Gregory Harms’s new book
In a piece entitled “It’s not about religion, says Gregory Harms. I say it is,” Philip Weiss addressed a number of issues in response to the observations I make in my book, It’s Not about Religion. In his analysis, he focuses more on the role of Jewish-Zionist influences, good and bad, in the Middle East. While I am not in a position to speak on matters of Jewishness and the “Jewish political soul,” I would like to discuss some of Weiss’s main points concerning the Middle East’s management and manipulation, and the role the United States and Israel play in these affairs.
As Weiss mentions, “Harms is critical of those who speak for the American interest, but it must be pointed out that these types have long opposed the relationship with Israel as counter productive.” He then goes on to cite the hesitance of the State Department regarding the establishment and US recognition of Israel in 1947-48. This hesitance did exist, and even more broadly than Weiss indicates. Along with State, most of the defense and intelligence community were against partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state. The judgment was merely practical: Partition of Palestine would offer a significant change in the regional status quo, inviting unknown outcomes. Moreover, the Middle East in 1948 was not yet the major strategic concern it was to become, so it was deemed best to keep things constant.
The decision to recognize Israel, again, was based on pragmatism and power. Given the Zionists’ resourcefulness and martial performance during the 1948 war, Washington began to take interest in Israel as being a potential use. The view from the White House toward Tel Aviv has always been one of service and utility. Truman’s feelings about the Jews – which bounced around from sympathetic to anti-Semitic dismissal – hardly played a role. So in 1948, the assessment among US policymakers went from hesitance regarding an unknown quantity to viewing Israel as a possible instrument. That Israel was a Jewish state factored little if any in the calculus. It is also worth bearing in mind that Washington’s other geostrategic “pillar” in the Middle East is Saudi Arabia. Power is not overly particular.
Weiss then notes the hesitance of former planners such as Brent Scowcroft and James Baker regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, that “Neoconservative Zionists pushed for the Iraq war” to America’s detriment. As Weiss notes,
[The invasion] would gain us nothing in terms of oil or strategic advantage. And they [those who were hesitant] were plainly right; it was hugely costly to the U.S….. Today Russia and China have oil concessions in Iraq, and Iraq is working against the U.S. on Iran.
The thesis that the Neocons and the Israel lobby pushed the United States into Iraq (also maintained by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in their book The Israel Lobby) defies logic and runs counter to how power has worked throughout human history. The top advisers around the president (Cheney, Rumsfeld, et al.) saw an opportunity and presumed it would be a turkey shoot. The decision to invade and the manifest thinking behind that decision are entirely consistent with the history of US foreign policy, especially the post-1945 period. Weiss is right that the operation was a failure according its apparent objectives, and that it was costly. But to whom was it costly? The burdens are borne by the military, their friends and families, and the American tax payer. Were these actual concerns – which they never are – the United States would simply never invade foreign countries.
With regard to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, Weiss lists a number of intellectuals and members of the defense and political establishment who, as he states, “have said that the occupation doesn’t serve America’s interest. Both George H.W. Bush and Obama called for an end to settlements, and both failed; there’s still an occupation.” It is true some view the occupation critically, for various reasons. However, the argument that the occupation does not serve US strategic interests is not convincing. Israel’s control of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem serves a dual use. First, it helps keep Israel in the mode of militancy. By remaining thus, Israel then has two constant needs: it requires more and better weaponry, along with diplomatic protection. So the defense industry benefits handsomely, and Washington benefits by having a needy client and therefore better leverage over its behavior. Second, democracy prevention is a core doctrine in US foreign policy. If the Palestinians achieve easy self-determination, other groups might become similarly inspired (called the “domino theory,” among other labels). The occupation therefore sends a sober message to this effect. And if Israel’s occupation did indeed run counter to US geostrategic interests, there would be no more occupation.
Weiss correctly observes that neoliberal capitalism carries on in regions and countries such as South America, Vietnam, and others, regardless of greater independence from the United States. However, this has been despite Washington’s past efforts to exert greater influence. Palestine is not vital to American corporate intrigue; and upon the eventual creation of a Palestinian state, yes, there will be opportunities to make some money. But for now, Palestine remains a domino and something to keep Tel Aviv occupied, as it were.
The issue of settlements teeters on the edge of what is acceptable to White House policy. Bush Sr. and Obama (and others) did not “fail” in achieving a halt to settlement construction; the issue is just of low to medium priority. Israeli expansion in the West Bank can raise the temperature too high and possibly provoke local and regional instability beyond preferred, manageable levels. When Israel oversteps its bounds, its leash gets jerked. Israeli recalcitrance is expected; it’s part of Tel Aviv’s job to be difficult. But again, at acceptable levels. Were the settlements a serious issue where US priorities were being impeded, a phone call would be made and there would be no more settlement expansion.
After 1945, the United States emerged the most powerful state on earth, with Soviet Russia coming in a distant second place. By the early 1950s, the strategic value of the Middle East began to increase, and US interest along with it. The history of American involvement in the Arab world has been one of control, and all the brutality that goes with it. Is Washington engaged in a war on Islam? No. It is and has been, however, engaged in an effort to suppress the region’s inhabitants and their basic desires for freedom and dignity. That they are mostly Muslim is not an underlying factor; the situation would likely be no different were most people in the region Presbyterian, Taoist, Rastafari, or adherents to Choctaw Indian spirituality.
