To address your points:
1. I don’t accept positions because scholars – credible or otherwise – believe them, rather through making their case based on available data, you reach a conclusion on whether you agree or disagree. This is a small sample, citing many of the same things you did, but the interpretation is different (another mistake you make about my comments that I will address later).
The US position was clear that only minor and mutual swaps on the ’67 border were acceptable, a near unanimous view at the UN was that withdrawal was to be to ’67 borders. This is not in dispute by anyone except the biggest of Israeli hasbarists, like Dershowitz for example. Palestinians who reject then’67 borders generally do so on the basis of Balfour and Partition, rejecting 242 outright as insufficient. They don’t cite it as malleable in terms of borders.
242 states a withdrawal from territories occupied in the “recent” conflict, not to the Partition borders. Does this automatically erase your point about final borders? In itself, no, but we shall see with the following points.
2. Perhaps in situations pre-dating the UN Charter (membership) or when negotiations bring about agreed borders, the UN Charter is not the deciding factor. Not after and certainly not once the UNSC takes control of an issue. This is a stipulation of the Charter, the UNSC literally can re-write or override international law once it adopts an issue.
The Charter is a binding treaty on all member states and membership in the UN requires domestic ratification of it. Acceptance in the UN as a member state does not come with ambiguity on borders. In the case of Israel, as I pointed out, no binding resolution (by the UNSC) has ever disputed Israel’s borders and has never demanded more than a withdrawal to the Green Line. As I mentioned, asking whether this constitutes an exception to the acquisition of territory rule, led to the same answer by 2 undisputed experts on the issue – Richard Falk on the law and Finkelstein on the political record. They both agreed that binding UNSC resolutions – meaning the law – have only gone as far as demanding Israel withdraw to the Green Line.
Whether Israel chooses to withdraw further is up to it. De facto positions, once accepted by setting a legal precedent – in this case the UNSC demanding only withdrawal to the Green Line and no further – become law.
3. This can be further studied by looking into the vetoes 1976 resolutiin backed by Syria and the PLO, the Israeli rejection of it at the time, and commentary on it from various Palestinian factions, as well as the Israeli press. It is usually claimed that the PLO accepted the ’67 borders (lol if at all) in the 80s when they declared a state, or as you mentioned, during the Clinton negotiations.
A simple look at the resolution I mentioned, the Israeli position on it and the commentary of that period, tells otherwise. I understand the confusion and disbelief about this given the attacks on the position from within the PLO itself, as well as from the outside. You can google “1976 Syria PLO draft resolution veto” as a starting point or check out Finkelstein and Noam Chomsky’s commentaries on the “PLO peace offensive”, and go through some of the references they cite. I can also help with this if you want.
I believe there is also the matter of PLO leadership being shuffled in the late 60s or early 70s as preparation to adopt this position. I can’t remember the details but they did remove rejctionist factions/persons. I will look it up if you want.
4. The ICJ did in fact address the Israeli side of the Green Line. The ruling is about the illegal wall Israel has been building in the OPT. The reason borders, Jerusalem and settlememts were tackled in this ruling was because those issues had to be finitely determined before ruling on the legality of the wall – or rather it’s route (this is why refugees were ignored, as it has no bearing on the wall). The ICJ clearly stated that if Israel built the wall on it’s side of the Green Line, it would be legal because that is within its legal borders.
5. No peace no justice is a great slogan. I would never denounce or disagree with the principle. But in this case, the law has determined that “justice” includes the state of Israel on the ’67 borders. Again, back to feelings and reality.
My personal feelings are that there should be no states in the world, no borders. But outside of a theoretical discussion with my buddies about how great it would be if we could be like Star Trek 200 years in the future, it has no basis in reality today or tomorrow. And probably not even next year. It’s a noble position and on a personal level I agree, I’m just not going to organize any campaigns around it cause I would prefer that more than 5 people show up to a rally on erasing borders lol.
