers to "Zionists" as "bloodsuckers who attack Palestinians" as well as "the descendants of apes and pigs."

      White House spokesman Jay Carney said Morsi

      should make clear that he respects people of all faiths and that this type of rhetoric is unacceptable in a democratic Egypt."

      State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters:

      We completely reject these statements as we do any language that espouses religious hatred

      Clearly, the Obama administration, without batting an eye, equates Zionism with Judaism (the religion).

      link to news.yahoo.com

  • Obama taps Hagel with combative speech-- following outreach to AIPAC
  • Jews for Palestinian right of return
    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 5:49 am

      eljay:

      Something like this.

      A very reasonable view.

      I would be inclined, though, following Shlomo Sand, to replace "Jewish" with "Israeli" in your statement:

      3. A fostering of Jewish culture in Israel, and Palestinian culture in Palestine, with each state respecting the cultures of the minorities within them.

    • Sibiriak January 6, 2013 at 9:22 am

      Taxi:

      Still peddling the sham 2SS, Sib?

      The so-called "peace process" to this point has been a total sham. I don't support that b.s.

      You think war criminals and their criminal progeny deserve to keep the land-loot?

      No.

      You think the holocaust jews deserve justice but not the ethnically-cleansed and mass-murdered Palestinians?

      No.

      You think the zionist masadists out there would let ‘honest’ people like you determine their borders?

      No.

      Short of evicting zionism from the middle east,

      Just exactly how do you envision this complete eviction taking place?

      As the not-a-Zionist Chomsky said:

      If you’re really in favor of a one-state solution, which in fact I’ve been all my life...you have to give a path to get from here to there. Otherwise, it’s just talk.

      I have no problem with Zionism disappearing. I see that as a very long term prospect, though. In the meantime, I think a two-state settlement (not a "solution") *could* be a step in that direction.

    • Sibiriak January 6, 2013 at 8:43 am

      Obsidian,

      I remember a poll recently that showed that a majority of Palestinians reject two states. I could be wrong.

      Here's one recent poll:

      link to pcpsr.org

      52% support and 46% oppose the two-state solution but 57% believe such a solution is no longer practical due to continued settlement expansion.

      71% believe that that the chances for establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim to non-existent.

      But 68% oppose a one-state solution and only 30% support it.

      On the question of Palestinian organizations backing BDS, Philip Weiss wrote:

      ... when I attended the Third National BDS Conference in Hebron this past December one attendee asked Omar Barghouti why the movement doesn't explicitly endorse one state?

      He responded by saying it's because the overwhelming number of Palestinian organizations that endorsed the BDS call support two states.

      I'm assuming Barghouti knows what he's talking about. Do you have reason to think otherwise?

    • Sibiriak January 5, 2013 at 11:02 pm with 5 replies

      Shmuel:

      But does “the full measure of justice” also require “a democratic state throughout historic Palestine”?

      I would tend to say yes. But a *full* measure of justice is not necessarily achievable (it rarely is in this world). If Palestinians are willing to accept a partial measure of justice, that is their prerogative.

      Are there no other possibilities?

      Of course there are. Two states in historic Palestine, for one.

      Can we – specifically as Jews – presume to dictate the modality of the “reversal of dispossession” (as Dr. Haidar Eid puts it)?

      No. But that's what this document does. It's dictating a one-state solution, even though a majority of Palestinians (and Palestinian organizations supporting BDS) support two states.

  • Only non-Jews can save Israel, Eldar says
    • Sibiriak January 5, 2013 at 11:36 pm with 7 replies

      CloakAndDagger:

      The sooner it collapses and vanishes from existence (the entity, not the people), the better it is for the rest of the world

      Exactly how to you envision Israel collapsing--and when? That just seems like wishful thinking to me, unless you provide some concrete details.

  • Exchange on anti-Sephardi racism on the left
    • Sibiriak January 11, 2013 at 4:13 am

      Some even manage to challenge the analytical rational mindset. Concerning the above they would consider this symbolical,

      The "analytical rational mindset" is not the be all and end all of human understanding--but it's not to be excluded either when dealing with religious ideologies, imo. (Nor can religion be reduced to ideology alone.)

    • Sibiriak January 10, 2013 at 4:20 am

      Mooser:

      “*All* human belief systems — including all religions — are up for rational inquiry and debate.”

      What you got for The Resuurrection? The Transfiguration? How, exactly, does that wine change to blood? The wafer to flesh? Got a rational analysis for miracles? Yes, sir, a rational analysis, is needed!

      Indeed, Christian theology, miracles etc. should be subject to inquiry and discussion from various angles, as they have been.

      What is your point? Oh, I get it now.... perhaps it's a variation on the theme:

      Critics who habitually single out Israel for condemnation while ignoring far worse actions by other countries (especially other Middle Eastern countries) are anti-Semitic.

      link to jewishvirtuallibrary.org

      Have some people been "singling out" Judaism for too much criticism?

    • Sibiriak January 9, 2013 at 8:23 pm

      LeaNdr

      This discussion is already taking place

      Thanks for the heads up.

      The problem is that it may not be as focused on Judaism as you think it should be.

      I don't think it should be focused on Judaism.

    • Sibiriak January 9, 2013 at 4:53 am

      Byzantium:

      from a doctrinal point of view, the purpose of religion is to facilitate the communion between the human and the divine (to “reconnect” as the Latin root would have it).

      That seems to me a prescriptive rather than descriptive notion.

      As for the etymology of the word "religion" see:

      link to etymonline.com

      religion (n.)

      c.1200, "state of life bound by monastic vows," also "conduct indicating a belief in a divine power," from Anglo-French religiun (11c.), Old French religion "religious community," from Latin religionem (nom. religio) "respect for what is sacred, reverence for the gods," in Late Latin "monastic life" (5c.).

      According to Cicero derived from relegere "go through again, read again," from re- "again" + legere "read" (see lecture (n.)).

      However, popular etymology among the later ancients (and many modern writers) connects it with religare "to bind fast" (see rely), via notion of "place an obligation on," or "bond between humans and gods." Another possible origin is religiens "careful," opposite of negligens.

      The "religare" -- "to bind fast" (cf. "ligament")---root meaning always made sense to me.

    • Sibiriak January 9, 2013 at 4:07 am

      Mooser,

      I do not tell other people whether their religion is valid or not.

      I'm not sure what you mean by "valid", nor do I recommend simply going around and "telling" people things, but I certainly believe religious ideologies should be just as subject to rational critique as political ideologies (and the two are often entangled, as we well know.)

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 10:12 pm

      LeaNdr

      Short condensed look at the creation of Israel’s foundation myth, pretty usable from the 99,9 percent non-Jewish perspective too, I guess:
      Political Theologies in the Holy Land: Israel Messianism and it’s Critics

      Thanks for the reference. Looks interesting. Expensive, though!

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 9:16 pm

      Mooser:

      You came right out finally and said in so many words, that you think the colonial hand-off from Britain (and whoever) to the European Zionists supersedes the rights of the people who live there

      I'm sorry to see you completely misunderstand Khalidi's and my position on the Mandate, namely that the Mandate constituted an "Iron Cage" that effectively--and reprehensibly---made it very difficult for Arab Palestinians to press their rightful claim to self-determination.

      I guess you just can't help putting words in people's mouths. Perhaps it is because you are fighting old battles and imaginary foes.

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 10:42 am

      Shmuel,

      You are completely right.

      But none of that is to say that it did/does not seek to ground its modern ideology in ancient/classical myths etc.

      "Ancient/classical myths etc." -;)

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 10:04 am

      Mooser,

      ” I haven’t altered a single statement I have made on this issue. Contemporary Judaism has fully embraced….”

      No Sean, everything you are saying is right in line with your original statement: (Dec. 5th)

      “Judaism’s core driver: messianic ethnocentrism and ethno-religious nationalism organized around a particular physical territory (Eretz Israel and Jerusalem).

      The key components:

      1. ethnocentrism
      2. territorialism
      3. nationalism
      4. messianism”

      But you know you can’t stand on that, so you’ve resorted to all sorts of qualifiers and obfuscation.

      I don't see how a qualification that makes an assertion more precise is a form of obfuscation.

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 9:37 am

      According to Baruch Kimmerling, religious Zionism, far from being grounded in classical (rabbinic) Judaism, required a major theological "revolution" that "reversed the whole Jewish-rabbinical paradigm."

      Historically, Jews who defined themselves as religious were deeply divided in the stances they adopted toward modernity, Jewish enlightenment and secularism, Zionism, and, later, the very existence of a secular "Jewish state. 26

      From the beginning, a small religious stream was established within the Zionist movement,27 and even before the appearance of Zionism, there were rabbis who called for a mass "return to Zion."

      The real theological revolution, however, occurred in the late 192os and was led by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook,28 who reversed the whole Jewish-rabbinical paradigm and causal relationship concerning "redemption."

      Traditionally, the fulfillment by all Jews of all the "613 commandments" listed in the holy scriptures was the condition for the coming of the Messiah, the return of all Jews to Zion, and full redemption. Rabbi Kook reversed this, declaring that when as many Jews as possible fulfill the single commandment to "settle the holy land," the Messiah will appear to redeem "his people" politically and theologically, and will make them follow all his commandments and precepts. A cosmic redemption of the "whole world" will then follow.

      This new religious perception granted religious meaning and legitimacy to secular nationalism and the so-called socialist pioneer Jews by making them "tools" of a divine project of religious redemption.

      The Kookian theological revolution laid the foundation for the participation of its followers in the secular Israeli state and society in the here and now, and for a collaboration between this segment of religious Jews and the secular Zionists.

      (From "The Invention and Decline of Israeliness")

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 9:15 am

      Shmuel:

      Sand argued that religious Zionism has not grounded its ideology in the myths, symbols, themes, etc. of Rabbinic Judaism (take as shorthand for whatever you said)

      I defined "classical Judaism" as rabbinic Judaism from 800 AD to approx. the beginning of the 19th century.

      Sands argues that modern religious Zionism was grounded in religious themes not at all consistent with classical Judaism.

      I've already shown how Sand argues that secular and religious Zionism is grounded in Old Testament historical narratives that were marginal to classical Judaism.

