my critique of the leftwing critique of Israel lobby theory

David Green, who has been a friend to this site, takes on my belief in the Israel lobby in this post at Palestine Chronicle. His is the standard leftist critique of the lobby theory, saying that there is nothing to praise in the so-called American interest, and the U.S. is motivated by imperial/material concerns and not by ethnicity. Here’s the heart of his objection:

American politicians and pundits are loyal to themselves, their wealth and status, their class of people, and the neoliberal world order so long as it benefits them—which it has, to say the least…

It’s a beautiful Saturday and I want to go skiing, but a few words. Green is, like Chomsky, whom he quotes a lot, a materialist; he sees wealth as a great motivation for states and political actors. So do I. The error, though, is that they dismiss religious ideology as a political motivator; and in doing so Green shows himself to be shallow and mechanistic. He reminds me of all the commentators who said that the religious right were voting against their economic self-interest in supporting Bush in 2004. Right. People have other motivations than strict material self-interest. AIPAC is filled with rich people who can’t wait to give away their money. They are motivated by ethnocentrism, and Zionism. The Iraq war was a giant disaster materially, forseeably. It was motivated by various ideologies, including Zionism among the neocons.

The trouble with Green’s analysis is that it overlooks or treats as trivial such facts as:

–Ann Lewis, Democratic Jewish powerbroker, saying in ’08 that the role of the US gov’t is to support what the people of Israel want; she is expressing a religious fervor; 

–The US government helps create a government in Iraq that includes former terrorist groups but specifically excludes Hamas from any government-making negotiations in Israel (why the double standard?)

–Barack Obama runs for president as an anti-Iraq-war candidate and gets past Hillary on that basis, but even as he does so calls for Jerusalem to remain undivided and can’t say a word against Israel’s Iraq, Gaza (why the double standard?)

–Sheldon Adelson gives $300,000 to the Republican Party in 2000 not because of any material interest but because he doesn’t want Jerusalem divided, as the Camp David negotiations suggested it might be, and days after the last tranche of that money is delivered, Douglas Feith, a nobody cipher who helped set up the One Jerusalem lobby out of desire to maintain a greater Israel, is hired to a high position in the Pentagon in the upcoming Bush administration.

–Obama’s own national security adviser, Gen’l Jones, going to J Street and saying that the Israel/Palestine conflict is the one issue that it is in the best interest of the US to resolve to guarantee greater security for its citizens; and lo, J Street is smeared in Israel; and Obama makes no progress on this stated objective…

It goes on and on. This is an important conversation; because the old materialist left needs to integrate an understanding of the power of religious thinking into its analysis. Yes I know religion is the opiate of the masses. It turns out that religious feeling and ethnocentric feeling too pervades human life, even in the elites.

About Philip Weiss

Philip Weiss is Founder and Co-Editor of Mondoweiss.net.
Posted in Iraq, Israel Lobby, US Politics

{ 33 comments... read them below or add one }

  1. Avi says:

    Then there’s the 9/11 commission whose chairman asked high ranking FBI agents as to the motivation behind the attacks, and one by one they all said that the main motivator was the US’s unquestionable support for Israel and its crimes.

    As Phil’s article shows, there is a trend here. And that trend points to the overwhelming influence of the Israel lobby.

    To refuse to accept such facts is to put ideology ahead of logic, and that’s what motivates many of Israel’s foot soldiers.

  2. Danaa says:

    What Phil says is true – the new (old) way of dismissing the “dual loyalty” argument is to conflate jews and wealth, then claim that it’s the latter that corrupts the former, nothing to do with zionism. But one knows the argument is an empty one, because the moment one does exactly that – conflating jews with money and/or influence, out come the hidden daggers of “anti-semitism”. So the Chomsky style argument “it’s all about money” used to dismiss the jewish lobby as “just another lobby”, before going on to wax about the evil of all lobbies, is but a sophisticated form of subterfuge – a deflection of a valid criticism, practiced most commonly by people on the left. This is exactly the type of earnest argumentation that people like Jeffrey Blankfort have spent decades taking apart (and he comes in for rather unfair criticism in David green’s piece). To make the issue even more complicated, for many people it is not necessarily simple zionism that underlies the contention that the Lobby is merely a case of “boys will be boys”. IMO, this line of argument is motivated primarily by fear – for self and community. It is a tacit recognition that Jewish power, wealth and influence has indeed become both too visible and too ubiquitous to give one comfort. The neocons are too obviously infused with this new sense power and are wielding it with too much relish, even as the dire consequences – to the US – of their zionist/tribalist world view are there for all to see. As every jew knows, nothing like jewish history to illustrate that what goes up must come down.

    So in this respect, the protestations by well meaning and well analysing people like Green may not be motivated by some deep unacknowledged zionism, but spring from a well of bottomless worry. The worry is not groundless, which may be why they take the labels of “dual loyalty” so much to heart. Because while they may not be guilty of it personally, they share the worry with people like Dersh, who are.

  3. bob says:

    This is a very common oversight that Phil picks up. Another common reply is to look at resources as a motivating factor for the first gulf war. However, there too you have:

    The Washington Post Washington, D.C.: Sep 6, 1990. pg. a.36

    Israel’s American supporters, who have long tried to get the Bush administration to pursue a tough line against Iraq, are now deeply uneasy about the shape U.S. policy on the Middle East is taking, fearing that the United States’s new Arab alliances will lead to a tilt away from Israel.

    Israel’s advocates still support the administration’s response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and welcome moves that could weaken Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. “We remain completely in support of what they’ve done in the gulf,” said Malcolm Hoenlein, executive director of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations. “That’s an issue on which there’s complete consensus.”

    But behind the consensus lurks the worry that over the long run, America’s newly strengthened alliances with Saudi Arabia and Egypt will take priority over America’s ties with Israel and lead to increased American pressure on Israel to reach a settlement with Palestinians over the future of the West Bank.

