Yeah, right. Thanks, Noam.
“However, in the last decade, the professor’s flaws have become glaring. His descriptions of our freedom seem more irrational than ever, his advocacy of compliance increasingly strident. His lectures are so predictable and tedious that they sometimes seem generated via algorithm. Chomsky is as famous as he is because he’s always demonstrated power-serving biases—as early as 2009, Seaumas Milne observed that “He describes himself as an anarchist or libertarian socialist, but often sounds more like a radical liberal.”* But Chomsky, too, has evinced a major rightward slide under Obama.
For instance, Chomsky used to explain how American imperialism could destroy a country and this would still produce benefits for the wealthy classes who dominate US policy. He theorized this as minimal vs. maximal goals: a totally subservient neo-colony may be the maximal goal, but the minimal goal of a failed state still squelches what Parenti calls “the threat of a good example” and warns other countries not to displease the wealthy whose interests Washington represents. In an interview from 1982, for example, he says “I think the chances of the US meeting its minimal goals, namely just preventing any constructive nationalist revolutionary movement from taking power and being able to do anything, that minimal goal I think the US can and probably will achieve. The maximal goal of installing the kind of government we succeeded in installing in Guatemala in 1954 may not succeed.”1 He explained the US destruction of Vietnam in similar terms. This may be a vulgarized version of a Marxist critique of imperialism, but it’s illuminating commentary because it still has at least one foot in the world of radical, class-based analysis.
In contrast, under the previous president, Chomsky moved away from this good radical analysis and has pushed a class-free image of the US as a blundering giant, an “empire of chaos” as he calls it, destroying countries on accident mostly due to lack of knowledge. “The chaos and destabilization are real, but I don’t think that’s the aim,” he said in 2015. “Rather, it is a consequence of hitting fragile systems that one does not understand with the sledgehammer that is the main tool, as in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere.” As is increasingly the case as he gets worse, Chomsky does not explain why his previous framework of “minimal vs. maximal goals” does not apply. Readers are meant to believe that post-2009 wars are the first instances of American imperialism which did not benefit the ruling class. Iraq, prosecuted by the Bush junta, “is a different story: ‘Iraq is a country (the United States) wanted to invade,’ because of its resources and strategic location in the middle of the world’s biggest oil-producing region.” Iraq is a confusing case, though, since back in 2005, Chomsky said that the “minimal vs. maximal goals” framework did not apply to Iraq, so we can’t be sure what exactly the professor wants us to think about that country’s destruction.”
Well, one might consider Israeli interest in promoting the destruction of Iraq.
The ADL’s audit. FFS. Convincing those predisposed to be convinced. See NPR report from June 28, 2018:
“This comes after a wave of bomb threats in the U.S. to Jewish community centers. In 2017, the Anti-Defamation League, a Jewish civil rights organization, tracked 169 threats made to Jewish institutions in the U.S. It's not clear how many of those Kadar is responsible for.
In St. Louis, Mo., for example, U.S. authorities arrested a different man, Juan Thompson, for multiple threats to Jewish institutions across the U.S. Thompson's threats were reportedly part of a campaign he led to cyberstalk a woman he dated.
The ADL reports that there have been no bomb threats so far this year.”
So, Michael Ron David Kadar, an Israeli Jew, makes hundreds of bomb threats to American Jewish institutions, an undifferentiated contribution to a wave of bomb threats in 2017, and after his wings are clipped, ‘voila!’, no bomb threats reported in the first six months of 2018. Explain that, convincingly.
a little insight into the French view of the long-term viability of the israel project.
"It is in these conditions that De Gaulle commissions French parliamentary Alain Peyrefitte to consider scenarios of a partition of Algeria in which French interests will remain. In a report that was shortly later published as a book, Peyrefitte thus imagine six hypotheses of partition in a program that he (and many with him) candidly calls an “Israelization of Algeria.” The idea would be to declare the Sahara southern region a “neutral” territory, while the populated north of Algeria would be divided between the new independent Algerian state and another one gathering the European settlers and Algerians who would like to remain French, closely affiliated to France. Although Peyrefitte systematically refers to Israel and its successes (!) throughout his report, he writes that he would prefer a “French-Muslim Lebanon” than “a French Israel” — he indeed considers the hostility of Israel’s neighbors as somehow not desirable for this new state! The most limited scenario would consists in two French ‘islands’ around the cities of Oran and Bone (current Anaba), where the settlers are in majority, while the most extensive one would cover the entire northwestern part of Algeria, all the way to Algiers, which is imagined as a shared city in all hypotheses — remember, we are in the summer of 1961, exactly when the Berlin wall starts to be built.
In the end, this project of partition of Algeria will be quickly disregarded (provisions on the Sahara will however not); perhaps they were even meant for De Gaulle to put pressure on the GPRA during the negotiations. However, this project provides at least two teaching points. The first one concerns the colonial project in general, and French colonialism in Algeria in particular. What this partition project demonstrates is the sustained attempt for colonial powers to trace lines in maps according to their interests (Peyrefitte’s maps all show the location of oil and gas pipelines), regardless of the impact of their materialization ‘on the ground.’ In her book Mirages de la carte: L’invention de l’Algérie coloniale (Mirages of the Map: The Invention of Colonial Algeria), French historian Hélène Blais illustrate how the French military cartographic survey of the Algerian Sahara after that the colonization of the coastal territory had been more or less secured in mid-19th century, was simultaneous with the trace of line-based borders to define Algeria as a precise colonial territory — regardless of the fact that, to the exception of Italian-colonized Libya, all territories beyond these lines were already or soon-to-be under French colonial sovereignty too. In a desert where no element suggests the presence nor the necessity for sharp thick-less borders, such a colonial enterprise appears in its whole absurdity and violence. The later dreadful lines traced in 1916 by British Colonel Mark Sykes and French diplomat François Georges-Picot splitting the Levant in two areas dominated by the French colonial empire (Syria and Lebanon) and the British one (Iraq, Kowait, Jordan, Palestine) are perhaps even more blind to the violence of their arbitrarily dividing borders.
The second teaching point consists in seeing how this rhetoric of “israelization” allows an additional retrospective reading of the Zionist project — also the alternative vision of Zionism remaining only a project much like the French one. What the 1961 partition of Algeria project (13 years after the violent creation of the State of Israel) shows us in what very few now would not call its absurdity and its violence, is that the 1947 United Nations partition plan of colonized Palestine between its Jewish population (and the hundreds of thousands who will later become settlers in Palestine) and its Arab population was in no less (if not more, given that the French plan would probably have not intensified its settler colonial policies towards the newly created state) absurd and violent. Furthermore, the UN plan also remained a project, while the actual partition that resulted from the 1948 Nakba (initiated weeks before the end of the British mandate) violently evicted 800,000 Palestinians from Palestine, without them having been able to return since then."