      Sand also points out the central and unequivocal prohibition in classical Judaism against mass migration to the Holy Land:

      A number of rabbinical prohibitions forbade hastening the salvation, and therefore migrating to the source from which it would arise. The most prominent prohibitions were the famous three vows in the Babylonian Talmud: “That Israel must not [seek to] rise up over the wall; that the Holy One Blessed Be He adjured Israel not to rise up against the nations of the world; that Holy One Blessed Be He adjured the idolaters not to enslave Israel overmuch” (Tractate Ketubot 110: 72).

      “Rise up over the wall” meant mass migration to the Holy Land, and this clear-cut prohibition affected Jews throughout the ages, instilling an acceptance of exile as a divine ordinance not to be broken.

      Sands gives many other examples of how Zionism radically departed from the beliefs and themes of classical Judaism.

      Shmuel:

      Does he say that the ideology and theology of religious Zionism is not rooted (without necessarily being a “natural” product of it – witness Haredi attitudes to Zionism) in the literature of the “Rishonim” (such as Halevi, Nahmanides and Maimonides)?

      Sand says that Nahmanides was "exceptional and eccentric" in the context of classical Judaism. I can't find relevant references to Halevi or Maimonides.

      Sand doesn't discuss interpreations of the "Rishonim" literature in "The Invention of the Jewish People". He sees the roots of religious and secular Zionism elsewhere.

      (Of course, "religious Zionism" comprises a large theological/ideological "tree"--your particular education may represent only one branch.)

      Perhaps he is wrong.

      But the very fact that it is debatable shows that it is not a trivial point, and certainly not a matter of tautology.

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 7:46 am

      Shmuel,

      OK. Contemporary religious Zionists “ground” their ideology (provide a basis for, justify) in the myths, symbols etc. That ideology (“contemporary religious Zionism”) is thus “grounded” in the myths, symbols, etc. It is the idiom of religious Zionism. It is how religious Zionism explains its own concepts and beliefs. Sand has never said otherwise.

      Sands argues that secular and religious Zionism are not grounded in classical Judaism (defined as I did above.) The religious grounding comes from outside classical Judaism.

      According to Sands:

      The foundation myth was, of course, the textual cosmos of the Old Testament, whose narrative, historical component became a vibrant mythos in the latter half of the nineteenth century

      It was not a "vibrant mythos" prior to that, i.e. not during the period of classical Judaism.

      The Old Testament was a "marginal book" in classical Judaism (as defined above), according to Sands.

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 7:12 am

      Shmuel,

      That definition works for me as well.

      Can’t a guy paraphrase a little, without being suspected of trying to pull a fast one? Trust me; it was just meant as shorthand.

      I trust you.

      "Playing fast..." is not the same as "pulling a fast one", of course. But you were just paraphrasing, I know. -:)

      link to idioms.thefreedictionary.com

      link to idioms.thefreedictionary.com

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 7:00 am

      Shmuel:

      It is grounded in those as well (as are all contemporary forms of Judaism, including Haredi Judaism). That does not mean that that it is not grounded in “ancient and classical Judaism” (sean did not say “exclusively grounded”).

      All the above statments are factual ones, not logical deductions from definitions of terms. I never said it was not --in fact-- grounded in "ancient and classical Judaism", but that there was no logical reason it had to be grounded in that.

      I suspect I'm flogging a dead horse here on the distinction between matters of fact and matters of logic.

      Sand argues that Zionism is not a product of classical Judaism.

      "Classical Judaism" is not necessarily the same as "classical Jewish myths, symbols etc.". You are playing fast and loose with terms.

      He argues it is not grounded in classical Judaism, imo, given a definition of that term as I suggested above.

      "Ground"= "The foundation for an argument, a belief, or an action; a basis."

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 6:00 am

      Shmuel,

      We'll just have to disagree.

      There is no logical reason why "contemporary Jewish religious Zionism" could not be grounded in Jewish religious themes, symbols etc. from outside the traditions of "ancient and classical Judaism".

      In fact, one of Sand's major contentions is that both religious and secular Zionism are in fact NOT grounded in the traditions of classical Judaism, if that term is taken to mean something like "rabbinical Judaism as it emerged after about AD 800 and lasted up to the end of the 18th century."

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 5:19 am

      Shmuel:

      It is the meaning of the term religious in this assertion.

      There is no logical necessity to ascribe that meaning, and that one alone, to the term "religious".

      "Religious" could equally well refer to religious symbols, myths etc. that are not part "ancient and classical Judaism" but are still part of Jewish religion. "Ancient and classical Judaism" are not the whole of Judaism (Jewish religion).

      That's why I wrote previously:

      If you take “ancient and classical Judaism” to be only a part of the Jewish religious tradition, not the whole, then Sean’s statement is not tautological.

      Shmuel:

      Zionism that is not “grounded in the myths, symbols, beliefs and themes of ancient and classical Judaism” would not be “contemporary religious Zionism”

      It could be. Whether it is or not is a factual question, not a logical one.

    • Sibiriak January 8, 2013 at 4:15 am

      Shmuel:

      This is the statement I referred to as tautology:

      2. Contemporary Jewish religious Zionism is grounded in the myths, symbols, beliefs and themes of ancient and classical Judaism.

      A reasonable definition of “contemporary Jewish religious Zionism” would be ‘a form of Zionism grounded in the myths symbols, beliefs and themes of ancient and classical Judaism’. Hence, tautology.

      The fact Sean's statement may express a reasonable definition of "contemporary Jewish religious Zionism" makes it at most a truism, not a tautology.

      For it to be a tautology, his statement would have to be necessarily true due to its logical form.

      In this case, however, it would be perfectly *logical* to assert the opposite of what Sean asserted: that "contemporary Jewish religious Zionism is NOT grounded in the myths, symbols, beliefs and themes of ancient and classical Judaism."

      Sean's proposition would become even more informative if one specified the meaning of the phrase: "the myths, symbols, beliefs and themes of ancient and classical Judaism".

      I attempted to do just that by identifying a grounding in newly re-emphasized nationalistic Old Testament narratives and themes, as opposed to certain themes in rabbinic Judaism, which had downplayed those Old Testament narratives.

      I don't claim that's the whole story, but I think it's a huge part of it.

    • Sibiriak January 7, 2013 at 4:40 am

      seanmcbride:

      2. Contemporary Jewish religious Zionism is grounded in the myths, symbols, beliefs and themes of ancient and classical Judaism.

      Shmuel:

      2. Tautology. Of course Jewish religious Zionism is grounded in elements of Jewish religious tradition. As a matter of fact, so is secular Zionism. Both groups however, have stressed those elements of tradition that reinforce their beliefs (Zionist and otherwise), reinterpreting, reinventing or discarding those that don’t.

      I agree with Shmuel's statement (including the continuation), but I don't think he necessarily demonstrates that Sean's statement is tautological.

      Sean refers specifically to "ancient and classical Judaism", while Shmuel refers to "the Jewish religious tradition" in general.

      If you take "ancient and classical Judaism" to be only a part of the Jewish religious tradition, not the whole, then Sean's statement is not tautological. It suggests which particular elements of the Jewish religious tradition were emphasized and privileged by secular Zionism and "Zionized Judaism".

      The question, though, is: what specifically did Sean mean by "the myths, symbols, beliefs and themes of ancient and classical Judaism"?

      I'm going to engage in some conjecture-- I could be way off base, I admit.

      Based on Sean's previous references to Biblical tales of conquest, ethnic cleansing, genocide, a "Chosen People", a "Promised Land" etc. in discussing (religious and secular) Zionist ideology, I'm thinking that he's referring to Jewish religious thought which emphasizes Old Testament narratives as opposed to Rabbinical traditions which de-emphasized those narratives (and, in fact, prohibited mass migration to the Holy Land).

      Shlomo Sands ("The Invention of the Jewish People") writes:

      For there to be a national consciousness, a modern collective identity, both mythology and teleology are required. The foundation myth was, of course, the textual cosmos of the Old Testament, whose narrative, historical component became a vibrant mythos in the latter half of the nineteenth century, despite the philological criticisms aimed at it.20 For Graetz, the teleology was nurtured by a vague and not yet wholly nationalist assumption that the eternal Jewish people were destined to bring salvation to the world.

      The centuries-old Jewish communities never thought of the Old Testament as an independent work that could be read without the interpretation and mediation of the “oral Torah” (the Mishnah and Talmud).

      It had become, mainly among the Jews of Eastern Europe, a marginal book that could be understood only through the Halakhah (religious law) and of course its authorized commentators.

      The Mishnah and Talmud were the Jewish texts in regular use; passages from the Torah (the Pentateuch) were introduced, without any narrative continuity, in the form of a weekly section read aloud in the synagogues. The Old Testament as a whole remained the leading work for the Karaites in the distant past and for Protestants in modern times.

      For most Jews through the centuries, the Bible was holy scripture and thus not really accessible to the mind, just as the Holy Land was barely present in the religious imagination as an actual place on earth.

      Mostly products of rabbinical schools, educated Jews who were feeling the effects of the secular age and whose metaphysical faith was beginning to show a few cracks longed for another source to reinforce their uncertain, crumbling identity.

      The religion of history struck them as an appropriate substitute for religious faith, but for those who, sensibly, could not embrace the national mythologies arising before their eyes—mythologies unfortunately bound up with a pagan or Christian past—the only option was to invent and adhere to a parallel national mythology.

      This was assisted by the fact that the literary source for this mythology, namely the Old Testament, remained an object of adoration even for confirmed haters of contemporary Jews. And since their putative ancient kingdom in its own homeland presented the strongest evidence that Jews were a people or a nation—not merely a religious community that lived in the shadow of other, hegemonic religions—the awkward crawl toward the Book of Books turned into a determined march in the imagining of a Jewish people.

      ------

      Henceforth, for many people, Judaism would no longer be a rich and diverse religious civilization that managed to survive despite all difficulties and temptations in the shadow of giants, and became an ancient people or race that was uprooted from its homeland in Canaan and arrived in its youth at the gates of Berlin.

      This major transformation of Judaism (not complete, of course), which began in the late 19th century and accelerated rapidly after the Holocaust (and further after 1967), seems to me a key part of what Sean is trying to draw attention to.

      Shmuel:

      If you are referring to the Gush Emunim variety of religious Zionism, they certainly go to great lengths to find “Jewish” roots for all of their beliefs and actions. The views of “progressive” (e.g. Reform) religious Zionists on the other hand, are virtually indistinguishable from those of their secular Zionist counterparts.