    For the Israel lobby, there is a bittersweet quality to the current situation. For months before Iraq invaded Kuwait, Israel’s backers stood almost alone in warning the Bush administration about the dangers Saddam posed to stability in the Middle East. Saddam’s invasion effectively won the argument for the pro-Israel forces and produced the anti-Iraq policy they were seeking. But that policy is now taking a form that leaves Israel’s allies anxious.

    Alfred H. Moses, chairman of the board of governors of the American Jewish Committee, cast the concern as a question. “Will the emphasis in the future be more on protecting oil in the gulf than on protecting Israel in the Mediterranean?”

    Rep. Mel Levine (D-Calif.), one of Israel’s staunchest congressional supporters, said he worried that Israel’s role as “the cornerstone of American policy in the Middle East will be eroded both by the massive flow of arms to the region and by the United States’s growing closeness to regimes that continue to deny Israel’s right to exist.”

    “Opposition to Iraq is one thing,” said Rep. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.). “Eighty thousand American troops side-by-side with Saudis, Syrians and Egyptians is another.”

    The qualms of the pro-Israel community will have their first practical effect on congressional skirmishing over the administration’s plan to sell $6 billion to $8 billion worth of arms to Saudi Arabia and to forgive Egypt’s $7 billion debt to the United States.

    Almost no one expects the administration’s proposal to founder, and this alone suggests how much the world has changed since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In the past, Israel’s supporters have been quite successful in limiting arms sales to Arab nations.

    This time, Israel’s friends are likely to settle for a plan to balance arms sales to Arabs with new sales to Israel so that the Jewish state can maintain what Rep. Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.) called “qualitative superiority.” There is also talk of partial forgiveness of Israel’s debts.

    At the heart of the pro-Israel critique of the new Arab arms purchases will be the argument that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait showed how easy it is for arms sold to “moderate” Arab states to end up in the hands of “radical” states-as U.S. arms sold to Kuwait ended up in Iraqi hands.

    “I have heard no argument that this weaponry will constitute an effective deterrent against an Iraqi invasion,” Berman said. “I’m more concerned that these weapons will become part of an Iraqi arsenal. What happened to the weapons we shipped to Kuwait?”

    Schumer predicted that Congress would try to put strings on the Arab arms sales, but said he worried that these would prove ineffectual. “The strings can be snapped by the country that owns the weapons,” he said.

    Israel’s supporters are not entirely gloomy. Their hope is that America’s new ties with the anti-Iraq Arab states will make it easier for the United States to push them toward recognizing Israel. And they feel that Saddam’s actions more than vindicated their early warnings.

    When the Israeli government and Israel’s American supporters began their warnings about Saddam earlier this year, these were seen-even by some of Israel’s American friends-as an attempt to divert attention from the Palestinian campaign for a homeland and to reduce pressure on the Israeli government for negotiations on the future of the West Bank.

    “At the time, there was concern among a number of people that the worries about Iraq were an attempt to deflect answering questions about the peace process,” said David Ifshin, a Washington lawyer and Democratic activist who has long toiled in the pro-Israel cause. “As it turns out, their concerns about Iraq were obviously prescient.”

    Levine and Hoenlein argued that Saddam’s invasion and its fallout-including support for Saddam from the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization-buttressed many points that Israel’s supporters have been making for a long time.

    Levine said the invasion should “disabuse Israel’s critics” of the idea that the Jewish nation’s alleged intransigence toward the Palestinians was the primary cause of instability in the Middle East, when in fact the main cause was Arab radicalism.

    And Hoenlein said the Palestinian response should increase American wariness about the PLO leadership and even of King Hussein of Jordan. “Many who have been suggested as potential partners for peace have shown their true colors in supporting Saddam Hussein,” said Hoenlein.

    But Israel’s supporters are concerned that whatever gains Israel may make in the short term will be lost in America’s new Arab alliances. Ifshin said that Arab countries that supported the United States now might “present a bill later” and “pressure the United States to put pressure on Israel on the West Bank.”

    Stuart Eizenstat, who was a top aide to former president Jimmy Carter, said Israel’s supporters had broader worries.

    Eizenstat noted that for more than a decade, Israel’s U.S. supporters had successfully promoted a policy that cast Israel as America’s “principal strategic ally” in the Middle East, a nation militarily capable of defending U.S. interests in the region. They did so, he said, in order to base Israeli-American friendship not simply on “indefinable moral, sentimental, democratic values” but on the harder ground of coinciding military interests.

    Israel’s supporters, he said, fear “that all this is going to be thrown away and that the real strategic alliance will be with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and even Syria.” Schumer said that the Iraqi conflict was laying the basis for exactly the sort of realignment in the Middle East that American friends of the Arab world had long been seeking. “It’s a State Department Arabist’s delight,” Schumer said.

    Eizenstat said he did not share these fears, partly because the strategic relationship with Israel was based on an East-West rivalry that no longer exists and that an alteration in Middle Eastern alliances was thus inevitable long before Iraq invaded Kuwait. Eizenstat said the U.S.-Israel ties would remain strong for the reason they have always been: Shared values between the two countries-including the value of democracy.

    Also, see here

  4. bob says:

    Phil, this was also covered at some length on this thread

  5. All, when the liberal moderate left asks the right questions and confirms the right answers.

    That is live and let live. Actual democracy rather than ideological.

  6. BenjaminGeer says:

    People do indeed have other motivations than strict material self-interest; they have non-material, symbolic interests. Sociology has come a long way in the past few decades towards understanding the political economy of symbolic power, but a lot of leftists haven’t been paying attention.

