The unspoken alliance: Israel’s secret relationship with apartheid South Africa

Editor’s note: The eulogies from Israeli leaders in response to the death of Nelson Mandela are pouring in. What goes unspoken in their remembrances is that Israel had a close relationship with the South African apartheid regime. Here’s an excerpt from Sasha Polakow-Suransky’s groundbreaking book that delves deep into the alliance. Titled “The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa,” it was published in 2010. 

unspokenallianceOn April 9, 1976, South African prime minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster arrived at the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem with full diplomatic entourage in tow. After passing solemnly through the corridors commemorating those gassed in Auschwitz and Dachau, he entered the dimly lit Hall of Remembrance, where a memorial flame burned alongside a crypt filled with the ashes of Holocaust victims. Vorster bowed his head as a South African minister read a psalm in Afrikaans, the haunting melody of the Jewish prayer for the dead filling the room. He then kneeled and laid a wreath, containing the colors of the South African flag, in memory of Hitler’s victims. Cameras snapped, dignitaries applauded, and Israeli officials quickly ferried the prime minister away to his next destination. Back in Johannesburg, the opposition journalist Benjamin Pogrund was sickened as he watched the spectacle on television. Thousands of South African Jews shared Pogrund’s disgust; they knew all too well that Vorster had another, darker past.

In addition to being the architect of South Africa’s brutal crackdown on the black democratic opposition and the hand behind many a tortured activist and imprisoned leader, Vorster and his intelligence chief, Hendrik van den Bergh, had served as generals in the Ossewa Brandwag, a militant Afrikaner nationalist organization that had openly supported the Nazis during World War II.

The group’s leader, Hans van Rensburg, was an enthusiastic admirer of Adolf Hitler. In conversations with Nazi leaders in 1940, van Rensburg formally offered to provide the Third Reich with hundreds of thousands of men in order to stage a coup and bring an Axis- friendly government to power at the strategically vital southern tip of Africa. Lacking adequate arms supplies, van Rensburg’s men eventually abandoned their plans for regime change and settled for industrial sabotage, bombings, and bank robberies. South Africa’s British-aligned government con sidered the organization so dangerous that it imprisoned many of its members.

But Vorster was unapologetic and proudly compared his nation to Nazi Germany: “We stand for Christian Nationalism which is an ally of National Socialism . . . you can call such an anti- democratic system a dictatorship if you like,” he declared in 1942. “In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism and in South Africa Christian Nationalism.” As a result of their pro-Nazi activities, Vorster and van den Bergh were declared enemies of the state and detained in a government camp.

Three decades later, as Vorster toured Yad Vashem, the Israeli government was still scouring the globe for former Nazis— extraditing or even kidnapping them in order to try them in Israeli courts. Yet Vorster, a man who was once a self- proclaimed Nazi supporter and who remained wedded to a policy of racial superiority, found himself in Jerusalem receiving full red-carpet treatment at the invitation of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.

· · ·

Prior to 1967, Israel was a celebrated cause of the left. The nascent Jewish state, since its creation amid the ashes of Auschwitz, was widely recognized as a triumph for justice and human rights. Leftists across the world, with the notable exception of those in Muslim nations, identified with the socialist pioneering spirit of the new nation. Africans welcomed Israeli development aid and voted in Israel’s favor at the United Nations. Europeans for the most part supported the Jewish state, often out of socialist idealism or sheer guilt. Even Britain, which fought Jewish guerrilla organizations until the eve of Israel’s independence in 1948, recognized the state of Israel in January 1949. Although the South African Jewish community became the largest per capita financial contributor to Israel after 1948, relations between the two countries’ governments were cordial but chilly for much of the 1950s.

In the 1960s, Israeli leaders’ ideological hostility toward apartheid kept the two nations apart. During these years, Israel took a strong and unequivocal stance against South Africa. In 1963, Foreign Minister Golda Meir told the United Nations General Assembly that Israelis “naturally oppose policies of apartheid, colonialism and racial or religious discrimination wherever they exist” due to Jews’ historical experience as victims of oppression. Israel even offered asylum to South Africa’s most wanted man.