      Yes, but all those groups turn to the Old Testament to ground their ideologies. As it has been said: the religious Zionist says, "God exists, and he gave us this land"; the secular Zionist says, "God doesn't exist, and he gave us this land."

  • The dead two-state dream remains alive in mainstream media
    • Sibiriak January 5, 2013 at 11:11 pm

      Annie Robbins:

      i don’t recall ever reading the Palestinian Authority has given up Area C. that seems really out there. perhaps i am misinterpreting what that means

      For Halper, "Given up on Area C" seems to mean that the PA has *in fact* given up on Area C, even if the *rhetoric* is otherwise.

      [Halper:] When government or agencies come to the Palestinian Authority for investments, the PA tell them invest only in Area A and Area B. Do not invest in Area C. They’ve given up C.

      Perhaps that's hyperbolic, but he may have a point.

    • Sibiriak January 4, 2013 at 2:05 am

      Henry Norr:

      It’s not just Netanyahu who stands in the way – who in Israeli politics is prepared to push any plan like those, and where among the Israeli public would they seek political support?

      Exactly.

    • Sibiriak January 3, 2013 at 1:56 am

      Here's a link to the Halper interview:

      link to icahdusa.org

      I don't have any link for the report he mentions.

      A quick Google search didn't turn up anything that supports Halper's contention. I suspect he is being hyperbolic.

    • Sibiriak January 3, 2013 at 12:51 am with 6 replies

      "Bantustans" or a non-contiguous "state" (recognized by the UN?)--call it what you want, that's what we are heading for.

      Jeff Halper speculates that the PA will eventually agree to some kind of "viable apartheid":

      < Israel could well annex area C, which is 60 per cent of the West Bank. Now, a couple of months ago the European Council diplomats in Jerusalem and Ramallah sent a report to the EU saying that Israel has forcibly expelled the Palestinians from area C. Forcible expulsion is hard language for European diplomats to use.

      [...] So area C contains less than 5 per cent of the Palestinian population. In 1967 the Jordan valley contained about 250,000 people. Today it’s less than 50,000. So the Palestinians have either been driven out of the country, especially the middle class, or they have been driven to areas A and B. That’s where 96 or 97 per cent of them are.

      The Palestinian population has been brought down low enough, there is probably somewhere around 12,5000 Palestinians in area C, so Israel could annex area C and give them full citizenship.

      Basically, Israel can absorb 125,000 Palestinians without upsetting the demographic balance. And then, what is the world going to say? It’s not apartheid, Israel has given them full citizenship. So I think Israel feels it could get away with that.

      No one cares about what’s happening in areas A and B. If they want to declare a state, they can...

      In other words, we’re finished. Israel is now from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River, the Palestinians have been confined in areas A and B or in small enclaves in East Jerusalem, and that’s it.

      Now the wrinkle is that I think they will do this with the agreement of the Palestinian Authority because Fayyad is a neoliberal.

      Fayyad is saying to Israel, we don’t need territory. If you give us economic space, to do business, and our business class can do okay and we can trickle down to our working classes, it’s good enough. So we don’t need Area C.

      As a matter of a fact what the European Counsel General said in its report is that the Palestinian Authority has given up Area C. Completely. When government or agencies come to the Palestinian Authority for investments, the PA tell them invest only in Area A and Area B. Do not invest in Area C. They’ve given up C.

      The idea is that Israel allows trade, to move freely between these Palestinian enclaves. I call it “viable apartheid”. I think Fayyad has developed a viable apartheid, saying that in the neoliberal world we need economic space, not territorial space. You let us move our goods freely into the Arab world, you give us an access to the Israeli market, and it’s fine. In other words, all the developments, like this new city Rawabi for upper-class

      Palestinians, are in the contours of Area A and B. They are now building a highway from Ramallah to Jericho; the Japanese are building it with the PA. Then either the Japanese or USAID will build from Ramallah to Bethlehem so greater Jerusalem, with E1, will be incorporated into Israel.

      I think you can get into a deal where Israel annexes Area C, it’s taken Jerusalem, they’ll give the Palestinians something symbolic like control of Haram Al Sharif/The Temple Mount, you can put up a capital in Abu Dis again. Basically, what I am saying is not only that they are they going to nail this down but they will do it with the agreement of the Palestinian Authority.

      And then there is this:

      ...earlier this month, Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported that Abbas informed several PLO leaders "to be prepared for a new confederation project with Jordan and other parties in the international community," and that his office has already issued reports that evaluate "the best strategies to lead possible negotiations with Jordan" toward "reviving the confederation."

      He has reportedly asked PLO officials to prepare themselves to pursue this strategy. This report, if confirmed by official sources, could be a watershed moment for the Palestinian national movement, and the highest profile endorsement of this persistent proposal.

      Abbas's willingness to explore a Jordanian confederation comes on the heels of the United Nation's recent declaration of Palestine as an observer state by a 138-9 vote. This clear victory for Abbas gives him the political capital to explore such a potentially controversial move -- and also the international recognition of sovereignty that would allow Palestinians to enter into a confederation with Jordan as equal partners.

      link to theatlantic.com

  • With conventional wisdom solidifying behind Hagel, will Obama finally declare on 'Meet the Press?'
    • Sibiriak January 5, 2013 at 11:48 pm

      lysias,

      Imagine the reaction if this court, because of its Catholic majority, decides to overrule Roe v. Wade.

      If this court overruled Roe, it could because the majority is conservative, not because it is Catholic.

    • Sibiriak January 5, 2013 at 12:51 am

      seanmcbride:

      One can point to many public statements by major Jewish religious leaders which are clearly merging Zionism and Judaism into a single belief system. Many of them are cheerleaders for Israel, and are using their interpretations of Judaism and Torah to defend and promote the policies of the Israeli government.

      It's somewhat surprising that your description of the merging of Zionism and Judaism is meeting with such resistance here. It seems rather uncontroversial to me (with the necessary caveats, exceptions etc. of course.)

  • Who started it?
    • Sibiriak December 20, 2012 at 12:04 pm

      The people of the Gaza Strip have now been under occupation for 46 years,

      1962

      Canadian Lt.-General E.L.M. Burns, chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (1954-1956), "Between Arab and Israeli" :

      The Strip is about forty kilometres long, and averages eight and a quarter kilometres in width; thus it contains about 330 square kilometres.

      There are about 310,000 Arab residents in the Strip, 210,000 of them refugees from the southern parts of Palestine now occupied by Israel. Thus there are about 1500 persons to the square kilometre of arable soil -- about 3900 to the square mile ...

      One does not see people starving or dying of disease in the streets; nevertheless the Gaza Strip resembles a vast concentration camp, shut off by the sea, the border between Palestine and the Sinai near Rafah, which the Egyptians will not permit them to cross, and the Armistice Demarcation Line which they cross in peril of being shot by Israelis or imprisoned by the Egyptians.

      They can look east and see wide fields, once Arab land, cultivated extensively by a few Israelis, with a chain of kibbutzim guarding the heights or the areas beyond.

      It is not surprising that they look with hatred on those who have dispossessed them.

  • Israeli army releases video of Dec. 12 killing of Palestinian youth at Hebron checkpoint
    • Sibiriak December 17, 2012 at 8:23 pm

      link to haaretz.com

      As the incident occurred at night, and the footage was filmed from a distance, it is not possible to see whether or not the deceased was holding a toy gun. Nevertheless, it is clear in the footage that Salima had attacked the Border Police officer before being shot.

      The video is 43 seconds long and has been edited. Salima is seen approaching the officer and speaking with him, then walking around near the guard post before attacking the police officer with his fists. It should be noted that Salima was an outstanding wrestler, who represented Palestine in various international competitions. The policewoman who saw the incident is then seen walking out of the guard post and shooting Salima.

      From the outset, the female Border Police officer testified that she had seen Salima attack the policeman and remove from his pocket a gun, which she thought was real. The video shows her version of the incident was true.

      If it is "is not possible to see whether or not the deceased was holding a toy gun" , the the video doesn't show that all elements of her version are true.

      True or not, I don't think it is wise of anti-Zionists to presume the story MUST be false, especially while more information is still coming in.

      All the discussion on the details of this single incident can distract from the larger picture: the oppressive nature of the Occupation and apartheid system that is the context for these kinds of incidents.

    • Sibiriak December 17, 2012 at 7:56 pm

      Obsidian:

      ... pointing something at the soldier’s head and than assaulting the soldier.

      I'm not sure about that. If you are talking about his right hand, the kid proceeds to strike the soldier with that hand. It's not clear he's holding anything.

    • Sibiriak December 17, 2012 at 7:49 pm

      How many times was the kid shot?

  • In 'Dissent' debate, Walzer hints that leftists who focus on Israel are anti-Semitic
    • Sibiriak January 2, 2013 at 1:17 am

      Hostage,

      On the one hand you write:

      The national home in Palestine was only a Palestinian one.

      And on the other hand:

      So, the notion that Palestine only contained one national home was formally rejected.

      With all due respect, you are contradicting yourself.

      Actually, you can't avoid these contradictions, since from your narrow personal perspective, the Mandate's call to establish a Jewish national home was merely "hortatory boilerplate," while for everyone involved-- the British, the Zionists, the Arab Palestinians et al.--it was a whole lot more than that.

    • Sibiriak January 1, 2013 at 7:27 pm

      Hostage,

      The only subject we’re discussing is Khalidi’s legal interpretation of an international legal instrument ...

      Neither Khalidi nor I ever restricted our remarks to legal interpretations.

      Jews residing in other countries were still considered “immigrants” and “illegal aliens” there, and they had absolutely no enforceable civil right to even step foot in the country without obtaining a visa.

      1)According to article 7 of the Mandate, Britain was obligated to enact a nationality law with provisions framed so as to:

      to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

      2) A visa requirement hardly negates the concept of a "national home" for the "Jewish People"--including Jews outside of Palestine. Even today, Jews wishing to immigrate to Israel under the Law of Return must obtain a visa.

      The President of the Zionist Organization considered the majority of European Jews little more than dust, with no future, who were deemed unfit for immigration.

