A friend, reading Weiss on Robert Kaplan and Jeffrey Goldberg, writes:
One other thing to take into account with Goldberg and Kaplan. To both of them,
war is a turn-on. This predilection sharpens their interest in the fortunes of
the modern Sparta, which is Israel. And it is an element of their enthusiasm
for Israel’s wars. Remember the rhapsody about the many kinds of guns in
Israel, in Goldberg’s memoir Prisoners–an involuntary self-parody of this
state of mind. And Kaplan spoke with admiration of the lusty American soldiers
with whom he rode shotgun as they attacked Arab strongholds which they referred
to as "Injun Country."
The book, Imperial Grunts, in which Kaplan introduced that new use of an
old phrase, contains a revealing one-sentence panegyric on the American empire
in 2002: "By the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States military
had already appropriated the entire earth, and was ready to flood the most
obscure areas of it with troops at a moment’s notice." Note the tone: sheer
appreciation of a marvelous marvel. The same pleasure in the idea of military
power and the anticipated spectacle of destruction was the motive of Kaplan’s
dry bombing-run over probable American targets in Iran–the subject of an
excited article in The Atlantic two years ago.
The state of mind is susceptible of genteeler turns; but if patriotism is the
melody, war is always the undersong. Recall for example George Packer’s New
York Times Magazine column "Recapturing the Flag," in September 2001. Packer
there went further, in a programmatic sense, than either Goldberg or Kaplan.
He wrote of an "instinct for the battlefield" which (he had found as a young
man) nothing in liberal politics could satisfy. But "Sept. 11 changed all that,
instantly." And: "What I dread now is a return to the normality we’re all
supposed to seek: instead of public memorials, private consumption; instead of
lines to give blood, restaurant lines." He went on to quote, to misleading
effect, William James on our duty to "inflame the civic temper as past history
has inflamed the military temper." James was speaking of the moral equivalent
of war; Packer was pushing for war. And he, like Goldberg and Kaplan, testified
to a craving not just for this or that war, but for war itself as an experience
that searches the truest of human emotions and offers the most irrefutable test
of self-sacrifice.
"Giving blood" (also shedding blood)–not "standing in restaurant lines." The
severity of Sparta, not the decadence of Athens. It is a feeling one wields as
a moral axe–on oneself and on one’s neighbors, but only for a time. A state of
irresolute satisfaction peculiar to Americans who would like to be Israelis but
prefer to live in America.
Israel as the modern Sparta. Very nice observation, and one worth thinking about more.
How many people must die because these pinheads got beat up in junior high? Related story:
His Toughness Problem—and Ours
Ian Buruma | September 27, 2007
link to agonist.org
One thing that the US and Israel have in common is that they always fight their wars on someone else’s land. It’s always someone else’s home that the bombs fall on. No wonder warmongers can find such enthusiasm for it. They aren’t the ones sitting in the rubble when it’s over.
This is a great thread. Anonymous introduces the proper disdain with which to view these war-whoopin’ warmonger scribes. They deserve our disdain, and our disgust.
And America First? That was a wonderful line: How many people must die because these pinheads got beat up in junior high?
Anonymous: “The severity of Sparta, not the decadence of Athens.”
Even though I am taking it way out of context, I think this quote from the Athenian Pericles’ Funeral Oration is appropriate.
For the whole earth is the tomb of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men.
I think the Greek city-state of Athens has contributed far more to modern Western social and political culture than Sparta. While the utility of such comparisons and analogies is limited, and the influence of such an ancient contribution to the development of our modern culture should not be overstated, the ways Athenian men chose to live are far more “graven … in the hearts of [Western] men” than those of Sparta.
It is not surprising that neocons have a fetish for Sparta, and when one day people who would call us ancients think upon our times, neocons will likely be remembered with the same disdain. Sparta’s most noble act, their unexpected mercy to Athens after finally forcing their surrender, is one we are not likely to see emulated by their infantile would-be ancestors. Neocons and other extremist Zionists carve distrust and hatred into the hearts of men, especially in the Arab lands whose acceptance of Jewish power in the Levant is the best hope that Israeli Jews will not eventually be driven into the sea.
Colonial Zionists think that military power, accompanied by fear and despair in their neighbors, is the sole guarantor of Israeli security. Military power is certainly necessary, but it is not sufficient. What is the capital of Greece now? Even the vaunted phalanxes of Sparta were eventually destroyed, and then their militarized society vanished without lament. If American Jews, many of whom bear a special responsibility for enabling Israeli imprudence, don’t wake up and interrupt Israel’s slide into fascism and apartheid, then the Star of David as a symbol of state will pass the way of the Lambda, and no one will care.