In addition to condemning apartheid, Meir forged close ties with the newly independent states of Africa, offering them everything from agricultural assistance to military training. Many African leaders accepted invitations to Israel and some, impressed with the Israeli army, decided to hire Israeli bodyguards. African states returned the favor by voting with Israel at the U.N. in an era when the Jewish state had few diplomatic allies. At the time, black American leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. were also outspoken in their support of Israel, likening criticism of Zionism to anti-Semitism.

Things began to change with Israel’s stunning victory over its Arab neighbors in the Six-Day War of 1967, which tripled the size of the Jewish state in less than a week. The post-1967 military occupation of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian territory and the settlement project that soon followed planted hundreds of thousands of Jews on hilltops and in urban centers throughout the newly conquered West Bank and Gaza Strip, saddling Israel with the stigma of occupation and forever tarring it with the colonialist brush.

Israelis did not take kindly to the colonial label. After all, Zionism had in many ways been an anti-imperial movement. The World Zionist Organization may have mimicked European colonial settlement tactics in the early 1900s, but by the 1940s Zionism’s more extreme proponents were fighting to oust the British Mandate government in Palestine. Consequently, many Israelis saw their independence as a postcolonial triumph akin to the successful liberation struggles of newly independent African and Asian countries and they bristled at any attempt to equate Zionism with European colonialism.

Conquest and expansion had not been part of the IDF’s (the Israel Defense Forces) strategic planning for a war that it perceived as a defensive struggle for survival. Even Israel’s leaders were shocked by the extent of their territorial gains in the Six- Day War. Indeed, before the shooting stopped, the first internal military memos proposed withdrawing almost completely from the newly acquired territories in exchange for peace with the Arab states. Yet, as Arab negotiating positions hardened and religious Zionists and socialist idealists alike sought to redeem and settle the land, the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Sinai Peninsula slowly transformed Israel into an unwitting outpost of colonialism.

Aided by a healthy dose of Arab and Soviet propaganda, Israel’s image as a state of Holocaust survivors in need of protection gradually deteriorated into that of an imperialist stooge of the West. As criticism of Israel mounted and Arab states dangled dollars and oil in the faces of poor African nations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Third World countries increasingly switched allegiance. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, all but a few African countries severed diplomatic ties with the Jewish state, and the Israeli government abandoned the last vestiges of moral foreign policy in favor of hard-nosed realpolitik.

It wasn’t long before Israel initiated defense cooperation with some of the world’s most notoriously brutal regimes, including Argentina’s military dictatorship, Pinochet’s Chile, and apartheid South Africa.

At its core, the Israeli–South African relationship was a marriage of interests and ideologies. Israel profited handsomely from arms exports and South Africa gained access to cutting-edge weaponry at a time when the rest of the world was turning against the apartheid state. For the next twenty years, a Janus- faced Israel denied its ties with South Africa, claiming that it opposed apartheid on moral and religious grounds even as it secretly strengthened the arsenal of a white supremacist government.

Israel and South Africa joined forces at a precarious and auspicious time. The alliance began in earnest after the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, and shared military and economic interests drove the relationship for the next three years. Though both countries were receiving varying degrees of support from the United States, neither enjoyed a defense pact with Washington and both were wary of relying too heavily on the Americans for their survival— especially in the early 1970s, when unconditional U.S. support for Israel was by no means assured. This alliance exposed Israel to great risks in the realm of public relations, especially when the Jewish state’s legitimacy was already under attack at the U.N. from pro-Palestinian groups and aligning itself with the hated apartheid regime threatened to tarnish its reputation further.

Rabin’s Labor Party government, which ruled the country from 1974 to 1977, did not share the ethnic nationalist ideology of South Africa’s rulers, but Israel’s war-battered industries desperately needed export markets and the possibility of lucrative trade with South Africa was hard for Defense Minister Shimon Peres to resist. As Rabin, Peres, and a new generation of leaders inherited the party from David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, the conviction that compromising certain values was necessary for survival gained sway and socialist idealism gave way to realpolitik. During the Rabin years, South African arms purchases breathed life into the Israeli economy and Israeli weapons helped to reinforce the beleaguered and isolated apartheid regime in Pretoria.