      That document you cite is from 1940 and was speculating about the post-war situation to come. What it actually says is:

      It was to be anticipated, Dr. Weizmann said, that by the at the end of the war there would be at least 2,500,000 Jews seeking refuge. Of those perhaps 1,000,000 would represent Jews with a future and the others Jews whose lives where behind them--"who were but little more than dust". He believed it would be possible to settle in Palestine 1,000,000 of those refugees....

      Hostage:

      My answer to that question posted previously was: I believe they did.

      No your answer was a complete evasion.

      You posed a question; I answered "yes"--that is not an evasion.
      Apparently, you can't take yes for an answer.

      because you said that particular legal mandate was beside the point (of our discussion about the British mandate).

      I said it was beside the point because (to your consternation) I agreed with you, as does Khalidi . There was no point debating something we all agreed on!

      If you wish to continue debating that point with yourself, be my guest.

      In any case, I appreciate all your informative contributions to this discussion. I've pretty much said all I have to say.

    • Sibiriak December 31, 2012 at 1:56 am

      Hostage:

      More to the point, I’ve provided links to the British Cabinet papers about the Balfour Declaration and the UNSCOP report.

      They stated that the term “national home” had no known legal connotation and that there were no precedents in international law for its interpretation.

      Many of the Zionists quoted in those sources thought the term only implied a shrine or national cultural center, like the university on Mount Scopus

      I think that earlier comment or yours gets to the heart of our disagreement (and your legal fetishism).

      When you boil it down, your argument is that the various provisions in the Mandate calling for the protection of existing civil and religious rights for non-Jewish communities in Palestine were clear, valid and legally enforceable, while the provisions obligating the British government to establish, develop and expand a "national home for the Jewish People" were essentially meaningless--because they had "no known legal connotation and no precedent".

      I, following Khalidi, have argued that far from being meaningless, the Mandate's explicit call for Britain help reconstitute, develop and expand a Jewish national home in Palestine--a colonialist project-- critically privileged Jewish interests over Arab Palestinian interests. Furthermore, the explicit references to a "national home", "the Jewish people", "historical connections", etc. amounted to an official promulgation of all the foundational myths of Zionism.

      I have also argued that ambiguity of the term "national home" played right into the hands of Zionist interests, allowing the British to assist in the development of a Jewish proto-state, while giving Zionists "plausible deniability".

      The other (similar) point that cuts to the heart of this debate regards the central concept of a "Jewish people." You asserted that:

      The mandate made it quite clear that Palestine was not the national home of ALL the Jewish peoples.

      I contested that point. I questioned how you could substitute the plural notion of "Jewish peoples" for the singular term in the Mandate, "the Jewish people"?

      I asked you:

      How many Jewish peoples exist/existed, according to your theory? The national home in Palestine was intended for which of these peoples??

      Your response was very revealing, if evasive. You never explain which of the various "Jewish peoples" you think the "national home" in Palestine was intended for in the Mandate. You do say that:

      If you’re going to talk about cultural uniqueness, the national right of self-determination, and national homes, is there really only one White Anglo-Saxon people in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United States, Great Britain, & etc.?

      The British and Israeli governments couldn’t even get the Palestinian Jews to agree upon a single Chief Rabbi. The Ethiopian Jews had their own religious practices that the government of Israel has prohibited. Neither the mandate, nor the UN minority protection plan would have permitted the government to practice any such religious discrimination

      That statement really does not explain your remarkable claim that:

      The mandate made it quite clear that Palestine was not the national home of ALL the Jewish peoples.

      You seem to be arguing that the term "the Jewish people" is vague, undefinable etc., and therefore essentially meaningless in terms of the obligations imposed by the Mandate.

      You conclude, therefore, that:

      The national home in Palestine was only a Palestinian one.

      I submit that, however valid as an *ideal*, that notion flies in the face of the plain meaning of the Mandate when it used the term "national home for a the Jewish people".

      Personally, I happen to agree most of the arguments in Shlomo Sands "The Invention of the Jewish People"--- but the point is, that is not the way the Mandate viewed the issue.

      The Mandate states:

      …recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country

      It is abundantly clear that "The Jewish people" doesn't refer to simply the existing Jewish community in Palestine at the time, nor does it suggest that only that community has a "historical connection" with that land. It refers to Jews all over the world. (The 1922 White Paper refers to "Jews in other parts of the world", in that regard.)

      [Hostage:] Article 3 obliged the Mandatory to permit and encourage local autonomy for all the communities too.

      [Sibiriak:] “Local autonomy” for “all the communities” —except the Jewish *people* who get a “national home”. Can’t you see the disparity there?

      Apparently, you refuse to see that glaring disparity in the heart of the Mandate.

      It would be nice, indeed, if *under the terms of the Mandate*:

      The national home in Palestine was only a Palestinian one.

      Unfortunately, that was simply not the case, and no amount of wishful thinking can change that fact.

    • Sibiriak December 31, 2012 at 12:30 am

      Hostage:

      After the Zionists lost that battle, they tried to claim that it could be inferred from the reference to the protection of the political rights of the Jews in other countries, that only the civil and religious rights of non-Jews were protected.

      The House of Lords responded by adopting a resolution rejecting any Mandate that included the Balfour Declaration.

      I realize one of your favored debating strategies is to repeat the same arguments over and over, so that when those that disagree with you finally tire, one of the versions appears to stand uncontested.

      See my previous responses to those same points here:

      link to mondoweiss.net

      link to mondoweiss.net

      link to mondoweiss.net

      link to mondoweiss.net

      link to mondoweiss.net

    • Sibiriak December 30, 2012 at 11:09 pm

      Hostage,

      I’ve gone out of my way to cite legal authorities who say the term “Jewish national home” was, not only ambiguous, but that it had no known meaning or scope in international law.

      Here we find a perfect example of your LEGAL FETISHISM which is the basis for our fundamental disagreement.

      You claim that the term "Jewish national home" ( and presumably likewise, "a national home for the Jewish people") had no known meaning in international law, but Britain's rulers, Palestinian Arabs, Jews (Zionist, non-Zionist alike), the international community ALL understood the phrase "national home for the Jewish People" (and the specific obligations to facilitate the establishment of that national home) to be highly meaningful, even if there was dispute about that meaning.

      As Khalidi said:

      League of Nations Mandate made it a solemn responsibility of Great Britain to help the Jews create national institutions. The mandatory power was specifically called upon to extend all possible assistance to the growth and development of this national entity, notably by encouraging Jewish immigration and “close settlement on the land.” The tiny Jewish community of Palestine, composing about 10 percent of the country’s population at the time, was thereby placed in a distinctly privileged position.

      The fact that the meaning of the term "national home" was unclear, or even possibly non-existent, in international law at the time in no way negates Khalidi's point about Jewish interests being privileged over Arab Palestinian interests. International law is not the only reality.

      As I wrote previously:

      And the very ambiguity of the phrase “Jewish national home” in the Mandate itself tilted the document in favor of Jewish interests.

      The inclusion of such a phrase–the inclusion of entire Balfour Declaration–allowed for British-assisted development of a Jewish proto-state in Palestine, while the ambiguity allowed various figures to deny that such a “Jewish national home” was actually a potential state in the making.

      Moving on to your next point:

      [Sibiriak:] Whether or not British were obligated to preserve those Palestinian rights–I believe they were–is besides the point.

      [Hostage:] Propaganda fail! That was the entire point of this discussion. i.e. the fault was not the lack of adequate national recognition or legal guarantees for non-Jews in the Mandate instrument, it was that the government of Great Britain knowingly and willfully violated the ones that were deliberately included.

      1) We are having a reasonable debate here. Neither of us are propagandists.

      2) You conveniently omitted the continuation of my statement. I wrote:

      Unlike in 1911, the British government after the Mandate was explicitly obligated to facilitate Jewish immigration and settlement on the land. Thus, the Mandate established a NEW obligation to assist the Zionist project in Palestine that hadn’t existed previously.

      The simple fact is the Mandate required such facilitation of immigration and settlement ONLY in regards to the Jewish people.

      The British obligation to preserve existing rights of the "non-Jewish" communities, including the Arab Palestinians, IS besides the point since we BOTH AGREE on that obligation.

      Where we disagree is on the import of the British obligation to establish a "national home for the Jewish people" and to facilitate its growth and development.

      Your rhetorical strategy is to completely downplay if not totally deny such an obligation via the argument that the term "national home" was essentially meaningless.

      I find that argument entirely unconvincing and explained why.

      If the Mandate had the legal effects that you claim it did

      I never restricted my comments to legal effects.

      The Mandate set up a fundamental clash of rights and obligations. That clash could never be resolved in the sphere of international law alone, pace your legal fetishism.

      [Sibiriak:] The Mandate [...] promulgates all the foundational myths of Zionist ideology: the existence of an indivisible “Jewish People” with “historic rights” to “reconstitute” their “national home” in Palestine.

      This arguably set up a situation where, given the fundamental irreconcilability of aims, it would become increasingly likely that "massive force would have to be employed in order to impose a Jewish national home on the unwilling Arabs (Khalidi)."

    • Sibiriak December 30, 2012 at 9:58 pm

      Hostage,

      Apparently we’ll just have to wait for hell to freeze over then, because I still haven’t heard your response to this:

      Apparently, hell froze over! (It's very cold where I live).

      My answer to that question posted previously was: I believe they did.

      BUT, I also pointed out the fact that in addition to the the obligation to protect "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine", the Mandate obligated the British not only to protect, but to facilitate in multiple ways, a separate and new right of the Jewish People as a whole to reconstitute, develop and expand a national homeland in Palestine, i.e. the British were obligated to assist in a colonialist/Zionist project which was adamantly opposed by vast majority of the population.

      No matter how many points you make about the first obligation, they cannot negate the reality of the second obligation.

      Nor can they negate the fact that, under the terms of the Mandate, that second obligation was of a qualitatively different nature than the first, and that it singled out the Jewish People (not just the local Jewish community) from all the other existing local communities (who were lumped under the term "non-Jewish".)

      Here is some anecdotal evidence which explains why the establishment of self-governing institutions would have prevented the rights of the non-Jewish communities from being violated.

      Whether the violation of rights could have been prevented is pure historical speculation.

      Khalidi also speculated on that same point:

      Could the Palestinians have improved their situation by accepting some British proposals, whether for a legislative council or an Arab Agency?20

      Given the low ceiling that would have been imposed by the British in view of the terms of the Mandate, and that necessarily would have obliged the mandatory government to act in support of the Zionist project, any such body, irrespective of its makeup, would undoubtedly have had little impact on changing the nature of the pro-Zionist policies followed by the British in Palestine.