  7. bob says:

    I’d also like to add that its common for historians to point out how, in the 1940′s, many in the U.S. government were against supporting UN partition of Israel because of oil and materialist concerns (like inflaming the arabs). There was also a fear within the U.S. that the Soviets would use of this volatile mix of U.S. support for Israel against the US. Support for Israel came from ideological sources and, a “moral commitment to Jews” -and for a fear of a loss of Jewish support.

    Frankly, its very easy to expose this materialist argument as the ideological arguments often run counter to materialistic concerns.

    • Citizen says:

      No question Truman was flattered as being the reincarnation of Cyrus The Great; this registered with Truman, who had read the bible many times over in his youth, and that Truman needed Jewish money for his whistle stop campaign, and also feared it would be thrown to Dewey. The Zionists made all this perfectly clear to Truman.

  8. bob says:

    Since I can’t post on Green’s article:
    Another series of important points are summed up by Walt.

    Professor Mearsheimer and I made it clear in our article and especially in our book that the idea of invading Iraq originated in the United States with the neoconservatives, and not with the Israeli government. But as the neoconservative pundit Max Boot once put it, steadfast support for Israel is “a key tenet of neoconservatism.” Prominent neo-conservatives occupied important positions in the Bush administration, and in the aftermath of 9/11, they played a major role in persuading Bush and Cheney to back a war against Iraq, which they had been advocating since the late 1990s. We also pointed out that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and other Israeli officials were initially skeptical of this scheme, because they wanted the U.S. to focus on Iran, not Iraq. However, they became enthusiastic supporters of the idea of invading Iraq once the Bush administration made it clear to them that Iraq was just the first step in a broader campaign of “regional transformation” that would eventually include Iran.

    People pushing a materialist point of view often omit the indisputable fact that neoconservatives fought very hard for more than a decade and won a series of political battles to achieve the war against Iraq. Neoconservatives lobbied hard for Bill Clinton to pass the Iraq liberation act. Clinton, of course, was criticized for not really implementing a bill he passed under extreme political duress during a low point in his Lewinsky scandal. Bush and Cheney were in line with neoconservative goals against Iraq and Iran until after September 11. Various scholars, like Sneigoski, Halper, Clarke, and Heilbrun note how the neoconservative rapid success over Colin Powell, stunned the political establishment. People really didn’t expect that they would be able to run rough shod over such a powerful and dominant person like Powell.

    The neoconservatives ideological affinities towards Center and Center-right Israel are also undisputed. Many are very, very open about their affinities and have strong political connections to groups like Likud. They wrote openly in 1996 how removing Saddam would be “an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right.” Its an extreme task to ignore the very clear and very open ideological affinities of people who undoubtedly and very openly pushed for this war.

    • Citizen says:

      A few relevant excerpts from the conclusion to Stephen J.
      Sniegoski’s The Transparent Cabal–well over 400 pages, extensively supported by footnotes from the horse’s mouth straight from sources available to anyone (hence the title of the book–all Sniegoski did was connect the dots because the USA MSM refused to do so, preferring to keep the US masses ignorant):

      “Suffice it to say that the neoconser-
      vatives viewed American foreign policy through the lens of Israel’s interests,
      as Likudniks have perceived Israel’s interest. Quite likely they truly viewed
      Israel’s interests to be America’s interests, rather than seeing themselves as
      sacrificing the interests of the United States for the sake of Israel. Self-de-
      ception is not uncommon in ideologically driven individuals.
      ———
      That a
      “passionate attachment” to a foreign state could cause some Americans to
      support a foreign policy detrimental to the interests of the United States
      was a cardinal warning in George Washington’s famous “Farewell Address”
      ———
      That the neocons assumed Israeli security, as perceived by Likudniks, to
      be a fundamental goal of American foreign policy would seem to reflect a
      bias for Israel, rather than a detached and objective assessment of Ameri-
      can national interest. Dorrien thinks that the issue is solved by attributing
      it to a neoconservative “article of faith.” But how was this “article of faith”
      arrived at? Was there any underlying motive to explain the adoption of this
      particular “article of faith?” It would seem reasonable to conclude that the
      “article of faith” reflected prior attachment to Israel – an attachment that
      becomes rather obvious in looking at the background of neoconservatism
      and neoconservatives. Identifying with Israel’s interests, the neoconserva-
      tives projected the interests of that country onto the United States. That
      there was a life-and-death struggle with the Arab/Islamic world might
      very well be true for Israel, but it certainly was not the case for the United
      States.

      ———-

      The neoconservative support for and ties to Israel have been obvious. If
      a comparable relationship existed involving other peoples, there would be
      nothing extraordinary about pointing that out. Analysis of the role of eth-
      nic groups in American politics is commonplace in political science and
      history and it is not considered evidence of hostility toward the groups
      being analyzed. For instance, political commentators do not hesitate to
      link Cuban-Americans’ goal of making the elimination of Castro a cen-
      tral element of American foreign policy with the fact that they are Cuban
      émigrés.
      However, since Jews and Israel are involved here, the subject approaches
      the realm of the taboo.
      ————-
      Evidence for the neoconservative and Israeli connection to the United
      States war in the Middle East is overwhelming and publicly available.
      ————-
      (Repeat: All you need to do is connect the dots, which is what
      The Transparent Cabal does, and the US MSM has never done, although they
      are the alleged Fourth Estate, responsible for keeping the US masses informed citizens, the key to an effective democracy.)
      ————–
      It should be hoped that in the self-proclaimed “Land
      of the Free,” Americans should not fear to honestly discuss the background
      and motivation for the war on Iraq and the overall United States policy in
      the Middle East. Only by understanding the truth can the United States
      possibly take the proper corrective action in the Middle East; without such
      an understanding, catastrophe looms.

      (The testimony as to the key motive for the 9/11 attack before the US Congress is available on Youtube–US rubber-stamping of Israeli actions good or bad, was the key motive, as was told to the 9/11 Commission by the perps, and by those called to Congress and asked to explain the motivation for 9/11–the former was excluded as to specifics from the final 9/11 Commission Report, and the latter was ignored by the media.)

