The U.S. and Iran have struck a deal to open the Strait of Hormuz, but Israel may prevent an end to the war

According to reports, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz and formally end the fighting between the two countries was signed on Monday. 

It is important to clarify that, regardless of White House statements, this is not a peace deal. It is an agreement to end the standoff in the Strait of Hormuz and a commitment to stop fighting for 60 days while an agreement is reached, hopefully. The negotiation period can be extended if both parties agree. Still, it is a important agreement that indicates a end to this disastrous war could be in sight.

But as usual Israel stands to play the role of spoiler. The one thing that is most clear is that Tel Aviv won’t give up on its long-term goal of regime change in Iran. But if this MOU actually takes effect and opens the Strait of Hormuz, that will not be achieved through this war. 

What is the agreement?

According to American officials, details of the MOU will be released in the next day or so. But we already have a pretty good idea of what it says and what it does not say.

While none of the terms have been announced, it seems certain that the mutual blockades of the Strait will be lifted and commercial traffic will flow through the whole Persian Gulf again. That might take a bit of time, as mines planted by Iran must be removed, a delicate process. But if all sides cooperate, it will be done in short order.

There seems to be a consensus that the ceasefire does apply to Lebanon. Even the Israelis seem to believe this. But there is less clarity about exactly what that means.

Israel is currently occupying a large portion of Lebanon. Israeli leaders have already made it clear they have no intention of leaving. 

For the time being, it seems that the MOU will allow Israel to remain in place. The language both sides have used has often featured the “end of attacks” on Lebanon. Iran obviously seeks a full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, but whether they are willing to put that off to the negotiation period rather than insisting on it happening immediately remains to be seen.

Speaking on the Breaking Points podcast, journalist Jeremy Scahill said he had been told that, in exchange for refraining from retaliating against Israel for its attack on Sunday on Dahiya in Lebanon, U.S. President Donald Trump would press Israel to withdraw entirely from Lebanon. 

That would be welcome if true, but it is more likely that Iran refrained from that attack so Israel would not get what it wanted from its bombing, namely the disruption of this MOU. So Lebanon still stands out as the main trigger point for blowing up this agreement.

Some outlets have reported that the MOU includes an agreement for the U.S. and its allies to free up about $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets. Other reports have omitted this point. 

What is most likely is that the Trump administration, stuffed as it is with figures, including the president himself, who have relentlessly blasted Barack Obama for giving Iran “pallets of cash” in the JCPOA, is trying to find a way to satisfy Iran’s demands for funds without lifting sanctions too soon or giving Iran cash or access to cash directly. 

Thus, they are pursuing alternatives where other countries would quietly make frozen Iranian funds available. The UAE was reported to have done just that in recent days, and, despite its vehement denials, it is very likely that those reports are accurate. 

The bulk of the money would come from Qatar, which would release $24 billion in two transactions, one at the beginning of talks and one at the end. It is unclear whether the United States has agreed to this arrangement, but it appears to be what Qatar proposed. 

Iran, for its part, will give Trump the talking point he needs by pledging, once again, that it will not pursue a nuclear weapon. Since this has been their position for decades, and that stance has been documented as truthful by American intelligence all that time, this is not a big ask from Tehran. But Trump will portray it that way, and that seems just fine with Iran. 

Israel is playing the spoiler, again

Israeli leaders are scrambling to craft a domestic narrative about what amounts to a decisive defeat for them and the United States. 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed that “We will remain in the security zones for as long as required to defend our country.” Security zones, in Netanyahu-speak, mean occupied territories. 

He went on to say, in Trumpian fashion, “Iran was racing toward a nuclear weapon. If we had not acted at the time we did and with the power we did…Iran would already have atomic bombs.”

That is, of course, a complete lie, one contradicted by every intelligence assessment in Israel, the U.S., Europe, and everywhere else that has assessed Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 

It’s a mark of Netanyahu’s desperation that he feels the need to say it. It is also a mark of his need to pacify Trump by affirming the false narrative of an American victory.

Meanwhile, an Israeli attack killed one person and wounded a journalist in the southern Lebanese town of Kfar Tebnit. This was just a small signal that Israel intends to maintain the fighting in Lebanon as a means to scupper the deal with Iran. 

Hezbollah affirmed that it has the right to self-defense against both Israeli aggression and occupation, as indeed it does under international law. 

These facts on the ground create an open opportunity for Israel unless Trump is willing to act forcefully to restrain them. That quandary is an intentional result of the framework Iran has set up. They are testing Trump to see if he can and will rein in Israel. 