The impact of their tryst was felt across the globe. As the Cold War spread south in the 1970s, Africa became an ideological battleground, pitting Angolan government troops and their Cuban allies against South Africa’s formidable military machine, which owed its prowess in no small measure to Israel. The U.S. government feared that South Africa’s white minority regime, driven by a siege mentality and militant anticommunism, might resort to the nuclear option when faced with Soviet proxies on its borders. The U.S. government had by 1970 accepted that Israel was a member of the nuclear club, but Washington worked tirelessly in the late 1970s to prevent South Africa from joining it. As hard as officials in Jimmy Carter’s administration tried, their nonproliferation policy failed to prevent South Africa from acquiring the bomb soon after Carter left office, and subsequent U.S. administrations couldn’t stop Israel from helping the apartheid state develop more advanced components of its nuclear arsenal.

These two isolated states formed an alliance that allowed South Africa to develop advanced nuclear missile technology and provided Israel with the raw material and testing space it needed to expand its existing arsenal of missiles and nuclear weapons. All of this occurred in the face of intense international criticism, surveillance by U.S. and Soviet intelligence agencies, and constant condemnation by the United Nations General Assembly.

This mutually beneficial relationship was forged outside the jurisdiction of international conventions such as the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the cornerstones of Western efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The two countries developed and improved their respective weapons systems under such secrecy that not even American intelligence agencies knew the full extent of their cooperation.

The Israeli–South African relationship was not only about profit and battlefield bravado, however. After Menachem Begin’s Likud Party came to power in 1977, these economic interests converged with ideological affinities to make the alliance even stronger. Many members of the Likud Party shared with South Africa’s leaders an ideology of minority survivalism that presented the two countries as threatened outposts of European civilization defending their existence against barbarians at the gates.

Indeed, much of Israel’s top brass and Likud Party leadership felt an affinity with South Africa’s white government, and unlike Peres and Rabin they did not feel a need to publicly denounce apartheid while secretly supporting Pretoria. Powerful military figures, such as Ariel Sharon and Rafael (Raful) Eitan, drew inspiration from the political tradition of Revisionist Zionism—a school of thought that favored the use of military force to defend Jewish sovereignty and encouraged settlement of the biblical lands of Greater Israel, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Sharon, Eitan, and many of their contemporaries were convinced that both nations faced a fundamentally similar predicament as embattled minorities under siege, fighting for their survival against what they saw as a common terrorist enemy epitomized by Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) and Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The ANC may have never employed indiscriminate violence to the extent that the PLO did, but in the eyes of the generals in Tel Aviv and Pretoria, Mandela and Arafat were one and the same: terrorist leaders who wished to push them into the sea. And for the top brass in both countries, the only possible solution was tight control and overwhelming force.

Foreign Ministry officials in Israel did not always approve of close ties with South Africa, but it was the defense establishments— not the diplomatic corps— that managed the alliance. The military’s dominance was so complete that the Israeli embassy in Pretoria was divided by a wall through which no member of the diplomatic corps was allowed to pass. Only when opponents of apartheid within the Israeli government sought to bring down that wall in the late 1980s did the alliance begin to crumble.

· · ·

The research for this book took place in a world where information and disinformation are equally important. Even decades after the fact, Israel remains extremely sensitive about keeping secret the details of its collaboration with a regime that is now universally condemned as immoral. Journalists and scholars who wrote on the Israeli–South African relationship during the 1980s suffered from a lack of access to key participants and official documents. As a result, the story they told, though partially accurate, was incomplete.8 For the past six years, I have struggled to fill in the gaps by prying open bureaucratic doors, accessing highly restricted archives, and interviewing more than one hundred key players in both countries.

In Israel, dozens of people initially refused to speak with me. I traced former ambassadors to desert kibbutzim and elderly South African Jewish émigrés to designer apartments in the posh northern suburbs of Tel Aviv. From the offices of defense contractors to assisted living communities, I was treated to battlefield tales and old photo albums offering glimpses of a relationship that until now few government officials have dared to talk about.