      Moreover, it would have given tacit Palestinian approbation to the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine [...]

      Nevertheless, any elected representation, no matter how hemmed in by restrictions, or how limited in proportion to the absolute Palestinian majority of the population, would have given the elected Palestinian representatives an uncontestable legitimacy, and an unparalleled platform from which to make their case. The Congress Party in India used state assemblies to just this end in the late 1930s.

      As with some limited form of acceptance of a Jewish national home, in the end this would probably have had at best only diplomatic or propaganda value.

      And there is no guarantee that the Palestinians would ever have been granted even sham representative institutions, given the ferocious opposition of the Zionist movement to anything that gave the Arabs a recognized, official, representative voice, and of British officials and politicians to anything that would have weakened the terms of the Mandate.

      But in view of the glaring weaknesses of the Palestinians in just these realms of diplomacy and public relations, acceptance of such proposals might conceivably have slowed the slide of their country into the hands of the Zionist movement.

      I think it is reasonable to think that the Palestinians could have done many things differently and slowed down the Zionist project.

      On the other hand, I don't think the " the establishment of self-governing institutions" would have derailed that project.
      No such institutions would have negated the British desire, obligation, and capacity to support it.

    • Sibiriak December 30, 2012 at 5:45 am

      Hostage:

      Frankly its the you two birds who either can’t or won’t respond to the questions I’ve asked

      I answered those questions. There is a very long delay before my posts appear.

    • Sibiriak December 29, 2012 at 9:02 pm

      Hostage,

      Sibiriak: 2) Show where the 1922 White Paper limited the “Jewish People” mentioned in the Mandate to the Jewish people that had already been in Palestine for several generations.

      Hostage: I already supplied the direct quote and a link which said that was the understanding of the British government when it made the Balfour declaration. link to mondoweiss.net

      The problem is: that quote does NOT back up Hostage's claim.

      The Mandate and the White Paper both refer to a "national home" for "the Jewish People" "in Palestine", as well as to an existing Jewish "community".

      Let's break this down conceptually:

      The "national home" is a part of mandatory Palestine. The White Paper says it is not the whole of Palestine. There is no dispute on that point. Furthermore, a "national home" does not necessarily mean separate statehood. No dispute there either. As I wrote earlier, the term is unclear, which played into Zionist hands--allowing British-assisted development of a Jewish proto-state while giving "plausible deniability" to Zionists at the same time.

      "The Jewish People" refers to Jews throughout the world. It is not limited to just the Jews living in Palestine at the time. The White Paper refers explicitly to "Jews in other parts of the world" and "the Jewish people as a whole". Hostage is flatly wrong to assert that the term "the Jewish People" is in any way limited---it can refer to Russian Jews, East European Jews, West European Jews, North African Jews, Iraqi Jews, Yemenite Jews, Indian Jews, Chinese Jews etc. etc.

      The Jewish "community" already existing in Palestine is an element of the Jewish People and that seminal element is to be developed and expanded via immigration, settlement on the land etc. within the Jewish people's national home so as to " provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities."

      According to the White Paper, the Jewish National Home "should should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection."

      According to the Mandate, the "Jewish people"--not just the local Jewish community -- have a "historical connection" with Palestine and "grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country."

      Now it should be clear that "reconstituting" the "national home for the Jewish people" does NOT simply mean guaranteeing the rights of the existing Jewish community in Palestine as just one local community among others with the same rights. Rather, it involves the British-assisted growth and development of that community so that it becomes a national home for the Jewish people *as a whole*.

      KEY POINT: The Mandate thus promulgates all the foundational myths of Zionist ideology: the existence of an indivisible "Jewish People" with "historic rights" to "reconstitute" their "national home" in Palestine.

      The White Paper is an attempt to assure the Arab Palestinians that this "national home for the Jewish people" to be reconstituted and expanded should not alarm them.

      In fact, they were right to be alarmed. History proves that in spades.

      The Mandate had many ambiguous and contradictory elements. It could be interpreted in different ways. Nevertheless, it formally enshrined the basic elements of Zionism and obligated the British government to facilitate their realization. The Palestinian Arabs--90% of the population--were given no right to reject this colonialist project.

      Hostage would have us believe there was no ambiguity in the Mandate, no internal contradictions or contradictions with other elements of international law. He argues that rulings by certain international courts--many decades after Mandatory Palestine ceased to exist--clear up any ambiguities and establish an indisputable meaning for the Mandate for all time.

      This is not only a misguided view of how legal documents and declarations function in history, but also a complete misreading of Khalidi's basic argument.

      Khalidi was not arguing for a singular, fixed-for-all-time interpretation of the meaning of the Mandate. He was showing how the Mandate--with all its ambiguities and contradictions--served to privilege Jewish interests over Arab Palestinian interests and provide *the foundation*for a British-backed Zionist colonialist project in Palestine against the wishes of the vast majority of the population. (In other sections of his book, Khalidi talks about the failure of the Palestinian leadership to effectively resist this colonialist project--he doesn't let them off the hook at all.)

      I provided a link to one such debate between Jews, Palestinians, and other lawmakers in the Ottoman Parliament of 1911. Please answer my question: Did the British have an obligation to preserve the rights hitherto enjoyed by the Palestinians to participate in representative lawmaking bodies that debated and adopted laws regulating Jewish immigration?

      Whether or not British were obligated to preserve those Palestinian rights--I believe they were--is besides the point.

      Unlike in 1911, the British government after the Mandate was explicitly obligated to facilitate Jewish immigration and settlement on the land. Thus, the Mandate established a NEW obligation to assist the Zionist project in Palestine that hadn't existed previously.

      The simple fact is the Mandate required such facilitation of immigration and settlement ONLY in regards to the Jewish people.

    • Sibiriak December 29, 2012 at 12:07 pm

      Hostage,

      1) Please provide a quote for that.

      I already cut and pasted the text and supplied the link to the White Paper here: link to mondoweiss.net

      Hostage, I'm asking for a specific quote from the White Paper. I've read it. I don't need a link to it. It does not say what you claim it says, i.e., the "Jewish national home was the existing Jewish community."

      You can go argue with His Majesty’s Government over its understanding of the terms “national home” or “communities”

      My problem is not with the British government's interpretation of those terms, it is with YOUR idiosyncratic interpretation.

      You conflate those two terms. You make the nonsensical claim that a "national home for the Jewish People" = just the existing Jewish
      "community."

      By doing so, you are in effect saying that the obligation to establish a "national home for the Jewish people" was meaningless, since that "national home" was the already-existing Jewish community. How can there be a mandate to establish something that already exists?

      Likewise, when the Mandate states:

      ...recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country

      you are in effect saying that is meaningless, since the Jewish national home is simply the existing Jewish "community" there could be nothing to reconstitute. (Clearly, the "historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine" refers to Jews all over the world--not just the Jewish "community" in Palestine-- and "their" refers that Jewish people.)

      Your whole argument is sophistry intended to make it seem like the Mandate never mandated a "national home for the Jewish people" --and only the Jewish people-- and all the concomitant obligations of the British government to facilitate that colonialist enterprise.

    • Sibiriak December 29, 2012 at 11:37 am

      Hostage,

      Sibiriak: That is not propaganda, that is a simple fact–a direct quotation from the text of the Mandate. See Article 4.

      Hostage: Nothing in Article 4 mentions diplomatic recognition in Geneva.

      Nobody said it did!

      Please recall it is THIS exact statement which you called "propaganda":

      [Khalidi] This latter point is extremely important, for BY THE TERMS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATE, the Jewish Agency was “recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine.

      That statement is true, and the phrase in quotation marks IS a direct quote from the text in the Mandate. It is NOT propaganda. My statement stands.

      Note: Khalidi never said that article 4 directly mentioned diplomatic status--that is another strawman of your own invention.

      He said: "The resulting recognized international standing of the Jewish Agency meant that the Zionist movement was entitled to diplomatic representation in Geneva." Note the word "resulting". And he called this a " quasi-official diplomatic status". To repeat, he never said it was an official status mentioned in article 4, as you falsely assert.

      It doesn't go without notice that you routinely distort Khalidi's positions in order to easily refute your distortions.

      We’ve already shown that Article 7 of the Mandate required Jews to be treated as Palestinian citizens and nationals.

      You distort the intent of Article 7, once again making it seem like a restriction on Jewish Zionist interests when in fact it was intended to *serve* those interests.

      Let's look at Article 7:

      The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

      This provision is not simply a requirement that Jews *living in Palestine* be treated as "Palestinian citizens and nationals". Far more importantly, it obligates Britain to facilitate the acquisition of citizenship in Palestine for *new Jewish immigrants* coming from outside Palestine. Britain, thus, was clearly obligated to serve Zionist interests.

    • Sibiriak December 29, 2012 at 7:41 am

      Hostage:

      Khalidi: ...BY THE TERMS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATE, the Jewish Agency was “recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine.”

      Hostage: Oh Please. Now you’re adding insult to injury by repeating more propaganda.

      That is not propaganda, that is a simple fact--a direct quotation from the text of the Mandate. See Article 4.

      Hostage: The British used that same clause to remind the Jewish Agency that it had no role in the actual decision making process or in governing Palestine.

      You've missed (or deliberately ignored) Khalidi's point. He never claimed that the Jewish agency wasn't a consultative and advisory body to the Administration in Palestine and to the British government.

      What Khalidi DID point out was that:

      The resulting recognized international standing of the Jewish Agency meant that the Zionist movement was entitled to diplomatic representation in Geneva before the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, in London, and elsewhere.

      By contrast, the Palestinians had no international standing whatsoever, and indeed were often dependent on the hostile and unsympathetic British for such unsatisfactory diplomatic representation as they could obtain in Geneva and elsewhere.

      [...]The significance of the quasi-official diplomatic status accorded to the Jewish Agency by Britain and the League of Nations through the Mandate thus cannot be overemphasized.

      It gave the Zionist movement an international legitimacy and guaranteed it invaluable access in world capitals, besides providing the framework within which the Zionist para-state that ultimately became Israel could be constructed without hindrance, and indeed with ample British and international support.28

      Khalidi, thus, described one more critical example of how the Mandate privileged Jewish interests over those of the Palestinians.