I have a feeling that the purveyors and consumers of war pornography have never been present or dwelled upon the aftermath of the battles that fascinate them. I wonder how many corpses in different stages of decomposition they have had to smell, or better yet, pick up and carry.
Another good comparison is to Prussia. Cleary the greatest military state in the last millenium. They were so effective at war the rest of the world had no choice but to purge her lands of all German speaking inhabitants and divide the land between Poland and Russia. And today, just 60 years later, there are very few on this planet that have even heard of that state and none but a tiny fringe that laments its loss.
“This predilection sharpens their interest in the fortunes of
the modern Sparta, which is Israel.”
Hardly. Israel is much more like turn of the century Serbia on the verge of tripping up an empire. Of course, the similarities are obvious to the rest of the world, that’s why they’re scrambling to take advantage of the coming fall (see: everything BRIC).
Perhaps because of my own tendencies toward insularity, I am seized by the need to inflame the civic temper. This site is subtitled “the war of ideas in the Middle East.” Focused on Israel; it is dedicated to informing a particular constituency, those who are Jewish, of the other side of issues which previously were presented from a perspective limited to unquestioned support of Israel’s state and policies. Yet it also informs a greater constituency, all those of us who are not Jewish. And, I would argue, the importance of Israel is far greater than its existence as a Jewish state.
Discussing the issues that led to the current state of affairs in Israel allows us – in many instances, forces us – to consider issues that are central to an understanding of who we are as Americans. What is democracy? What is citizenship? What is meant by ‘rights’? What is ‘privilege’?
Excepting members of the armed forces and ancillary forces who take part in combat in another country, we in the US have been spared the every-day reality of war – it happens elsewhere. 9/11 was an incident, one which had long term consequences, but the direct result of those consequences didn’t take place on American ground.
Israel is a nation in which can be seen the consequences of accepting war as a necessary part of every-day life. I don’t think people in the US recognize the extent to which many of our leaders are prepared to base foreign policy on war as every-day life, which they somehow believe can be kept on foreign ground, in this case Central Asia – Afghanistan.
Focusing on Israel is both necessary and useful. But people must be vigilant and active regarding US actions elsewhere, also. I referred above to my own insularity. Comments indicate that many of those who participate on Mondoweiss are not as insular as I am, yet I think there is a large readership which remains less engaged with US foreign policy in general. A discussion of where the US is and where it should go from here is on-going at the Center for New American Security site, beginning at cnas(dot)org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/08/maybe-bacevich-has-point-introducing-afghanistan-strategy-dialogue.
It is a necessary discussion. More people should join in.
Following are excerpts of comments made on the CNAS blog posts by someone unidentified other than as “Bill,” beginning 8/10/09.
I think it is very important that we get the context right in this debate.
What is the larger United States national security and foreign policy goal that is driving this discussion?
I say that this larger goal — and the focus of US national security and foreign policy today — is the need to transform the Third World such that it might better service the needs of the expanding global economy.
This explains why the Department of Defense and the Department of State are today being retooled so as to better accomplish this mission (transform of the Third World).
It is within this context (need to transform the Third World to better service the expanding global economy) that the cost / benefit analysis re: Afghanistan — and other Third World projects — is being and must be undertaken.
… the Department of Defense has a major ongoing initiative to adopt enhanced irregular warfare capabilities [hard power] tailored for use in the Third World; and the Department of State has a major ongoing initiative to adopt enhanced diplomatic and aid tools [soft power] also tailored for use in the Third World.
These two new “carrot and stick” initiatives do seem to be designed to be used — in tandem — to accomplish a broad and seemingly important strategic goal of “opening up” “backward,” “recalcitrant” or “poorly designed” nations and transforming them such that they might better service the old and new market nations and better service the expanding global economy.
This, I believe, is the reason why we should not expect that nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan will be left to their own devices once their militaries have been brought up to par. This (security) will be seen as having only accomplished half the job. The other half of the job is to make these nations better servants (or partners, if you wish to look it that way) to the world-market.
“Why would the US be commiting to a project of armed state-building now, in 2009?”
Because now, with the United States the sole superpower — and China, Russia and India having been converted to market ideas and disciplines — the Third World is the only thing that stands in the way of significantly greater economic activity and growth.
So how does what I have described above play out?
As the United States moves to transform the Third World — (through smart power initiatives) — such that it might better service the global economy,
The types of conflicts we see today in Afghanistan and Iraq (regime change, ethnic conflict, tribal conflict and religious conflict) become more likely.
The United States will use “carrots and sticks” to install market-friendly governments in appropriate Third World nations.
After the United States has its market-friendly government in place, it will defend its interests.