In South Africa, retired military intelligence officials asked for my U.S. passport number and ran background checks before inviting me to their homes for interviews. Tracking down the key protagonists led me to sprawling rural farms and gated retirement communities. I met former defense ministers and generals for coffee in strip malls and over shots of brandy in Pretoria’s bars. A Soviet spy who had sent some of South Africa’s and Israel’s most sensitive military secrets to Moscow invited me to his home on the windswept coast of the Cape Peninsula, where he now lives comfortably among the retired naval officers he once betrayed. Former employees of the arms industry giant Armscor and the nuclear scientists involved in building South Africa’s atomic weapons were the most reluctant of all, but several eventually opened up. My family’s roots in South Africa helped ease the suspicions of several octogenarian generals, who instantly became candid in the presence of someone they regarded as a fellow white South African in the hope that I would share their nostalgia for the old days. Some saw the interviews as an opportunity to secure their place in history and were self-aggrandizing to the extreme; others guarded their secrets closely. I have therefore not relied exclusively on oral history.

Accessing government and military archives was even more difficult. The South African authorities repeatedly rebuffed and then delayed my requests. But after sixteen months of waiting for documents, I managed to get my hands on over seven thousand pages of records from the South African Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the defense contractor Armscor, including the Israeli side of the correspondence— but not before Israel’s government did its utmost to prevent me from getting them.

In April 2006, the Israeli Defense Ministry intervened to block South Africa’s release of a 1975 agreement outlining the planned military cooperation between the two countries, which is signed by Defense Ministers Shimon Peres and P. W. Botha. The Directorate of Security of the Defense Establishment (known by its Hebrew acronym Malmab) insisted that declassification of the 1975 document or any others would endanger Israel’s national security interests. Fortunately, the South African Defense Ministry disregarded these protests. This is due in no small measure to the fact that the people whose records I sought are no longer in power in Pretoria. While the ANC government has not fully thrown open the doors to the apartheid government’s archives, it is far less concerned with keeping old secrets than with protecting its own accumulated dirty laundry after sixteen years in power.

Israel, of course, is a different story. There, intense secrecy surrounding this relationship remains in force. The actions of Israeli administrations from the 1970s and 1980s are still regarded as state secrets, and many of the architects of the Israeli–South African alliance—including Israel’s president as of this writing, Shimon Peres— remain in powerful positions. Even so, South African records pieced together with the oral testimony of retired high-level officials in both countries provide a startlingly clear, if incomplete, picture of the relationship.

This book does not equate Zionism with South African racism, as a 1975 United Nations resolution infamously did. Rather, I contend that material interests gave birth to an alliance that greatly benefited the Israeli economy and enhanced the security of South Africa’s white minority regime. Yet ideology was a factor, too: while the relationship was driven by concrete economic interests, it would have begun far earlier and ended much sooner had it not been for the influence of ideology.

As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict festers and the prospects for peace appear gloomier each day, it has become increasingly popular to compare the situation in Israel to the dying days of the apartheid regime in South Africa. This is not a new argument, but it is gaining traction in some circles as hopes fade for a two- state solution. During the 1980s, both the Israeli and South African governments were the targets of vicious criticism and international condemnation. In the end, apartheid South Africa collapsed while Israel survived, albeit as a fortress state mired in war. This was not surprising. As two leading South African academics wrote in 1979: “Israel solicits empathy because she stands for the minority right to live after experiencing the most systematic genocide in history. Israel can offer the Western world the continuous exorcism from fascism.” Apartheid South Africa, by contrast, had no such moral standing. The government’s overt racism offended Western political sensibilities far more than Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land, and American and European policymakers did not believe white South Africans deserved protection in the same way Jews did after the Holocaust.

Yet today, left-wing activists are attempting to paint Israel as a latterday South Africa, erode its claim to a unique moral position, and question its legitimacy. By calling for boycotts and divestment from Israel, these activists are following the script that proved so effective for the anti-apartheid movement during the 1980s. And to their own detriment, Israel’s leaders are playing their parts by building Israeli- only access roads, erecting countless military checkpoints, and expanding settlements in the West Bank.

Of course, Israel’s leaders have a responsibility to protect their citizens, but the Israel they have created is a far cry from the “light unto the nations” that was once revered by the African liberation heroes and American civil rights leaders.

Countless authors have chronicled, with varying degrees of fairness, how the Jewish state betrayed its founding ideals, abandoned socialist Zionist principles, and saw its democratic soul corrupted by occupation after 1967. But Israel’s domestic policies are only part of the story; its foreign policy, especially its ties with some of the world’s most reviled regimes, also contributed to its moral decay and the rise of anti-Israel sentiment abroad. Israel’s intimate alliance with apartheid South Africa was the most extensive, the most lucrative, and the most toxic of these pacts. Just as expanding settlements in the West Bank and Gaza eroded Israel’s democratic values at home, arms sales to South Africa in the early 1970s marked the beginning of an era in which expediency trumped morality in Israeli foreign policy and sympathy for the conquered gave way to cooperation with the conqueror.