  9. Keith says:

    I agree that this is an important topic that cries out for additional discussion and analysis. I’m a little concerned about the either/or approach I am seeing. Unquestionably, the Zionist lobby (in its totality) is extremely powerful. Yet, not so powerful that it overrules the perceived geo-strategic interests of the U.S. Empire.

    Writing in 1998, Michel Collon noted that “…the United States is in the process of completely fortifying the southern flank of all of Europe and the ex-USSR. Still missing in this chain are Iran, Iraq, and … Serbia” Since then, Yugoslavia was attacked and the strategically located Camp Bondsteel constructed in occupied Kosovo (until recently a part of Serbia). Iraq was occupied and numerous permanent bases built. Now, Iran is in the cross-hairs. This direct control of the Middle-East oil reserves- a stupendous source of geo-strategic power- has been a focus of U.S. policy for a long time and is independent of Israel. That Israel benefits from the destruction of Iraq and the potential destruction/economic subjugation of Iran does not represent a conflict of interests. Can one seriously imagine the U.S. invading Iraq and threatening Iran without the oil? Likewise, can one imagine the U.S. sitting idly by if Israel were to attempt to gain control of significant oil reserves by invading Saudi Arabia?

    On the other hand, we should not underestimate the power of ideology to influence and shape actions. This is particularly true with the Zionist ideology which is the driving force responsible for exploiting the Holocaust and fears of anti-Semitism to re-energize Jewish tribal solidarity. This group solidarity contributed to Jewish elite power-seeking success, and is something they likely will not give up willingly. In this regard, I contend that Zionism is an ideology whose spiritual center is Israel, but whose center of real power is located in New York/Washington. If by some miracle Israel made significant moves toward peace and justice and de-militarization in Israel/Palestine, I predict that the Lobby would oppose these moves rather than support Israel.

    This whole situation is made even more complex by the fact that significant numbers of the U.S. ruling elite are Jewish Zionists who have competing interests and tensions. They are continually making decisions concerning U.S./Israel based upon what they perceive is in their own long term interests. My gut feel is most of them perceive themselves more as Imperial Elite than as Jewish Zionists. In sum: the struggle for power among the elite “men of ambition” is the driving force behind most significant political/economic events, ideology is an intellectual framework for advancing elite objectives, over time ideology may take on a life of its own which transcends logic and reason. Of course, everything I’ve said is a simplification of real world complexity and nuance.

  10. bob says:

    Keith

    In addition to the points I made above on what people ignore on pushing a materialist POV, I’d like to highlight a few additional points

    Keith: Unquestionably, the Zionist lobby (in its totality) is extremely powerful. Yet, not so powerful that it overrules the perceived geo-strategic interests of the U.S. Empire.

    Lets be clear, the goals of oil supplies are often completely contradictory to US policy. If the U.S. goal was limited to resources, the U.S. would not support one of the rare countries in the Mid East without oil and one that unifies the region against the U.S.

    The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East
    For nearly 50 years, the United States’ policy in the Middle East has been directed towards two main goals: securing oil supplies for US industry and establishing Israel as a Jewish homeland. Taken together, these two goals are inherently contradictory and have created an enduring problem for successive US administrations: ‘For American policy makers, the Middle East has often been a headache, sometimes a nightmare, as each president has tried in his own way to pursue an even-handed policy, if only because he needed both Arab oil and Jewish campaign contributions. Implementation of a strategy to achieve these contradictory goals has traditionally met with obstacles, not lest within the United States itself. Ever mindful of its electoral base, any US administration must be sensitive to domestic opinion, especially during an election year. On the one hand, too little emphasis on Israel or too much on the Arabs may invoke the wrath of the legendary Jewish lobby, an electorally small but highly organized and well-placed body; on the other hand, too much emphasis on the Israelis and too little on the Arabs could trigger an oil price rise with adverse effects on the voters mood.

    Frankly, that the neoconservatives pushed for and overcame their obstacles for the Iraq war is without question. The centrality of Israel in the neoconservative worldview is irrefutable.

    What doesn’t have support is the strategic resources argument.

    Frankly, it is even more spurious as China extends its long term oil contracts in Iraq (compared to the dearth of US contracts).

    Keith: This direct control of the Middle-East oil reserves

    What direct control? What direct control is there? Explain, please. Include an understanding of fungible markets.

    Keith: In sum: the struggle for power among the elite “men of ambition” is the driving force behind most significant political/economic events, ideology is an intellectual framework for advancing elite objectives, over time ideology may take on a life of its own which transcends logic and reason.

    Most importantly, do you have direct proof to support this? We know the Israeli lobby’s role in the first and second Iraq war. It is extremely clear and their roles are clearly laid out. What proof do you bring to support your claim?

    • Citizen says:

      It has always been in the interest of Big Oil and hence the USA to prevent chaos in the Middle East, yet Israel’s strategy of divide and conquer; that is, basically to retain hegemony by sowing division amid the various Arab groups and states, ideally turning all Arab states into statelets, is not in the best interests of the USA. Yet the US policy has done just that in many ways–why? This BS goes all the way back to
      State Department POV during the Truman regime–well, there is no longer a cold war,
      so why is the USA acting against its best interests? Mearsheimer and Walt gave us the answer; but will this stop fulfilling PNAC, and Clean Break, despite 8 years of negative fallout on the USA? Seems unlikely. Obama’s a sucker. The big bankers were bailed out, and so will Israel’s hegemony–Iran the threat, all at Joe Doe’s expense.