Weiss is correct that religion does enter the picture and play a role in defining the various groups and how they interact. Islam and Judaism (and Zionism) are integral to the backgrounds and beliefs of those living in the region. Religion, therefore, is definitely in the frame. However, when one surveys the patterns of Western global dominance over the course of the last hundred years, what has been at work is a very short list of impulses, all of which are of this earth. As a result, the grievances of those in the Middle East living under this domination are also of an earthly nature, namely, the secular political demands being made by the Arab Spring.
Mr. Harms,
You wrote:
Another article, however, says that the State Department and diplomats, who were responsible for US foreign policy were saying the opposite. If the goal was to make the US strong in foreign policy, wouldn’t they be the ones promoting the decision?
Regards.
“The top advisers around the president (Cheney, Rumsfeld, et al.) saw an opportunity and presumed it would be a turkey shoot. ”
The opportunity was created by the media and the money that control the gates of the media with shutting those down who opposed the wars on the grounds advocated by war mongers.
What was Cheny’s gain or Rumsfield when they had a better more robust opportunity to go after ,and seize the oil,and control the country with much less sceptisim or opposition in 1991?
What changed? Who changed? During those years it was PNAC mebers and the media who ignored the effects of sanctions, who constantly referred to Iraq as threat to US interest ,asked the country to attcak the country from 1996 and put pressures and inserted bills in the Congress on a piece of napkin provided by AIPAC ,and who made sure anybody looking for jobs in the executive brancehs or legislative branches have right kind of credentials i.e 1- What will you do to remove threat from Iraq as if that were the most pressing issue Governemnt in terms of threat was facing. Thye also threw out Arabist form also in Hollywood and in TV soap opera.
Cheney changed and he could not have prevented that self -mutation without being judged as ineffective, weak, or being exposed for some hidden things in his career or facing problems with exposre in his business delaings with oil whcih then could have been used by AIPAC as the reason he did not wbat to uposet the appale-cart. Bu going with the gangs , he achieved another term in vice presidency and god knows only what more.
Though we focus on Iraq, for Israel any war in ME between US and ME conutry was desirable. iraq happened to ahve been demonized enough and could be cited ad libitum by the media liars as the devil trying to kill Bush father or setting Israel on flame or the raesons that US public will fall for and accecpt an Isarel knew that a war would lead to destabilization the one tyhey really wnated for gaining advantage over Palestine. Micheal Ledeen opnely talked about ” “CREATIVE DESTRUCTION” where CRAETION was for Israel AND DESTRUCTION WAS for Arab the war mongers made sure that there woudl be no democarcy and no post invasion paln to stabilize the counyrty . This is why their demads that US move to other countries after Iraq.
911 did not offer an oppertunity.It was manufactured by media and the peoeple who cntrolled the media .They could have asked right questions ,demanded solid honest investiagtions and questioned the prudence of war against “Axis of Evil” No they did not. They promoted it and they suppressed or diverted any
clue showing Israeli angle or governemnt’s failures.
Oh boy, Phil and the Lobby fetishists are gonna go nuts! Harms mentioned US Foreign Policy in other parts of the world! That’s the biggest cardinal sin at MW – you do that and the extreme lobby fetishists arguments go “POOF”!! into thin air. They don’t like that.
Hope you’re doing well, Libra. I hope you will remind me – am I tweedle dee or is Keith?
I think the line of reasoning here is silly.
Even viewed solely in terms of pragmatic geopolitics, our association with Israel has been a massive ball-and-chain that has been crippling us for sixty-plus years now. To argue that we have maintained this relationship out of pragmatic self-interest is absurd.
That’s one of the many, many problems with our support for Israel. Aside from everything else, it is just stupid. In 1945, we were the one non-colonial, non-communist superpower. Had it not been for our support for Israel, we would have been in a position of uncontested influence in the Arab world, and presumably still would be. Israel has never been of any use as an ally, and as a matter of fact, has seriously damaged our interests on several occasions with her continual espionage. Finally, there is the minor detail that the relationship has cost us a great deal of money — not just in direct aid to Israel, but in aid to those of Israel’s enemies we have managed to buy off on Israel’s behalf, in increased oil prices, and most spectacularly, in the agonizingly prolonged fiasco of Iraq.
If only our association with Israel had been a matter of self-interest. However, there isn’t even that to be said for it. Largely on Israel’s behalf, we have sacrificed thousands of American lives, expended hundreds of billions in treasure, and thrown away our influence in much of the globe. In exchange, we have got nothing.
“The top advisers around the president (Cheney, Rumsfeld, et al.) saw an opportunity and presumed it would be a turkey shoot.”
And…? An opportunity to accomplish what? Clearly the neocons wanted to go to war with Iraq to protect Israel. “The road to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad” – Paul Wolfowitz. As a piece of subterfuge they liked to emphasize the benefits of liberation that the Arabs would enjoy by way of an American bombing campaign and invasion. Meanwhile, the “crusted nut bars” – Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice had no interest in liberating Arabs and they weren’t Israel Firsters to the extent that they would send American troops to war for Israel’s exclusive benefit. They were concerned with Saddam’s clandestine WMD program. Bush was easily convinced by both the neocons and the wackos. He believed that Saddam had WMD and that “Bush the Leberator” had a nice ring to it.
” So the defense industry benefits handsomely, and Washington benefits by having a needy client and therefore better leverage over its behavior.”
We’ve been hearing this “client state” nonsense for years from Noam Chomskey. In what respect did our militarized client state help us with our military campaigns in ’91 and ’03? Israel was not only of no help, it was a liability. In the Gulf War we paid Israel an additional $30 billion to NOT help us. Clearly Israel has no value to us as a militerized client state and by your calculation, if Israel has no value as a client state to the US, it has no value.