Excerpted from The Unspoken Alliance by Sasha Polakow-Suransky Copyright © 2010 by Sasha Polakow-Suransky. Excerpted by permission of Pantheon, a division of Random House, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.

  1. The ties that bind, religious nationalism…. if Nazi ideology and its implementation was not ethnic racism, than neither is Zionist ideology and its implementation.

    • Secrecy, violence, ethnic hatred.

      Zionism has always been thus. Part of the darkness. How ordinary Jews think it is enlightened is a great sadness.

      • Seafoid, when you talk about secrecy, violence, ethnic hatred and Zionism being part of the darkness, it brings to mind Margaret Atwood’s first encounter with it on her her first trip to Israel; she called it the shadow over Israel and decribed it; coming from the very placid Canada, it had to be a real shocker for her:

        “… Recently I was in Israel. The Israelis I met could not have been more welcoming. I saw many impressive accomplishments and creative projects, and talked with many different people. The sun was shining, the waves waving, the flowers were in bloom. Tourists jogged along the beach at Tel Aviv as if everything was normal.

        But… there was the Shadow. Why was everything trembling a little, like a mirage? Was it like that moment before a tsunami when the birds fly to the treetops and the animals head for the hills because they can feel it coming?

        “Every morning I wake up in fear,” someone told me. “That’s just self-pity, to excuse what’s happening,” said someone else. Of course, fear and self-pity can both be real. But by “what’s happening,” they meant the Shadow.

        I’d been told ahead of time that Israelis would try to cover up the Shadow, but instead they talked about it non-stop. Two minutes into any conversation, the Shadow would appear. It’s not called the Shadow, it’s called “the situation.” It haunts everything.

        The Shadow is not the Palestinians. The Shadow is Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, linked with Israeli’s own fears. The worse the Palestinians are treated in the name of those fears, the bigger the Shadow grows, and then the fears grow with them; and the justifications for the treatment multiply.

        The attempts to shut down criticism are ominous, as is the language being used. Once you start calling other people by vermin names such as “vipers,” you imply their extermination. To name just one example, such labels were applied wholesale to the Tutsis months before the Rwanda massacre began. Studies have shown that ordinary people can be led to commit horrors if told they’ll be acting in self-defense, for “victory,” or to benefit mankind.

        link to haaretz.com

  2. A bit of chicken v egg going on here. Israel didn’t so much play the part as a consequence of BDS. It’s more that BDS is in response to the separation wall and the greatly increased settler building in the occupied territories. With the mindset of Sampson and the power of undeclared but very real nuclear weaponry, Israel’s troubled future may become very troubled indeed and far beyond Israel’s nebulous borders.

    Oh, and Dachau, unlike Auschwitz, was a work (often to death) concentration camp, not an extermination camp to gas Jews. The Reich preferred to do that in the other subjugated countries they built them in.

  3. Thank you, Sasha P. S., for a very comprehensive study of the Israeli/SA axis.

    Decades ago, journalist Jane Hunter published a small newsletter on Israel’s Foreign Policy, like a more specialized version of I. F. Stone’s newsletter.

  4. It is curious claim to blame Arab and Soviet for influencing the decision of African countries to severe relation with Israel. There was moral component and there was solidarity of common experiences between Arab and Africa.
    If Israel wanted to return the lands that it seized from Arab, why it decided in first place to mount a preemptive strikes against Egypt and why it seized Golan after the UN agreed cease fire resolution. If its intentions were so noble ,why it went to the extreme of killing the sailors and sinking the USS Liberty. Israel intention was clear from the days of Weizman talking in forked tongue one thing to Arab another to the supporters of the Zionist project. That double speak was the main characteristics of every Zionist leaders both military and civilian – Ben Guiron and Dayan and all other figures that succeeded in a Israeli politics. Before 6 day war, there were 1956 invasion by Israel and Lavon affairs . The 1956 collusion with France and UK was not any anti colonial freedom movement.
    The expulsion of Arab from Nov 1947 to most of 1948 was no anti colonial gesture. Neither was the use of the influences of USA to influence UN resolution in favor of partition.
    The alliance between Israel and S Africa was the normal development of the process that included the partnership with dictatorial regimes of Latin America and Algeria occupying France.