    • Keith says:

      BOB- Let me begin by noting that U.S. geo-strategy may be inferred (not “proven”) by reference to planning documents, physical actions, and common sense. It is not important that you or I agree with the strategy, or think it is efficacious, etc. The U.S. spends about as much on its military as the rest of the world combined. The U.S. has around 750 military bases around the world in what it feels are strategic locations. A lot of thought has gone into this along with much analysis of its implications. In addition to my comments in my first post, it might be beneficial if I refer to some analysis of U.S. geo-strategy.

      In my readings of analyses of U.S. foreign policy, a consistent theme by those who have studied and analyzed the documentary record is that control of the Middle East hydrocarbon reserves is a core component of U.S. geo-strategy. “Starting with the CIA’s covert overthrow of the government of Iran for the sake of the British Petroleum Company, American policy in the Middle East– except for its support for Israel– has been dictated by oil. It has been a constant motive behind the vast expansion of bases in the Persian Gulf.” (Chalmers Johnson)

      “What about U.S. relations with the Arab world? First, the U.S. will act to ensure that it controls the major energy resources of the Arab peninsula: this is a central principal of U.S. foreign policy, as it has been throughout the post-World War II period.” (Noam Chomsky)

      “Special security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, especially after the brief punitive mission in 1991 against Iraq, have made that economically vital region into and American military preserve.” (Zbigniew Brzezinski)

      Why occupy Iraq? “One reason has to do with our military basing posture in the region. We had been very dissatisfied with our relations with Saudi Arabia, particularly the restrictions on our basing….so we were for alternative strategic locations….to secure the energy lines of communications in the region. Bases in Iraq then, were very important.” (Karen Kwiatkowski, former Defense Department strategist)

      “Iraq, however, is part of a larger picture. Over the past half century the United states has been inexorably acquiring permanent military enclaves whose sole purpose appears to be domination of one of the most strategically important areas of the world.” (Chalmers Johnson)

      After the collapse of the Soviet Union, how did Israel see it role in the Middle East? “Israel’s main task has not changed at all, and it remains of crucial importance. Its location at the center of the Arab Muslim Middle East predestines Israel to be the guardian of stability in all the countries surrounding it. Its (role) is to protect the existing regimes….” (Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israeli intelligence)

      “It was neither sentimentality nor guilt for the Judeocide, or the effectiveness of a pro-Israel lobby, nor the biased reportage of the New York Times that necessitated the buttressing of Israel as the Prussia of the Arab East. It was oil. And it was oil that compelled Washington to spend billions in order to shore up the ‘security of the region’ via Israel, the Saudi monarchy, and the British created Gulf states.” (Tariq Ali)

      And on and on it goes. This is but a small sample, due to limited time and space, of an extensive analysis of the documentary record. Essential reading if one wishes to analyze U.S. Imperial geo-strategy, and how it relates to U.S. Middle East policy. Of course, any analysis of U.S. Middle East policy which doesn’t account for the importance of Israel and the Zionist lobby would be seriously deficient. On the other hand, any analysis of the Middle East which pooh poohs the importance of effective control of the Middle East oil reserves, the largest reserves on the planet, and a “stupendous” source of geo-strategic power, is very seriously deficient.

      • bob says:

        Keith: BOB- Let me begin by noting that U.S. geo-strategy may be inferred (not “proven”) by reference to planning documents, physical actions, and common sense.

        Let me begin by stating it is a fact that we know the neoconservatives fought long and hard for this war and finally got it over the objections of powerful people like Colin Powell.

        To put some sort of competing paradigm against it that is based on mere conjecture isn’t an idea thats on the same footing.

        Brzezinski, by the way, was a huge critic of this war, and was an supporter of Walt and Mearsheimer’s book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. To use his example as some osrt of counterweight is wrong.

        • Keith says:

          BOB- I’ve already spent too much time on this, however, I’m going to make one more post to clarify the difference between overarching geo-strategy and the tactical implementation of that strategy.

          Let me begin by noting that the influence on U.S. policy of American Zionist Jews including the neocons is not in dispute. I am familiar with Zionist plans for the Middle East, including “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” by Richard Perle, et al, prepared in 1996 for Binyamin Netanyahu. As for the enthusiasm of the neocons for war “proving” that the war was made in Israel and contrary to overarching Imperial strategy is pure and unsupported conjecture. These guys were U.S. planners, and to maintain that their loyalty to Zionism caused them to stiff the U.S. would require you to be a mind reader. Now, if U.S. troops in Iraq were replaced by Israeli troops, you would have some facts to back up your conjecture. Why? The occupation of Iraq is not inconsistent with U.S. geo-strategy, however, allowing a militaristic client state that much geo-strategic influence would be.

          The key point is the extent to which Zionist influence has fundamentally altered U.S. geo-strategy. All U.S. constellations of power attempt to influence policy and geo-strategy, nudging it here, bending it there. Your contention, however, is that the Israeli lobby has hijacked U.S. Middle East policy to the extent that our current actions reflect a significant break in U.S. geo-strategy, a seismic shift in policy. That is simply not the case.

          If you were to read the works of people who have analyzed U.S. policy, you would discover considerable continuity in overall strategy adapted to the contingencies of events, always focused on increasing U.S. power leading to hegemony. As it relates to the Middle East, a key element is the control of the oil reserves for geo-strategic reasons. The world runs on oil, and the ability to cut off the flow or control the price provides enormous leverage. The U.S. began pushing for increased control of Middle East oil at the beginning of the 20th century, finally pushing Britain and France out and establishing effective control after World War II. In a letter written in 1943 to Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius, President Roosevelt wrote “I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States.” Obviously, he was thinking of oil. Equally obvious is that this occurred before there was an Israel and powerful Zionist lobby.