      Your response ignored that entirely.

    • Sibiriak December 29, 2012 at 7:02 am

      Hostage,

      Article 6 said that the Jews were denied settlement on any state lands or waste lands that were required for public purposes. IOW the public interest trumped the interest in establishing the Jewish national home.

      Your conclusion does not follow from your premise. The public interest in the premise only refers to state lands.

      Let's take a look at Article 6:

      The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

      In your selective and distortionary representation of that article, you make it sound as if it were a restriction on Jewish Zionist interests.

      In fact, it is just the opposite. The reference to State lands and waste lands required for public use is an *exception* to the main intention, which is to obligate the British to facilitate Jewish immigration and settlement of the land. It positively calls for Jewish settlement in State lands, with that exception.

      These obligations to facilitate immigration and settlement refer to only ONE group--the Jewish people--not to any other "community" in Palestine.

      Furthermore, these obligations involve assistance to Jews coming from OUTSIDE Palestine--members of the Jewish people as a whole--not simply assistance to the local, pre-existing Jewish population.

    • Sibiriak December 29, 2012 at 6:36 am

      Hostage:

      Article 3 obliged the Mandatory to permit and encourage local autonomy for all the communities too.

      "Local autonomy" for "all the communities" ---except the Jewish *people* who get a "national home". Can't you see the disparity there?

      You are attempting to show that a "national home" was nothing more than "local autonomy" for the existing Jewish community in Palestine. That is utterly fallacious. If it was, there would have been no need to spell out the obligation to establish a "national home for the Jewish people", the requirements for immigration and settlement of the land, a special status for a Jewish agency etc. The Mandate could just have recognized a requirement for local autonomy for all the communities. It explicitly and decidedly did NOT do that.

      I've already quoted from the Mandate's various provisions that show that the "national home" for the Jewish *people* involved much than local autonomy for the existing Jewish community.

      Churchill’s White Paper described the Jewish national home as the existing autonomous Jewish community that had been recreated during the previous two or three generations.

      That is false--- as the quotes from that White Paper which I cited prove.

      Repeating a falsehood several times doesn't make any less false.

    • Sibiriak December 29, 2012 at 1:09 am

      Hostage,

      The mandatory said it was only necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, not that it should be created...

      1) According to the 1922 White Paper:

      They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be FOUNDED "in Palestine." [emphasis added]

      Note the term "founded". "Founding" a national home for the Jewish people is not simply "internationally guaranteeing" such a home, as you suggest.

      2) The Mandate itself states:

      Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the ESTABLISHMENT in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people... [emphasis added].

      Like the term "founded", the term "establishment" goes far beyond simply "international guarantees".

      3) Article 4 of the Mandate states:

      An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the ESTABLISMENT of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine...

      Again we fine the term "establishment". Note also that it is clear that the meaning of the term "Jewish national home" is not coterminous with the "Jewish population in Palestine".

      4)Article 6 of the Mandate states:

      The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

      The obligation to "facilitate" Jewish immigration and settlement far exceeds any simple requirement for international guarantees.

      Your interpretation that the "national home for the Jewish home" refers only the Jewish community that had *already* been "recreated" in Palestine simply does not accord with the texts of the Mandate, the Balfour Declaration, the 1922 White Paper etc. It was not interpreted that way by either the British, the Palestinians, the Jews.

      The Mandate clearly called for the *establishment* of a national home for *the Jewish people*, not simply Jews that were already living there, and it called for the British-assisted growth and development of that national home through immigration, settlement of the land etc..

      That community was described as the Jewish national home.

      Again, that is nonsensical. A "community" cannot be a "national home". A "national home" is a territory/polity FOR a people with national aspirations.

      Since the small community of Jews in Palestine at the time were only a small portion of the Jewish people as a whole, it is simply illogical and conceptually incoherent to say that that a small Jewish community WAS the national home for *the Jewish people.*

      The obligation for the British to facilitate the immigration/settlement of Jews from any where in the world into this newly established national home for the Jewish people would make no sense if that home was only the existing Jewish community itself.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 8:04 pm

      Hostage,

      White Paper said the Jewish national home was the existing Jewish community that had already been in Palestine for 2 or 3 generations

      1) Please provide a quote for that. In any case, that statement makes no sense. A community is a group of people; a home is place and/or polity for those people. Two different concepts.

      2) Show where the 1922 White Paper limited the "Jewish People" mentioned in the Mandate to the Jewish people that had already been in Palestine for several generations.

      3) Show evidence for any statements of restriction on Jewish immigration and/or settlement in the terms of the Mandate, immigration/settlement which the British were obligated to facilitate.

      ....the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may

      That statement flatly contradicts your remarkable claim that the "national home for the Jewish people" was somehow limited by the Mandate to the existing Jewish community.

      And if there is ambiguity on that issue, I would argue that once again, it only played into Zionist hands, making the wording of the Mandate further prejudiced toward Jewish interests over Palestinian interests.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 7:53 pm

      Hostage,

      Sibiriak: What he is saying is that the Mandate didn’t EXPLICITLY recognize the Palestinians as a people, while it did explicitly call for a Jewish national home

      Hostage:....have him read paragraph 70 of the ICJ advisory opinion and get right back

      Hostage, I assume you know what "explicitly" means. If the Mandate explicitly recognized the Palestinians as a people with clear rights to self-determination in the modern sense, please quote the section that makes that explicit recognition.

      A court interpretation (which you still haven't quoted) coming some what? 80+ years after the fact can hardly prove explicit recognition occurred when the Mandate was formulated!

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 7:44 pm

      Hostage,

      The Court said that amounted to national recognition of the communities, but Khalidi claims that it did not.

      1) Please define "national recognition" and "communities" and the "self-determination" of "peoples" in the modern sense---and provide quotation(s) for the court's position on the connection between those terms.

      2) "National recognition of the communities" is NOT equivalent to a recognition of a people as a people with national rights and a right of self-determination. "Communities" often revered to religious communities, and as you well know, religious communities were not necessarily peoples with rights to self-determination in given territory.

      3) The Mandate refers to "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" . These rights had a long history, and dealt with various groups, including religious communities. In contrast, the right of self-determination was a relatively new right, solidifying legally after WWI, and applying only to certain peoples. Therefore, references to long-standing rights of various "communities" does NOT necessarily equate to a modern right of a qualifying people to self-determination.

      4) No matter what, a very recent ruling of a court couldn't possibly have any impact on the interpretation of the Mandate during the time it was in effect. It is that historical interpretation that Khalidi is dealt with as you know.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 7:28 pm

      Talkback says:

      Please stop Hostage!!!

      Khalidi is talking only about the ARAB or NONJEWISH Palestinians when he says “Palestinian people”.

      Yes, that is patently obvious, yet Hostage continues with his fallacious conflating of different meanings. Don't expect him to stop, though.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 10:25 am

      Shingo:

      I would love to her your thoughts about whether creating a Jewish National home in Palestine was contrary to the intent of the Mandates ie. that they should facilitate the transition of existing states towards statehood.

      That's a excellent point. Khalidi, btw, has a long section showing how Mandates for other states where not compromised in the same was as the Palestine Mandate.

      that the whole business of creating a national home for the Jews was illegal because it was carried out without the prior consent of the local population in Palestine.

      That's a succinct way of putting it.

      In any case, it's getting late where I live, and I will have to bow out of this discussion, for a while at least.

      Hostage can have the last word, as always.

      I really do appreciate his amazingly informative posts, even if I disagree on certain points of interpretation.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 10:07 am

      Hostage,

      Hostage,

      Please provide a reliable source for that remarkable claim.

      The claim is entirely unremarkable. You are basing your objection on your assertion that:

      The Permanent Court of International Justice cleared-up any dispute over the meaning of the term of art “community” in the cases on the minority treaties that I cited earlier.

      1) Please provide quotations from that Court that assert that the Mandate recognized the Palestinian people as a people with national rights and the right to self-determination, since that is the issue under discussion.

      2) Please explain how a Court ruling made just recently could possibly have had any impact on the way the Mandate was interpreted during the time Mandatory Palestine existed. That is the issue Khalidi was dealing with, as you well know.

      They had the right to form and dissolve political unions, confederations, independent states, or to choose any other political status for the territory that they inhabited.

      The point you are failing to address is this:

      The Mandate *imposed* a Jewish “national home” of unspecified nature and size on the Palestinians. The Palestinian people had NO RIGHT to reject this imposition even though they made up some 90% of the people in mandatory Palestine.

      The Mandate obligated the British to facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine and "close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands"–without the Palestinians having any say in the matter.

      How could the Palestinians have an effective right to self-determination and national sovereignty over all their territory, if the British were facilitating Jewish immigration and Jewish settlement into a "national home" in Palestine?

      How could this British-facilitated immigration and settlement of Jewish people not be a colonialist project?

      Hostage: The mandate made it quite clear that Palestine was not the national home of ALL the Jewish peoples.

      You've yet to explain that remarkable statement. Which Jewish peoples were not supposed to immigrate to the "national home for the Jewish people"? Please provide evidence.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 9:41 am

      Hostage,

      The fact is that Article 13 said the mandatory was responsible for preserving the existing rights of the religious communities + securing free access to the Holy Places.

      With all due respect, that is a far cry from constituting a recognition of the Palestinian people and their *national* rights, including the right to self-determination in a specific territory.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 9:09 am

      Shingo,

      [the Palestinians' ] rights were being guaranteed and protected under the Mandate.

      Let's get down to brass tacks here.

      The Mandate obligated the British to put into effect the Balfour Declaration and create a "national home for the Jewish people".

      The Mandate also states:

      Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country.

      And:

      The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home

      And:

      An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine

      And:

      The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

      Taken together, these provisions in the Mandate amount to the *imposition* of a Jewish "national home" of unspecified nature and size on the Palestinians.

      It is not enough to point out provisions that recognize pre-existing rights, such as:

      nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine

      Neither is it sufficient to point out that the phrase "national home" is ambiguous and did not necessarily mean a state.

      The fact remains that the Jewish people-- not just Jews living in Palestine at the time--were given rights to immigrate into Palestine and set up a national home--and the Palestinians had NO RIGHT to object to this imposition.