  5. 4 years before Sasha Polakow-Suransky’s “groundbreaking book ” was published, the Guardian had published a comprehensive essay on the subject by Chris McGreal that contained most of the elements supposedly uncovered by Polakow-Suransky’s 7000 documents, but in a more palpable form, titled “Brothers in arms – Israel’s secret pact with Pretoria”, which oddly is very close to the one used by Polakow-Suransky, “The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa.” Here’s a small piece of McGreal’s piece that starts after Nazi-sympathiser Vorster’s visit to the holocaust museum:

    “… Vorster, whose army was then overrunning Angola, told his (Israeli) hosts that South Africa and Israel were victims of the enemies of western civilisation. A few months later, the South African government’s yearbook characterised the two countries as confronting a single problem: “Israel and South Africa have one thing above all else in common: they are both situated in a predominantly hostile world inhabited by dark peoples.”

    Vorster’s visit laid the ground for a collaboration that transformed the Israel-South Africa axis into a leading weapons developer and a force in the international arms trade. Liel, who headed the Israeli foreign ministry’s South Africa desk in the 80s, says that the Israeli security establishment came to believe that the Jewish state may not have survived without the relationship with the Afrikaners.

    “We created the South African arms industry,” says Liel. “They assisted us to develop all kinds of technology because they had a lot of money. When we were developing things together we usually gave the know-how and they gave the money. After 1976, there was a love affair between the security establishments of the two countries and their armies.

    “We were involved in Angola as consultants to the [South African] army. You had Israeli officers there cooperating with the army. The link was very intimate.”

    Alongside the state-owned factories turning out materiel for South Africa was Kibbutz Beit Alfa, which developed a profitable industry selling anti-riot vehicles for use against protesters in the black townships.”

    Full 2006 essay that probably served to inspire Polakow-Suransky:

    link to theguardian.com

    • Another small piece from the same link:

      “… White South Africa and Israel painted themselves as enclaves of democratic civilisation on the front line in defending western values, yet both governments often demanded to be judged by the standards of the neighbours they claimed to be protecting the free world from.

      “The whites [in South Africa] always saw their fate in a way related to the fate of the Israelis because the Israelis were a white minority surrounded by 200 million fanatic Muslims assisted by communism,” says Liel. “Also, there was this analysis that said Israel is a civilised western island in the midst of these 200 million barbaric Arabs and it’s the same as the Afrikaners; five million Afrikaners surrounded by hundreds of millions of blacks who are also assisted by communism.”

      • I wonder what this figure of “200 millions” is all about.

        Racist Zionist must have a fixed immutable language of hate that transcends/ignores not only the span of time but survives the local culture as well.

        “09/10/2003 Asia Times
        R Maitra
        Congressman Ackerman said ” Israel was surrounded by 120 million Muslims
        while India has 120 million Muslims” in joint Capitol Hill Forum held between Indian Political Action committee , AJC and AIPAC”. http://www.atimes. com” while Lantos in the same meeting was opening another line of hate against Muslim.

        • “I wonder what this figure of “200 millions” is all about.”

          It probably has something to do with the Zionists’ faulty math, or the Egyptian population of just under 100 million being excluded because of the peace treaty between the 2 countries. But it’s great for its spooking effect: a small sliver of land surrounded by 200 million barbarians. This sure helps to keep the cheques coming.

          A more reliable math would show that since almost every Arab country has been directly or indirectly having trade and other relations with Israel, with exception to Syria and Lebanon, it would mean that the actual populations of those countries still hostile to Israel total a mere 25 million people or about 5% of the total Arab population.

  6. Polakow-Suransky has performed an important service by spotlighting Israel’s alliance with apartheid South Africa – even if, as Walid suggests above, he was just elaborating on an article Chris McGreal published in the Guardian years earlier. But when the excerpt above deals with 1967, he’s just repeating Israeli mythology. Specifically, he says

    Conquest and expansion had not been part of the IDF’s (the Israel Defense Forces) strategic planning for a war that it perceived as a defensive struggle for survival. … Yet, as Arab negotiating positions hardened and religious Zionists and socialist idealists alike sought to redeem and settle the land, the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Sinai Peninsula slowly transformed Israel into an unwitting outpost of colonialism.