          The geo-strategic power accruing from control of the Middle East oil reserves should be obvious. Notice I said “control”, not merely access to. Japan has access to Middle East oil, we control the spigot. Most of our imported oil comes from Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela, which means we have greater flexibility in controlling price and volume. If Europe, Japan, or China get any funny ideas, they might find their oil cut off, just like we did to Japan in the summer of 1941. This time, however, I assume Japan would respond differently. Finally, I suspect that Zbigniew Brzezinski would more-or-less agree with what I have said, even though he may have opposed the Iraq invasion on tactical grounds as a piss-poor implementation of U.S. geo-strategy.

        • bob says:

          Keith: Let me begin by noting that the influence on U.S. policy of American Zionist Jews including the neocons is not in dispute.

          Absolutely.

          Keith: As for the enthusiasm of the neocons for war “proving” that the war was made in Israel and contrary to overarching Imperial strategy is pure and unsupported conjecture.

          No one is saying this. In fact, I made it clear to quote

          Professor Mearsheimer and I made it clear in our article and especially in our book that the idea of invading Iraq originated in the United States with the neoconservatives, and not with the Israeli government. But as the neoconservative pundit Max Boot once put it, steadfast support for Israel is “a key tenet of neoconservatism.” Prominent neo-conservatives occupied important positions in the Bush administration, and in the aftermath of 9/11, they played a major role in persuading Bush and Cheney to back a war against Iraq, which they had been advocating since the late 1990s. We also pointed out that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and other Israeli officials were initially skeptical of this scheme, because they wanted the U.S. to focus on Iran, not Iraq. However, they became enthusiastic supporters of the idea of invading Iraq once the Bush administration made it clear to them that Iraq was just the first step in a broader campaign of “regional transformation” that would eventually include Iran.

          Keith: These guys were U.S. planners, and to maintain that their loyalty to Zionism caused them to stiff the U.S. would require you to be a mind reader.

          Actually, they made it extremely clear when they “wrote openly in 1996 how removing Saddam would be “an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right.”
          Also, see information posted above like:

          The Washington Post Washington, D.C.: Sep 6, 1990. pg. a.36
          Israel’s American supporters, who have long tried to get the Bush administration to pursue a tough line against Iraq

          Thus, your assertion that Im making the claim that the war was “made in Israel, and your followup points on this are wholly based on an erroneous reading of what I have posted.

          Keith:The key point is the extent to which Zionist influence has fundamentally altered U.S. geo-strategy. All U.S. constellations of power attempt to influence policy and geo-strategy, nudging it here, bending it there. Your contention, however, is that the Israeli lobby has hijacked U.S. Middle East policy to the extent that our current actions reflect a significant break in U.S. geo-strategy, a seismic shift in policy. That is simply not the case.

          Actually, its a fact that the previous effort was containment. GHWBush infuriated the neocons when he did not invade, occupy, and overthrow Saddam. Powell was pushing for containment as well. The neoconservatives pushed for invasion, regime change, and a domino effect. That in it of itself is a huge policy change.

          Keith: If you were to read the works of people who have analyzed U.S. policy, you would discover considerable continuity in overall strategy adapted to the contingencies of events, always focused on increasing U.S. power leading to hegemony. As it relates to the Middle East, a key element is the control of the oil reserves for geo-strategic reasons. The world runs on oil, and the ability to cut off the flow or control the price provides enormous leverage. The U.S. began pushing for increased control of Middle East oil at the beginning of the 20th century, finally pushing Britain and France out and establishing effective control after World War II. In a letter written in 1943 to Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius, President Roosevelt wrote “I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States.” Obviously, he was thinking of oil. Equally obvious is that this occurred before there was an Israel and powerful Zionist lobby.

          First, saying I have not read this is very condescending as I have posted on these early policy contradictions in US policy between Israel and Arab countries. Combined with your previous misread of my information I posted above, its rather presumptuous to make this statement when you are having problems reading my work.

          For nearly 50 years, the United States’ policy in the Middle East has been directed towards two main goals: securing oil supplies for US industry and establishing Israel as a Jewish homeland. Taken together, these two goals are inherently contradictory and have created an enduring problem for successive US administrations:

          The contradictions between US policies of Arab countries and Israel represent another series of US policy breaks and discontinuity and ones that highlight non material concerns – especially when it comes to Israel.
          The geo-strategic power accruing from control of the Middle East oil reserves should be obvious.

          Keith: The geo-strategic power accruing from control of the Middle East oil reserves should be obvious.

          With the description posted above on the fungible oil markets, control of oil markets doesnt work in the manner you describe.

          Keith:If Europe, Japan, or China get any funny ideas, they might find their oil cut off, just like we did to Japan in the summer of 1941.

          1) I have enumerated specifically how this type of embargo will not work for China. Please read what I have posted. It is posted to you at March 6, 2010 at 11:53 pm. Take the time to read it.
          2) Japan in 1941 had a problem as the world oil supplies were not fungible in the way they are now. The oil supplies were tied up among the colonial powers. Understand how fungibility works, and you will understand why this model you describe is not possible in todays market.
          2)

  11. bob says:

    addition:
    “Lets be clear, the goals of oil supplies are often completely contradictory to US policy with Israel.

    • Citizen says:

      While oil is a fungible, there are ways a superpower can control which way the Arab spigot goes in the end; control of the spigot flow, even via spot market etc; so long as the US is the only superpower it has its hands on the spigot one way or another–this is a powerful hand becasue, e.g., Europe and Japan are much more dependent on that oild than the USA, hence veiled spigot control is also control over Europe and Japan, for example.

      • bob says:

        Citizen: While oil is a fungible, there are ways a superpower can control which way the Arab spigot goes in the end; control of the spigot flow, even via spot market etc

        I need some substantiation, please. Here’s two points to start with.

        1) Define this “spigot control.” Use actual examples. Abstain from speculation.

        2) Give proof that non-neoconservatives were pushing for this in an invasion of Iraq.