      Furthermore, even though rights were recognized for various "non-Jewish" communities, the Palestinians were NOT recognized as a people with national rights and aspirations as the Jewish people were. A Palestinian national identity had just recently come into being, so all references to previously existing rights did NOT amount to a recognition of a Palestinian people with *national* rights.

      Neither you nor Hostage has responded to the fact that the Mandate obligated the British to facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestinian--without the Palestinians having any say in the matter.
      This being the case even though Palestinians made up some 90% of the territory in question.

      Since this Jewish national home was to be a home for the "Jewish people", with their supposed "historical connection" to Palestine--not just Jews living there at the time--- the British were committed by the Mandate to a COLONIAL PROJECT.

      Facilitating the inflow of an unspecified number of Jewish immigrants inevitably meant the loss of Palestinian land control and a weakening of their majority status. Pace Hostage, the Mandate has no clear provisions limiting the size of this immigration nor putting limitations on the term "the Jewish people".

      Furthermore, neither you nor Hostage has responded to the fact that:

      ...by the terms of the League of Nations Mandate, the Jewish Agency was “recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine.” The resulting recognized international standing of the Jewish Agency meant that the Zionist movement was entitled to diplomatic representation in Geneva before the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, in London, and elsewhere. By contrast, the Palestinians had no international standing whatsoever, and indeed were often dependent on the hostile and unsympathetic British for such unsatisfactory diplomatic representation as they could obtain in Geneva and elsewhere.

      If setting up a national home for all the Jewish People, recognizing the Jewish peoples' --not just specific Jews'---"historical connection" to Palestine, facilitating immigration into that national home, empowering the Jewish Agency and giving it international standing, without giving the Palestinian people ANY SAY in the matter and all the while failing to recognize the Palestinians as a people with *national* rights (not just pre-existing rights)--if all that doesn't constitute a privileging of Jewish interests over Palestinian interests, then you must be interpreting those terms in an extremely abnormal fashion.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 6:38 am

      Shingo:

      If the Palestinian communities had been under international guarantees that dated back “far in time” , then surely the Mandate was obliged top respect those guarantees .

      To be even clearer: yes, the Mandate was obliged to respect guarantees that dated back "far in time".

      But as I explained in a reply to Hostage, Khalidi is NOT referring to rights and guarantees dating back "far in time". He is referring to newly emerging rights of the Palestinians *as a people with national aspirations". Those emerging rights could not exist far back in time, since that Palestinian national consciousness itself did not exist until relatively recently.

      Khalidi:

      Palestinian identity [...]emerged during approximately the same period as did modern Zionism

      And that Palestinian identity was still in a state of formation in the early 2oth century.

      [The emergent Palestinian identity] included elements of Ottoman, Arab, Islamic and Christian, local Palestinian, and European ideologies and thought.60 While a certain synthesis of these elements eventually emerged to constitute modern Palestinian nationalist political consciousness, Palestinian politics nevertheless remained considerably less homogeneous ideologically than politics within the yishuv.

      Be that as it may, the central fact is that the Mandate privileged Jewish national aspirations over these *equally valid* Palestinian national aspirations: among other things, it specifically called for a "national home" for the "Jewish people" but made no references to the rights or aspirations or even the existence of a Palestinian people.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 6:17 am

      Hostage,

      The political rights mentioned there were either prejudiced by the Mandate, as Khalidi claimed, or they were not, as the Court claimed.

      Strawman: Khalidi never claimed THOSE "rights and privileges of the Palestinian communities had been under international guarantees that dated back 'far in time'" were prejudiced by the Mandate.

      This gets to your fundamental misunderstanding of Khalidi's argument.

      To repeat, he is NOT talking about rights dated back "far in time", he is talking about *newly emergent* rights, never previously specified or guaranteed by any Western power et al.

      It is these NEW rights, concomitant with the recent emergence of the Palestinians as a people with national aspirations, that Khalid says were prejudiced by the Mandate.

      Khalidi writes:

      The Mandate for Palestine issued by the League of Nations in July 1922 was an internationally recognized document representing the consensus of the great powers of the day as to the disposition of the former Ottoman territory of Palestine. By this time, many of the Arabs of Palestine were already COMING TO THINK OF THEMSELVES IN NATIONAL TERMS AS A PEOPLE.

      As I have shown elsewhere, this was only one of their overlapping senses of identity, which included being part of the larger Arab people and of Greater Syria, as well as having other religious, local, and familial identities.3 [emphasis added].

      The reality of Palestinians as a *people with a national identity and aspirations* was an emergent phenomenon, and thus the rights associated with that newly emerging reality were also NEW.

      Consequently, rights dating back "far in time" --no matter how protected by the Mandate-- couldn't possibly involve these newly emergent rights of the Palestinian people.

      Your whole argument fails because it mistakenly conflates qualitatively and historically disparate rights.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 5:56 am

      Shingo:

      If the Palestinian communities had been under international guarantees that dated back “far in time” , then surely the Mandate was obliged top respect those guarantees .

      The point you are missing: the Mandate never recognized any guarantees to the Palestinian people regarding a right to self-determination as a people nor to any right to a national existence as a sovereign people in all of their country. In contrast, the Mandate did recognize the Jewish people's right to a "national home" in Palestine.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 5:18 am

      Shingo,

      Palestine was already their home and their rights were being guaranteed and protected under the Mandate.

      False. Palestinian rights to self-determination and sovereignty over all their country were neither guaranteed nor protected under the Mandate.

      As Keith wrote:

      it is difficult to account for Zionist “success” without being aware of the significant British favoritism which provided the Zionists with incalculable advantage over the rival Palestinians. Indeed, I suspect that Israel would not have come into being as a Jewish state without significant imperial support, the necessity of which Zionists were aware of right from the beginning.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 12:37 am

      Hostage,

      I’m discussing the continuity of international guarantees for the protection of Palestinian political rights that flows from the Treaty of Berlin through the San Remo resolution and the Mandate and on to the minority protection plan contained in resolution 181(II)

      But the point you are missing is: those particular rights flowing from the Mandate etc. did NOT include a recognition of the rights of a *Palestinian people* per se, or the right of a *Palestinian people* to self-determination. On the other hand, the Mandate DID recognize the right of the *Jewish People* to a national home in Palestine.

      There is a fundamental asymmetry there which had a major impact on subsequent historical developments, whether you wish to acknowledge it or not.

      you and Khalidi say that they were not included in the mandate at all.

      Strawman: Khalidi does not say that. What he does say is:

      The tiny Jewish community of Palestine, composing about 10 percent of the country’s population at the time, was thereby placed in a distinctly privileged position.

      By contrast, the Arab majority, constituting 90 percent of Palestine’s population, was effectively ignored as a national or political entity.

      That's a far different proposition than the strawman you put forward.

      The ICJ noted that the international community has a legal obligation toward all of the Palestinian people that has nothing to do with the PLO or the achievement of statehood in part of the territory of Palestine. That obligation includes the rights of Palestinians living in Israel or in refugee camps in the region.

      Another strawman. Where does Khalidi ever deny that?

      Hostage: Khalidi is still running around shreying about the non-existent role of the PLO in securing equal rights for the Palestinian citizens of Israel.

      THAT is where you are really going off on a tangent. That has nothing to do with the argument about Mandatory Palestine.

    • Sibiriak December 28, 2012 at 12:17 am

      Sibiriak: And the very ambiguity of the phrase “Jewish national home”

      Correction: the phrase was "national home for the Jewish people."

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 11:51 pm

      Hostage,

      Khalidi was wrong and repeating shopworn Zionist propaganda when he claimed that the mandate only protected the civil and religious rights of Palestinians, but not their political rights.

      Corrections: 1)You are misconstruing what Khalidi has said to create a strawman.

      Khalidi:

      While the Mandate’s twenty-eight articles included nine on antiquities, not one related to the Palestinian people per se: they were variously and vaguely defined as a “section of the population,” “natives,” or “peoples and communities.”

      So, Khalidi's point is NOT to say that rights were not accorded to various individuals/groups, but that national political rights were not recognized for a *Palestinian people* per se, as they explicitly were for a "Jewish People" per se.

      Going on about:

      recognizing the members of the Palestinian communities

      does not in any way undercut Khalidi's argument about recognition of a Palestinian *people* per se.

      2) Khalidi is not "repeating Zionist propaganda". He is making a highly detailed anti-Zionist argument demonstrating the systematic suppression of Palestinian rights during the Mandatory period, and a partial basis for that suppression in the wording of Mandate itself.

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 11:40 pm

      Hostage:

      Sibriak: None of the sources you cited contradicts Khalidi’s comments on the Mandate and Balfour Declaration.

      Hostage: In fact the Judges in their ICJ advisory opinions cited the effects of the Class A Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as being instrumental in recognizing the members of the Palestinian communities and preserving their political rights to their territory and to a state of their own.

      Again, you fail to show how that contradicts Khalidi.

      Preserving the rights of "Palestinian communities"--i.e. various groups---Arabs, Jews et al.-- is NOT equivalent to recognition of the Palestinians as a separate people with national rights, a right to self-determination etc. A "state of their own" does NOT refer to a national state for the Palestinian *people*. (Here again, we see your fallacy of equivocation--playing on two different meanings of the phrase "Palestinian state").

      On the other hand, the Mandate, incorporating the Balfour Declaration, DID recognize separate rights for "the Jewish people", NOT just equal citizenship right for Jewish inhabitants of Mandatory Palestine.

      In other words, the Mandate did NOT recognize a Palestinian right to a national existence as a *sovereign people in all of their country.*

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 10:14 pm

      Hostage,

      You’re intentionally ignoring the explicit object of the mandate and the requirement in the very same sentence about the obligation for the mandatory to develop self-governing institutions while safeguarding civil and religious rights irrespective of race or religion.

      No, just the opposite. Far from ignoring that obligation, what I've been doing is *contrasting* that obligation with the obligation to assist in the creation and development of a Jewish national in Palestine.

      Those two obligations are NOT of the same type; they are qualitatively different. Your argument that they were both legally binding in no way changes that fact.

      And the very ambiguity of the phrase "Jewish national home" in the Mandate itself tilted the document in favor of Jewish interests. The inclusion of such a phrase--the inclusion of entire Balfour Declaration--allowed for British-assisted development of a Jewish proto-state in Palestine, while the ambiguity allowed various figures to deny that such a "Jewish national home" was actually a potential state in the making.