I’ve decided that a realistic freedom and quick as possible end to misery for millions of people is more important – more worth struggling for – than my personal maximum beliefs, wants, wishes and aspirations. You must decide for yourself what’s right for you. Don’t take this as preaching, I’m just saying it’s me. I didn’t vote for 10 years because of my principles. Now my principles force me to vote becasue of the life or death difference it can make for thousands of people – not people like me, but those who suffer greatly from cuts to social programs and benefits, the small differences that you see between major political parties in my country.
As I’m also not Palestinian or Israeli and don’t live there, I really don’t have anything to say, or an opinion that matters. The most I can do, I think, is help from the outside and from that vantage point “enforce the law!!” strikes me as a more effective, more rational and tactically superior slogan than “no justice, no peace” – in the case of borders here.
When Israel launches illegal military attacks on the OPT (Geneva IV, which governs belliegerent occupations, does not allow for any military attacks whatsoever by an Occupying Power on occupied territory and the ICJ was clear in 2004 when it stated that as an Occupying Power Israel has no ability to invoke the right to self-defence found in the UN Charter in regards to the OPT) and virtually all commentary/analysis (from so-called “pro” Palestinian or Israeli, to the major human rights regimes. to the UN Sec-Gen, to various governments) talks about “disproportionate” attacks or Israeli self-defence, I will stand and say loud and clear “no justice, no peace”. Because in that case, a violation of law is taking place, which can empirically be described as “no justice” – I can cite the law – and on the flip side, peoples under occupation have a right to use force, that is the law as well, so no peace until justice is achieved (adherence to the law). When a police officer shoots a child holding a toy gun and clearly violates the rules of engagement, yes, “no justice, no peace”.
But when, because of my personal beliefs, I feel it’s unjust that a heroin addict is arrested and condemned to jail for possession, I cannot credibly and empirically say “no justice, no peace”. According to the law, justice was achieved as long as due process was not violated. If I don’t like it, to remain credible and within the relm of reality, I must work to have the laws changed, to shift society towards treatment instead of punishment.
In the case of ’67 borders, international law has accepted a position that a historical injustice – the colonization and theft of the majority of historic Palestine – will be just once a Palestinian state is established on the ’67 borders. I can accept the historical injustice of wiping out the Natives of my land, and at the same time accept that the law normalized that injustice by granting my country sovereignty over that land. I may not like it, but I accept it. Not that you or anyone else should, again not trying to preach, I just don’t see the tactical relevancy of going outside the law in the case of Palestine, especially when the law is so strongly in favour of the Palestinians.
Nothing I support, nor the law, says anything about Palestinians having an incontinguous state. A fully viable and independent state is demanded. Palestinian negotiators – take Taba as an example – have presented maps allowing Israel to keep hundreds of thousands of settlers in place on the border, while agreeing on equal territorial swaps and have presented acceptable solutions like tunnels or bridges to connect Gaza. None of the serious Palestinian positions (up untill Taba, after that is a different story as the Palestine Papers revealed) accepted the “swiss cheese” option of allowing Israel to keel the major settlement blocks and correponding bypass roads that carve up the West Bank. ’67 borders and a contiguous Palestinian state are 2 seprate matters. Borders here, was what I thought we were discussing.
6. I have never seen anyone interpret 242, or the positions of the framers, to mean Israel gets less than the ’67 borders. I have seen hundreds of examples of Israeli propaganda trying to interepret it as meaning Israel may withdraw to a point a deems fit meaning annexing large portions of the West Bank. My understanding of the acquisition of territory principle and the binding nature of all UNSC resolutions (ICJ confirmed this in it’s 1949 resolution on reparations) leads me to accept that since all UNSC resolutions since 1967 go no further than ’67 borders, and in fact reiterate this over and over again, the de facto annexation of territory from the Partition border to the ’49 armistice lines has been accepted by the UN as an official border.
Please let me know if you would like actual references to some of the stuff I cited.