Great post by Mitchell Plitnick on the birth and growth of the special relationship, which is rooted in U.S. “domestic” politics, i.e., the lobby. The post echoes what David J. Green says in Taking Sides (1984): that everything changed with Johnson. Nuclear policy changed overnight. (And so I wonder: Does Robert Caro say anything about this in his new bio of Johnson? I bet not.) Boldface is mine.
Today, Israelis’ greatest fear is not Iran, international isolation, the Boycott/Divestment/Sanctions Movement, or the Palestinians. Their greatest fear is loss of US support. Nothing else comes close.
That is a level of dependence that is unhealthy for any country. But it is also why Israelis have confidence that it will meet other threats, including growing global anger over an occupation that is “celebrating” its 45th birthday today.
The US has shielded Israel from the consequences of its actions, even when those actions — such as settlement expansion, and intransigence on negotiations — contravene US policies or interests. It does this because Israel is a close ally, yes, but also because Israel is a domestic, rather than a foreign policy, issue in American politics.
The result is that Israel is in a unique position. It can act as it sees fit, and the world’s only superpower will make sure that the UN Security Council takes no action in response. The US will also work to ensure that Europe, which is the main trading partner for most Israeli industries, does nothing more than cluck its tongue.
There are many reasons why Israel has continued to be in conflict every day of its existence. And, because of the nature of the conversation about Israel, one is constrained to point out that many of those reasons are not rooted in Israel’s policies and actions, but in those of its enemies.
But the special relationship with the United States is perhaps the biggest reason.
I have argued often that resolution of Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians and the Arab world faces a major obstacle in that Israel does not have sufficient motivation to make concessions. Well, the reason that Israel has so little motivation is that the US, due to the special relationship, shields it from the consequences of its actions.
Has that been helpful for Israel? In 1967, Lyndon Johnson believed he was helping Israel by unilaterally shifting US policy from one that would have required Israel to withdraw from the land it conquered to one that conditioned that withdrawal on a comprehensive peace.
That seemed like a good idea at the time, but the result was a 45-year long occupation, and another war, in 1973. It resulted in Israel, which had finally lifted martial law over its own Arab citizens, now holding millions of Arabs without basic rights for decades. It put Israel on the road to becoming a global pariah.
“one is constrained to point out that many of those reasons are not rooted in Israel’s policies and actions, but in those of its enemies.”
Reading that here, I almost had a heart attack.
BTW, I find it interesting that almost as soon as Israel got rid of martial law for the Israeli Arabs, the Arab countries around it attacked.
I have argued often that resolution of Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians and the Arab world faces a major obstacle in that Israel does not have sufficient motivation to make concessions. Well, the reason that Israel has so little motivation is that the US, due to the special relationship, shields it from the consequences of its actions.”
No s*** Sherlock……..we’ve said that here 1,000,000 times.
Israel will change (or disappear by hari kari) when the US no longer supports it.
And someday we will quit supporting it. Don’t know when, a few years, another decade, probably less than a decade ……but it will happen…the US Israel firsters are close to their peak…..after they hit it …..their fall will begin.
Live long enough and you realize everything is a cycle…particulary power.
The nuclear reactor at Dimona went critical on Dec. 26, 1963. Interesting date.
could we please stop calling Israel an ALLY of the US? We are not allies.
1. There’s no treaty of alliance and can’t be, as long as Israel has not declared borders and is not signatory to NPT;
2. Alliances are two-way streets; U.S. relationship with Israel is decidedly one-way.
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How U.S.-Iran relations are entangled in the U.S. – Israel relationship: Israel has and will continue to do everything in its power to drive wedges between any possibility of a U.S.- Iran rapprochement. In this, Israel displays all the sophistication of the ugly kid in junior hi who is not part of the in-group but sandbags anybody else who might seek to be part of the in-group. Grow up.
Not everything changed with Johnson. It wasn’t until Nixon in 1972 that the US started to use the UN SC veto to shield Israel.
After the athlete killings in Munich Israel launched air strikes on refugee camps in Syria and Lebanon and even sent ground troops into southern Lebanon. They killed as many as 300 Palestinian refugees, as revenge.
Not an ‘eye for an eye’, but ’30 eyes for an eye’.
The SC drew up a resolution which senior Bush (UN Ambassador at the time) vetoed for the first time.
I’m wondering if Green’s book covers those events in 1972, anyone know? I’m interested to know more about the behind the scenes manoeuvring around that first SC veto.