Anyone who would seek to overthrow a market-friendly government — or who tend to disrupt, delay or deny a market-friendly transformation –these individuals and/or groups will be put down.
This includes any Third World government installed by the United States that fails to honor its obligations to quickly and efficiently transform its nation to meet world market needs generally and to meet United States needs specifically.
Thus, ineffective transformation regimes, and ethnic, tribal and religious obstacles — any or all of which might get in the way of an efficient market-friendly transformation — all of these must be overcome.
Herein, irregular warfare and COIN fighters find their calling. This is why IR and COIN are, and will be, the coin-of-the-realm in the 21st Century.
Or so the explanation goes.
And this (the critical need to transform the Third World) is the reason why the United States is, and will be, committing to armed state-building projects now and in the future.
Thus, when we “debate the cost of Afghanistan” we must do so from the perspective of what has become the new central focus of United States foreign policy in the early 21st Century, to wit: A determination to transform the Third World such that it might better service the needs of the expanding global economy.
Afghanistan may now be considered a bad investment in this on-going project. But it is within this context (the need to transform the Third World so as to better service the expanding global economy) that the cost / benefit analysis is being made.
I do not see this as being about such trivial things as “redeeming failure” or “grabbing land.”
If one’s national security and foreign policy goal is to transform the Third World — such that it might better service the needs of the expanding global economy — then one must have the tools in one’s tool box that are appropriate for this task.
Until recently, the United States had few such tools that it could use in this new “transforming the Third World” mission. For example:
a. The United States did not have appropriate “carrots and sticks” that could be used to convince, coerce or compel Third World nations to undergo the transformational process. The United States’ “carrots and sticks” — which had been designed for use against the former Soviet Union — were of little use or utility in the Third World. (And the United States’ Third World friends and foes knew this.)
b. Even when the United States was able to convince, coerce or compel a Third World nation to undergo the transformational process, it (the United States) did not have the tools needed to deal with the problems that typical arise when a Third World nation must be transformed to meet First World needs.
Today, because of the problems experienced in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, these short-comings have been dramatically revealed. And, rather than abandoning the Third World transformational mission, the United States has undertaken the huge task of having its DoD and DoS, themselves, transformed — so as to better accomplish the Third World transformation task. Such is the commitment of the United States in 21st Century to this mission.
The other lesson that has been learned in this initial stage has been that one must do a better job of picking and choosing which nation(s) will be targeted to initially undergo the transformational process. It has been learned that some nations will be more trouble than they are worth and that some will actually prove destructive to the overall mission.
The globalization of Afganistan and other Third World nations — so as to better the service the needs of the First and Second Worlds nations — is indeed the mission. But you do not radically transform DoD and DoS if you think that this mission will be (1) short-lived, (2) be easy to achieve and/or (3) easy to sustain.
Want further evidence that state building and/or state maintaining (“armed” when necessary) — directed at the Third World and in the service of globalization and the First and Second Worlds — are the order of the day? Look at the major investiments and transformations being made by such huge defense contractors as Lockheed Martin, whose recent purchase of PA&E is consistent with the mission statement I have outlined above.
Want further evidence of this general trend, then look at how “think tanks” such as CNAS have become so important and prominent today.
The hand-writing is on the wall — in very bold letters — for all to see. And this (the need to transform the Third World such that it might better service the needs of the First and Second Worlds) is the context within which decisions regarding Afghanistan, and other Third World nations, will be made.
The Israel and Sparta comparison is common for some reason. I first came across the idea in Israel while reading the op-ed section in the Jerusalem Post. The writer was a retired professor from Nahariya who denied the idea that Israelis are Middle-Easterners. Instead, he called Israelis ” hot-blooded Mediterraneans and modern Spartans.” Of course his name was Goldsomething.
Great thread on these ludicrous “Spartan” wanna-bes.
Andrew Bacevich, who retired with the rank of colonel from the US Army, wrote the definitive review of Imperial Grunts in The Nation four years ago, link to thenation.com
If I may toodle my own squeaky horn, I posted a parody of Kaplan on antiwar.com a couple weeks ago, in which the Thucydides of The Atlantic reports from Iowa. Warning: Perrier-swilling coastal elite intellectuals may not be able to handle the bad news Kaplan sees looming on the midwestern horizon.
link to original.antiwar.com
Well, maybe it was a shameless self-plug on your part, but I found your parody to be hilarious. Thanks.
Nice satire Kaplan did of his neocon self. He fought for the IDF instead of the USA and deplores the fact even the lower class whites in the midwest are no longer so hot on
their service for Israel by way of the US Army in Iraq and elsewhere.