Tehran is surely as unimpressed as so many of us are with Trump’s public, epithet-laced scolding of Netanyahu. As I’ve noted, Netanyahu is also unimpressed with it. Words, no matter how harsh or vulgar, carry no weight here. Only the threat of real consequences will force Netanyahu to back off in Lebanon, and no one, including the Iranians, knows whether Trump will impose them on his ally.

More risk for Iran

While Trump faces intense electoral pressure to end this war, Netanyahu is facing even stronger pressure from hawks in the Israeli opposition.

Naftali Bennett, a leading contender to replace Netanyahu in the upcoming elections, vowed that “The clock for regime change in Iran will start as soon as the government in Israel is changed.”

Bennett advocates a multi-pronged strategy that depends more on Israel’s ability to stir up internal opposition in Iran than relying as much as Netanyahu has on pressure, although Netanyahu has used infiltration and espionage as well. 

For Bennett, the key is not so much the military pressure as maintaining sanctions and using economic stress to foment agitation against the Iranian government. 

That is a much cleverer strategy, although it is equally unlikely to produce a result Israel might want. 

Iranian leaders know they have a serious problem with domestic popularity that the U.S.-Israeli attack has only temporarily papered over. If the war does end, the economy still has a long road to recovery, and the Iranian government itself remains authoritarian and repressive. Many Iranians will not forget the events of this past January, when thousands of protesters were killed. Whatever role Israeli agents may have played in turning those protests violent, those Iranians were still killed by government forces. 

Netanyahu will also pursue that strategy if he fails to restart the all-out war against Iran. And should the MOU come into force, all-out war becomes much more difficult to attain, as it would mean the closure of the Strait of Hormuz again, something Trump and the rest of the world leaders are not likely to cooperate with. 

This is the obstacle Netanyahu has faced for forty years: he cannot wage war on Iran without American support. Until now, no American president was foolish enough to give him that support. And now, even the fool has learned why.

American responses

Unsurprisingly, there was bipartisan skepticism about the MOU. 

Republican Lindsey Graham, careful not to step on Trump’s toes, tweeted, “I am somewhat concerned that Iran’s view of the agreement seems different than what the American negotiating team is claiming. Under our law, any nuclear deal with Iran will be sent to Congress for review and a vote. I look forward to reviewing the final product and I believe it is imperative that the architect of the deal, Vice President Vance and his negotiating partners, be part of the process in presenting the final deal to Congress.”

To be clear, the MOU is not a nuclear deal with Iran. Trump does not need congressional approval for it. 

He will need to submit any final deal that covers Iran’s nuclear program and the lifting of nuclear-related American sanctions on Iran to Congress, under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) of 2015.

INARA, however, allows the Senate to pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval, which would only kill the deal if the Senate can override a presidential veto. 

To do that, you need wide bipartisan support. So, it’s important that Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) also expressed his skepticism and sounded a lot like Graham in doing so. 

Schumer’s statement read, in part, “The American people deserve details and full transparency – what exactly is in this ‘understanding’? …Trump must release the details publicly, brief Congress immediately, and end this war for good.”

But whether the MOU meets with Schumer’s or Graham’s approval is unimportant, as they will have no say until a final deal is struck.

Their responses, however, will help shape the politics around reasonable expectations for U.S.-Iranian talks. 

Those politics, at least among Democrats, will also be shaped by what is becoming a sharp split among pro-Israel Democrats. 

The far-right Democratic majority for Israel, naturally, called on Trump to only accept terms that Iran would never agree to. The more center-right Jewish Democratic Council of America offered some legitimate criticisms of Trump’s war but also criticized him for not allowing Israel to run wild and for giving Iran any kind of financial relief. 

On the other side, liberal Zionists expressed support for the deal. J Street “welcomes the announcement of an agreement to end the war with Iran. While the details of the agreement are still unclear, bringing this devastating conflict to a close will save lives, reduce the risk of further regional escalation and ease the severe economic harm this war has inflicted on people across the world.”

Similarly, Hadar Susskind of the New Jewish Narrative stated, “For years we have argued that military force alone cannot deliver security for Israel or stability for the region. This war proved that point at enormous cost. It is past time for the leaders of Israel and the United States to apply that lesson.”

That represents a further split among Jewish Democratic groups, as J Street and NJN would surely be joined by anti-Zionist and non-Zionist groups which will support an agreement that ends the war, even if not in the same terms as the pro-Israel groups.

If a deal with Iran does materialize out of the seed planted by the MOU, pressure from those sectors could be decisive in ensuring that Congress cannot thwart it. 

Mitchell Plitnick
Mitchell Plitnick is the president of ReThinking Foreign Policy. He is the co-author of Except for Palestine: The Limits of Progressive Politics and maintains the Cutting Through newsletter.