    If there was ever any doubt, official Israeli documents declassified a couple of years ago prove conclusively that that’s nonsense. Using these documents, Ilan Pappe has described detailed Israeli military planning beginning in 1963 (if not before) for the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza:

    The plan was code-named ‘The Shaham Plan’ and it divided the West Bank to eight districts for the purpose of facilitating the imposition of an organized military rule. Michael (Michel) Shaham was the general military governor of the Palestinian territories inside Israel and the official name of the programme was ‘the organization of the Military Rule in Occupied Territories’…. The Shaham plan also suggested names of people who should be appointed to the high posts in the future occupation. …

    By May 1967, the plan became operative and the actual appointment of military governors and military judges to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip moved to a more detailed stage…Each governor in May received a box (Argaz). Each box included instructions of how to govern an occupied Arab area; the Geneva and the Hague conventions; the Arabic translation of the emergency regulations; the book, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation….

    Although, in hindsight one can say that despite the elaborate preparations in practice an easier way was chosen: transferring the mode of rule according to the emergency regulations that were imposed on the Palestinians inside Israel between 1948 and 1966 and transplant them into the reality of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli interpretation of these regulations – in 1948 as well as in 1967 – gave unlimited control for a military governor over every aspect of life of the people in his area.

    In sum, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, far from being the sort of unexpected development Polakow-Suransky (and, to be fair, most other historians) describes, was meticulously planned well in advance of the Six-Day War.

    I had to go through quite a few contortions to get to this Pappe article, which was published under the title “Revisiting 1967: the false paradigm of peace, partition and parity” in a journal called Settler Colonial Studies. If you’re interested but the link above doesn’t work for you, he has delivered versions of the paper in several talks that are posted on YouTube, such this one.

    • Yes. This is the correct observation. Even this Guardian link points to that fact.
      This was the plan and it fitted perfectly well with the acquisition of the satellite pictures of Egyptian and Syrian military installations by Abba Eban from US.

    • Henry, thanks for the background on the pre-67 preparations by Israel. I had known about the war having been premeditated, but I didn’t know about the pre-planning of the occupation; like most, I thought it just happened spontaneously. It helps clear up the mythology you mentioned but reading through it, I kept wondering how hophmi and his friends here would react to this information that they surely know nothing about as they’re still at the stage of poor little nascent and defenseless Israel having being invaded by 5 hostile armies in 1948. I’ d appreciate hearing from them about it. The Zionists had their sights on all of of Palestine decades before 1947 and had planned way ahead on achieving that vile objective.

    • henry, at 16:55 in the video pappe mentiones a name (fee unbar?) of someone who published details of this plan in his memoir. do you know this name? and thanks for the video.

      and here’s pt 2

      • The name is Zvi Inbar, the former Military Advocate General (MAG) of the IDF and the Legal Advisor of the Knesset.

        I would like to clarify that the IDF, like many other armies, has many contingency plans which have instructions on how to deal with various future events. The fact that the IDF had plans deal with the occupation of the West Bank is not a proof that Israel was indeed had intention to occupy it, but to know how to deal with a situation in which Arab countries will lead to war in which the WB would be occupied by Israel. I believe that the IDF still has many contingency plans and still learn how to deal with various situations in the ME.

      • Annie, footnote #2 in Pappe’s “Revisiting 1967″ paper reads:

        The Shaham plan was first and only reported by one of the participants in a scholarly article. Zvi Inbar, ‘The Military Attorney General and the Occupied Territories’, The Law and the Army 16, no. 1 (2002): 147–9 (Hebrew).

      • annie,

        Pappe’s footnote reads:

        The Shaham plan was first and only reported by one of the participants in a scholarly article. Zvi Inbar, “The Military Attorney General and the Occupied Territories,” The Law and the Army, 16, no. 1 (2002):147–9 (Hebrew)

      • Thanks for posting a working link to the Pappe piece, MRW.

        Funny how people say “downloaded” when they clearly mean “uploaded” – not just you, but the proprietors of academia.edu, who of all people should know the difference!