        • BenjaminGeer says:

          I’m open-minded on this issue, but here’s something that might be relevant:

          The first oil crisis [of 1973] and the embargo showed that the kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] would play an increasingly important role in regional politics; the rise in its oil revenues, like those of the other Gulf monarchies, seemed to be unstoppable. Local economic development projects and the population’s absorption of these revenues were not enough to exhaust these huge sums of money, and created new problems in the form of a substantial increase in the population of Arab and non-Arab foreigners. The most logical solution would have been a reduction in oil production, which would have made it possible to maintain high prices while conserving the country’s substantial oil reserves. This option was firmly rejected by the US, which let it be known that any new reduction in oil production would practically be considered a cause for war. . . . American officials implied, in public and in private, that the US would consider military occupation of oil-producing areas if their vital interests made this necessary. The Saudis knew that such an enterprise would be difficult, due to the impossibility of operating the oil industry, especially the network of pipelines, in such conditions, because the installations would be too vulnerable to sabotage. But they did not want to run the risk of a major confrontation with the US, whom they needed in order to maintain their own security in general.

          Laurens, Henry. Paix et guerre au Moyen-Orient: L’Orient arabe et le monde de 1945 à nos jours. 2nd ed. Paris: Armand Colin, 2005, pp. 305-306 (my translation).

        • bob says:

          The Arab embargo, which was their “response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military during the war,” cost the US (according to some) roughly a trillion dollars (in 2001 dollars).Yet, others say this isn’t telling the whole picture.

          In 1973, for instance, Arab nations attacked Israel in an attempt to win back territories Israel had conquered in the 1967 war. President Nixon resupplied Israel with US arms, triggering the Arab oil embargo against the US.

          That shortfall in oil deliveries kicked off a deep recession. The US lost $420 billion (in 2001 dollars) of output as a result, Stauffer calculates. And a boost in oil prices cost another $450 billion.

          Afraid that Arab nations might use their oil clout again, the US set up a Strategic Petroleum Reserve. That has since cost, conservatively, $134 billion, Stauffer reckons.
          ———————-

          However
          price controls imposed in 1971 by the Nixon administration prevented major oil companies from passing on the full cost of imported crude to consumers at the pump. “Big Oil” did the only sensible thing: it cut back on imports and stopped selling oil to independent service stations in order to keep its own franchises supplied. By the summer of 1973, gasoline prices were exploding, pumps were running dry, and long lines were commonplace. And that was before the Arab oil embargo or production cutbacks were announced

          The reason is simple: Once oil is in a tanker or refinery, there is no controlling its destination. During the 1973 embargo, for instance, OPEC oil that was exported to Europe was simply resold to the United States or ended up displacing non-OPEC oil that was diverted to the U.S. market. U.S. oil imports were no more disturbed at the end of the day than Soviet grain imports were disturbed by the short-lived and ineffectual 1980 grain embargo. Saudi oil minister Sheik Yamani conceded afterwards that the 1973 embargo “did not imply that we could reduce imports to the United States … the world is really just one market. So the embargo was more symbolic than anything else.”
          “An Oil Embargo Won’t Work,” Wall Street Journal, 10 April 2002

          Any country who expects to manipulate this to these degrees will expect open hostility from the entire world. Even the United States cant sustain that. This is a global market, and affecting this has strong repercussions at home. Likewise, this is a global market, and a selective embargo cannot work as it frees up supplies.

          Though, even as the US now is unable to control the market “spigot,” we are dealing in hypotheticals- and its clearly a situation that would have serious impacts on the global economy and incur the wrath of the globe. You can expect very open hostility from this so called “spigot control” and you can expect an economic disaster at the US – as this is a global economy. Moreover, the U.S. can’t expect to take slow, lumbering, easy target oil tankers home, that is, unless you want them escorted by a carrier group. Thats an energy negative hypothetical situation if I ever heard of it.

          It should be noted that the market became even more fungible since 1973.

        • bob says:

          Saudis, by the way are worried about a raising price of crude

          Why the Saudis are worried about the high price of crude

          WITH oil prices nudging $140 a barrel, Saudi Arabia stands to receive a
          windfall this year of up to $400 billion, double what it earned from selling oil last year. Gloom at the world’s petrol pumps, it may be assumed, can only mean hand-rubbing glee for their biggest supplier. Such is the case with some of the kingdom’s rivals in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the cartel that supplies over one-third of the world’s crude. Iran, for instance, has consistently argued against doing anything to bring down prices. Why, then, have the Saudis mounted a risky bid to do just that, by boosting oil output and summoning the world’s top energy officials to an emergency meeting in Jeddah on June 22nd?

          The reasons span history, economics and geopolitics. No one in the Saudi oil ministry has forgotten what happened after the oil shock in the 1970s. The Arab boycott called in 1973 to protest against Western backing for Israel tripled oil prices. But it also prompted oil exploration in tricky places such as the North Sea and conservation measures that reduced demand. The result was a long-term slump in crude prices and a drop in the Saudis’ market share. The Saudis fear that the intensified search by the West for alternative energy will result in the same thing happening again. But the more immediate worry is that high oil prices may slow not just America’s but the whole world’s economy. That would trigger a sharp fall in demand for Saudi oil. Just as bad, a sharp global slowdown would slash the value of the kingdom’s hundreds of billions of dollars in overseas holdings. No wonder Ali al-Nuaimi, like his predecessors as Saudi oil minister, often cites “customer satisfaction” and “market stability”. Saudis retain another nasty memory from the 1970s. Branded as gluttons, they became a stock figure of ridicule in Western cartoons. And sudden wealth brought social strains at home that helped create a fundamentalist backlash that produced, among other things, al-Qaeda. The Saudi desire not to be stigmatised for the world’s woes, this time, may be gauged by their donation, last month, of a generous $500m to the UN’s World Food Programme.