      Thus, Khalidi writes about the *real historical effects of the wording of the Mandate*, not legal interpretations made decades later, long after the damage had been done, such as the very recent ICJ analysis you cite (which, in any case, doesn't contradict Khalidi.)

      Khalidi:

      A further problem facing the Palestinians is well summarized by the political scientist Issa Khalaf:

      “More fundamentally than self-governing institutions, the lack of effective power over the State meant that the Palestinian Arab notability which headed the national movement would be unable to use the resources of the state to centralize power in its hands and thereby develop into a cohesive stratum.”25

      This lack of even a minimal level of cohesion by comparison with other Arab elites, resulting in some part from the systematic British denial of access to power over a state mechanism, would long continue to plague the Palestinian leadership, even after the catastrophe of 1948.

      Nor did the Palestinians even have a para-state structure like the Jewish Agency, since the British would only recognize an Arab Agency, as Passfield suggested they might in 1930, on condition that they accepted the terms of the Mandate.

      We have seen that THE PALESTINIANS CONSIDERED THE MANDATE TO CONSTITUTE THE NEGATION OF THEIR NATIONAL EXISTENCE AS A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE IN ALL OF THEIR COUNTRY. (emphasis added)

      A "national existence as a sovereign people in all their country" is NOT compatible with the British drive to assist the development of a "Jewish national home" in that country. That's the fundmental problem with the Mandate that Khalidi explains in "The Iron Cage".

      An earlier British proposal, made in 1923, for an Arab Agency to be appointed by the high commissioner (rather than elected as in the Jewish case) was, in the words of Ann Mosely Lesch, “a pale reflection of the Jewish Agency,” without most of its power and functions, WITHOUT SANCTION IN THE MANDATE, without independence, and without international standing.26

      This latter point is extremely important, for BY THE TERMS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATE, the Jewish Agency was “recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine.” The resulting recognized international standing of the Jewish Agency meant that the Zionist movement was entitled to diplomatic representation in Geneva before the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, in London, and elsewhere. By contrast, the Palestinians had no international standing whatsoever, and indeed were often dependent on the hostile and unsympathetic British for such unsatisfactory diplomatic representation as they could obtain in Geneva and elsewhere.

      Once again, Khalidi demonstrates how the Mandate privileged Jewish interests over Palestinian interests.

      As ‘Auni ‘Abd al-Hadi, a member of the 1930 Palestinian delegation, complained to Passfield when the latter suggested that the delegation take their grievances to the Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva, rather than addressing them to the British: “When we submit a petition to the League of Nations it is carried by His Majesty’s Government who is there our antagonist, we are not represented there, and our case is being made by our opponents.”27

      The significance of the quasi-official diplomatic status ACCORDED TO THE JEWISH AGENCY BY BRITAIN AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS THROUGH THE MANDATE thus cannot be overemphasized. It gave the Zionist movement an international legitimacy and guaranteed it invaluable access in world capitals, besides providing the framework within which the Zionist para-state that ultimately became Israel could be constructed without hindrance, and indeed with ample British and international support.28

      Palestinian politics were thus condemned to an even higher level of frustration than politics in the other Arab countries.

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 9:32 pm

      Hostage,

      It requires a strained and untenable reading to conclude that only the Jewish communities were Palestinian ones.

      It requires a strained imagination to concoct such a strawman.

      Please cite where Khalidi or any one else in this debate asserted that "only the Jewish communities were Palestinian ones".

      neither the scope of the “Palestine administration” nor its “nationality law” were intended to be limited in any way to the act of conferring “Palestinian citizenship” on only those Jews to the exclusion of any other group.

      Another strawman. Khalidi never made such an assertion.

      It surprises me that you would want to spend so much of your time writing voluminous posts to refute assertions of your own making.

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 2:06 pm

      Hostage,

      The ICJ noted in its advisory opinion that the rights and privileges of the Palestinian communities had been under international guarantees that dated back “far in time”. The Court cited Article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin (1878) as one of the more recent examples.

      But that doesn't contradict Khalidi's statement in any way.
      Just citing as many legal documents as you can come up with may impress some folks, but it doesn't lend any actual support to your assertions.

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 1:53 pm

      Hostage:

      Even after Churchill’s 1922 White Paper had attempted to limit the scope of the national home and quiet objections over its possible meanings, a resolution was introduced and adopted in the House of Lords which rejected any Palestine Mandate incorporating the terms of the Balfour Declaration on the grounds that it would violate the assurances given to the Sharif of Mecca as well as those made by General Allenby in his declaration to the Palestinian people of 1918.

      But the fact remains that the Palestine Mandate DID incorporate the terms of the Balfour Declaration.

      The fact that various assurances were indeed violated only further reinforces Khalidi's argument.

      So the Parliament most certainly did recognize the Palestinian people and the fact that its officials had given legal assurances to them about their future government.

      Again, the Khalidi statement which you object to referred only to the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, not to various other British positions and assurances which turned out to be largely worthless.

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 1:42 pm

      Hostage:

      FYI, every country that ratified the Treaty of Lausanne took on an explicit legal obligation to recognize the new state and Palestinian nationality.

      You are missing the point entirely. Khalidi is not denying that a new state was created, and thus a new "nationality". What he is saying is that the Mandate didn't explicitly recognize the Palestinians as a people, while it did explicitly call for a Jewish national home.

      To say that a Palestinian state/nationality was created by the Mandate does not contradict that at all, since in that phrase, "Palestinian" refers to the territory and its ALL its inhabitants--including both Palestinians and Jews and others groups-- not to the "Palestinian people" as such.

      In short, you are committing a fallacy of equivocation.

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 1:28 pm

      Hostage,

      the Courts held that proposition was completely invalid and that the mandate didn’t create any national privilege for the Jews at the expense of the rights of the Palestinian people.

      The Mandate created a right for a Jewish national home in Palestine in *addition* to any existing rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants.

      Obviously, that meant the Palestinian Arab majority then had NO right to reject a Jewish National home in Palestine.

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 1:16 pm

      Hostage,

      Correction: I cited the ICJ’s legal analysis of the rights and standing of the Palestinian people under the terms of the Class A mandate and Article 22

      But you have not shown how that legal analysis contradicts the specific statement by Khalidi which I cited.

      In fact, the week before the Balfour Declaration was released, Privy Council President Lord Curzon, War Cabinet Secretary Hankey, and Secretary of State for India Montagu wrote memorandums explaining that the term “Jewish National Home” had no agreed upon meaning or scope to either the Jews or supporters of the Zionist movement.

      And, in fact, Khalidi has said pretty much the same thing regarding the ambiguity of the phrase "Jewish National Home":

      From November 2, 1917, the date that the Balfour Declaration was issued, over four years before the Mandate for Palestine was granted, Britain was fully committed to the creation of a Jewish “national home” in Palestine, whatever that term meant precisely.

      The Jewish national home in fact meant quite different things to different British officials at different times...

      So, far from contradicting Khalidi's argument, your assertions actually lend it further support.

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 1:06 pm

      Hostage,

      The mandate made it quite clear that Palestine was not the national home of ALL the Jewish peoples.

      How many Jewish peoples exist/existed, according to your theory?

      The national home in Palestine was intended for which of these peoples??

    • Sibiriak December 27, 2012 at 4:57 am

      Hostage,

      None of the sources that I cited is open to his private interpretation.

      None of the sources you cited contradicts Khalidi's comments on the Mandate and Balfour Declaration.

      Khalidi is still running around shreying about the non-existent role of the PLO in securing equal rights for the Palestinian citizens of Israel.

      Khalidi "shreying"? LOL!

      In any case, I never quoted Khalidi regarding the PLO. You are really going off on a tangent here.

    • Sibiriak December 26, 2012 at 12:17 pm

      Shingo, quoting Pierre Orts, chairman of Mandate Commission of the League Of Nation stated that:

      The mandate, in Article 7, obliged Mandatory to enact a nationality law, which again showed Palestinians formed a nation,

      It showed that "Palestinians", inhabitants of Mandatory Palestine--present residents and newly arriving Jewish immigrants ---formed the citizenship of Mandatory Palestine. It did NOT show that *the Palestinians* as a nation or people in Palestine had a right to a Palestinian "national home" as the Jews *from all around the world* had a right to a Jewish National Home.

      It showed that Mandatory Palestine was separate political entity, but WITHIN that entity a separate Jewish National home was to be established with the full and direct aid of the British, including assisting immigration, land settlement etc.

      Since this Jewish nation home was to be a home for ALL Jews, the British were thus committed by the Mandate to a colonial project; aiding the inflow of immigrants inevitably meant the loss of Palestinian land control and a weakening of their majority status.

      Khalid writes": As far as Great Britain and the League of Nations were concerned, [Palestinians] were definitely not a people."

      You have provided no evidence to the contrary. References to general civil and religious rights for "all inhabitants" is NOT a recognition of the Palestinians *as a separate people* with rights to self-determiniation. Jews, on the other hand, where explicitly recognized as a people with rights to immigrate to a national home in Palestine. There is an unmistakeable asymmetry there between Jewish and Palestinian national rights--written right into the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate which incorporated it.

    • Sibiriak December 26, 2012 at 11:27 am

      Shingo,

      I think you’re confusing the difference between what the British did and what the mandate stipulated.

      That's an important distinction, to be sure. But upon reviewing your and Hostage's posts, I am convinced more than ever that Khalidi is correct on both counts: The Mandate privileged Jewish national rights over Palestinian national rights, and the British carried out discriminatory and racist policies.

    • Sibiriak December 26, 2012 at 11:08 am

      Hostage,

      Khalidi said that the mandate included six articles (2, 4, 6, 7, 11, and 22) that never once cited Palestinians by name, whether as Palestinians or as Arabs.

      Khalidi is correct: in the Mandate, including those six articles "the Palestinians were never once cited by name, whether as Palestinians or as Arab."

      So that of course begs the question about the meaning of the citizenship law and Palestinian nationality that are specifically mentioned in Article 7.

      Article 7 reads:

      The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

      Jews taking up "permanent residents" are NOT "the Palestinians" Khalidi refers to--obviously!

      Reference to Jews--including new immigrants-- becoming citizens of Palestine is NOT equivalent to a reference to the Palestinian people in Palestine, let alone a recognition of Palestinian national rights on par with Jewish national rights.

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