          Today’s sky-high oil price carries another political risk. It empowers Iran,
          the revolutionary Shia state that the conservative Sunni Saudis view as their main rival for regional influence. Even as the world has ratcheted up sanctions to punish Iran for its suspected nuclear ambitions, the Islamic Republic has cashed in the rewards from soaring fuel prices. The tightness of the oil market has become, in effect, a line of defence for Iran, letting its radical leadership hint, truthfully, that any hostile act that may impede the flow of Iranian oil would risk a global economic decline.
          So Saudi Arabia’s motives for wanting to lower prices are clear. The trouble is that it cannot manipulate markets as before.

        • BenjaminGeer says:

          OK, but this doesn’t address the point I quoted above:

          The most logical solution would have been a reduction in oil production, which would have made it possible to maintain high prices while conserving the country’s substantial oil reserves. This option was firmly rejected by the US, which let it be known that any new reduction in oil production would practically be considered a cause for war. . . . American officials implied, in public and in private, that the US would consider military occupation of oil-producing areas if their vital interests made this necessary.

          In other words, it may be true that “once oil is in a tanker or refinery, there is no controlling its destination”, but it would still be possible to reduce production, and thus to put less oil in the tankers and refineries. But the US indicated that it would be prepared to use military force to prevent this, and the Saudis heeded the threat. Isn’t this a form of “spigot control”?

        • bob says:

          Keith In other words, it may be true that “once oil is in a tanker or refinery, there is no controlling its destination”, but it would still be possible to reduce production, and thus to put less oil in the tankers and refineries. But the US indicated that it would be prepared to use military force to prevent this, and the Saudis heeded the threat. Isn’t this a form of “spigot control”?

          Actually, as stated above as the major thrust of the article above…. the Saudis do not want to reduce . They do not want what you are stating in your article. it is the reason why I quoted it here, and it points out how a reduction in production is not the logical solution for the Saudis.

  12. bob says:

    Just to sum up. A materialist assumption completely ignores the ideological attachments of the well known people who pushed for this war. Also, the goals of US policy for the arab states often run completely contrary to US policy for Israel. US policy with Israel has a strong effect of uniting an otherwise disunited area, separated by deep cleavages like Sunni and Shia, against the U.S. The old principle is “divide and conquer,” not unify and quagmire. If purely materialist concerns were the chief concern, wouldn’t we have jettisoned the rare country that is not oil rich and has the effect of uniting the region against the power who props it up?

    • BenjaminGeer says:

      You could argue that material interests are a motivation for having client states in the region, but that symbolic interests (i.e. ideological attachments) help determine the choice of client states, e.g. Israel as opposed to Iran.

      • bob says:

        BenjaminGeer: You could argue that material interests are a motivation for having client states in the region, but that symbolic interests (i.e. ideological attachments) help determine the choice of client states, e.g. Israel as opposed to Iran.

        I like to determine what is known from the evidence. Currently, we do know that the neoconservatives pushed for this war. We know the Israeli lobby pushed for this war.

        Conversely, there are some ideas posed as competing narratives that are speculative and have conjecture as major supports. This is not acceptable.

  13. Keith says:

    PHILIP WEISS- I hadn’t planned to make anymore comments on this thread, however, in reflecting on some of the responses to my previous comments, I feel the need for one final reflection.

    In your initial post on the David Green post, you (unjustifiably in my opinion) link him with Noam Chomsky, apparently because he quotes Chomsky a lot. You then proceed to denigrate Green/Chomsky as “materialists”, “shallow and mechanical” people. I don’t know about Green, but the characterization of Noam Chomsky as “shallow and mechanical” is totally unjustified and indefensible. Why do such a thing?

    You provide a laundry list of Lobby/ethnic activities to prove your point of Lobby influence. When has Noam Chomsky ever said that these events were insignificant, or that lobby influence wasn’t real? For that matter, when has Norman Finkelstein ever denied this, even though his position on the Lobby is closer to Chomsky’s than to yours?

    What’s going on here? I attempted to put a geo-strategic perspective on all of this, to point out that though the lobby was indeed powerful, but that Imperial interests played a role. Hardly a controversial position, what with military bases practically everywhere, a military budget going through the roof, and a documentary record of strategic planners advocating U.S. hegemony. The response? Your acolytes arguing against Imperial geo-strategy having any significance whatsoever in the Middle East. Control of the Middle East hydrocarbon reserves? Nonsense, oil is “fungible” (a curious interpretation of the word, totally devoid of significance). Those who infer meaning from the documentary record, Imperial actions, and the “facts on the ground” are denigrated as “materialists”,
    “shallow and mechanical people.” What’s going on here?

    As nearly as I can tell, your post reflects a skirmish in a sort of sectarian turf-war between you and David Green. You need to be aware, if you aren’t already, that overemphasizing the lobby and underemphasizing Empire is a de facto defense of Empire. A way of saying that the crimes against humanity in Palestine have nothing to do with Empire, it’s the Lobby. What are the implications? That if we can alleviate the plight of the Palestinians, everything would be honky-dory? No problems with Empire, and the world-wide suffering that it entails? Reality taking a back seat to ideology? What’s going on here?

  14. bob says:

    Keith:- I hadn’t planned to make anymore comments on this thread

    Thats too bad. I certainly was hoping for some responses to my points that showed a good reading of what was posted, rather than your erroneous points I outline @ March 8, 2010 at 7:43 pm. I would like to actually have a discussion, but its extremely hard to accomplish this when you post rebuttals based on improper reading comprehension of the material posted. These reading comprehension problems ( for instance assuming the war was made in Israel) lead you to go on a red-herring ‘rebuttal’ to my criticism of your positions that are based on conjecture. As a result, the original points of your conjecture was not dealt with at all. There’s more, but it seems you are “finished” with this conversation.

    I would have to have a dialogue, but thats going to require you to deal with the material I post and read it correctly. When this can happen, I will be more than happy to continue.

Leave a Reply