Biden refuses to abandon the normalization fantasy

U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan is scheduled to travel this weekend to Saudi Arabia and Israel. The trip is the latest attempt by U. S. President Joe Biden’s administration to patch up its tattered Middle East policy, while Israel and its Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, continue the gradual uptick of their assault on the civilian population of Gaza.

Sullivan will be primarily striving to prop up the plan that has become a farcical cornerstone of Biden’s policy: a normalization deal between the Saudis and Israel that he has convinced himself will somehow revive the long-since desiccated corpse of a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. The strategy, if one can call it that, has taken on renewed importance as the November election looms and Biden flails about desperately trying to salvage a foreign policy win.

In Israel, Sullivan’s task is straightforward. Netanyahu has agreed not to escalate his assault in Rafah before Sullivan’s trip. While Netanyahu is hardly a man of his word, he has no reason to break his promise here. Sullivan will reinforce Biden’s desire to keep the slaughter in Rafah to the steady pace Israel has been going at so far. As I’ve noted, this works well for Netanyahu, and allows Biden to claim he is putting some restraint on Netanyahu’s excesses, but does little but stretch out the same amount of destruction and of Palestinian deaths and injuries over a slightly longer period of time. 

Sullivan also hopes to bring an update to Netanyahu about a proposal for Israeli-Saudi normalization, an agreement that is likely impossible without an end to the Gaza genocide and some show by Netanyahu that Israel is willing to revive the idea of a Palestinian state. 

The normalization fantasy

The Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, or MBS as he’s known, is not seen as a serious supporter of the Palestinian cause, but most Saudi citizens are, and many in the royal family consider it at least an important responsibility in terms of their image in the Arab and Muslim world. Whatever temptations MBS might feel to simply abandon the Palestinians and make whatever deal he sees fit is constrained by those facts and by the position Saudi Arabia has and wishes to hold as a leader of the Arab and Muslim world. 

Since Netanyahu’s political future depends on both maintaining the genocidal operation in Gaza and ensuring that Palestinians never recognize their basic rights, MBS is well aware that a normalization deal is unlikely for now. He has time, however, and the prize—a defense agreement with the U.S. sealed by a treaty and American help in putting together a civilian nuclear program—is so great, he is willing to pursue it.

The passion with which Biden has pursued this quixotic goal has kept the process alive and caused some alarm in some Washington quarters. It’s been a particular concern because the Saudis have recently tried to devise a path where they can get the package they want without Israel and Palestine being a part of it. 

That idea is a clear non-starter. The Saudis already have defense agreements with the U.S. What they want is an upgrade to the status of a treaty, a deal that prevents a recurrence of Donald Trump’s failure to come to Saudi Arabia’s defense in 2019, when their oil facilities were attacked by Ansar Allah (the Houthis) from Yemen. 

That means a treaty, which would require Senate approval, and that is out of the question without the Israel component. Even then, many Democrats are extremely skeptical of a Saudi deal, and with good reason. Biden’s obsession with this agreement is extremely dangerous, and a defense pact with Saudi Arabia is just terrible policy, even purely from a security point of view. 

Saudi aggression in the Mideast should be a major concern for Biden, though it appears not to be. Saudi Arabia’s shadow is long in the region, with the kingdom supporting militias and fighters in areas which could, at some point, lead to wider conflicts. That includes not only its high-profile involvement in Yemen and Syria, but also in Libya and Sudan, with ever-simmering tensions with Iran and an unsteady relationship with Türkiye thrown into the mix. They have even come into friction with their Gulf partners in the United Arab Emirates in recent years. A stronger defense pact with the United States would increase the risk of U.S. involvement in those conflicts, which has been proven repeatedly to end badly for everyone. 

A domestic nuclear program for Saudi Arabia, even a civilian one, has severe implications for the future of a region already badly de-stabilized by decades of foreign intervention and internal authoritarianism and corruption. As with virtually every lesson of history, Biden and his team have utterly failed to learn from the experience of the United States having almost single-handedly built Iran’s nuclear program, only to then wail to the heavens that now the Islamic Republic might use it for military means. Even aside from that worrisome possibility, a Saudi nuclear program will only enhance Iran’s motivation to escalate its own nuclear capabilities. 

A U.S.-Saudi defense pact and nuclear cooperation is simply terrible policy, born out of narrow-minded, militaristic thinking. It is a simplistic “Iran is bad, and must be countered by force, whatever the risks” line of thinking. Biden’s basic hatred of diplomacy, ironically shared by his Secretary of State Antony Blinken, means that this is the only strategy available to his mind, regardless of how destabilizing it will be for the region and how badly it will undermine U.S. security and other interests.

But the Senate does not seem poised to grant Biden his wish. Democrats share many of the concerns I’ve listed and Republicans, who won’t be inclined to give Biden a win, would only come on board if it were clear that a deal was what Netanyahu wanted. That seems impossible, as even in a best-case scenario for Biden, Netanyahu would have to be dragged into it, overwhelmed with carrots and probably pressured with at least some minor sticks. 

Biden’s obsession with normalization is only likely to grow between now and November. Donald Trump is certain to point to the fact that he brokered normalization deals between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, and Biden has tried to expand those deals and found himself incapable of accomplishing it. That’s a point that is likely to play well to undecided voters, and Trump—who, for all his insanity and narcissism, reads his audience far better than Biden does—will recognize that. Biden’s advisors probably know it, too, and that is feeding into this blind determination to pursue this awful policy.

Yoav Gallant and the future of Gaza

Biden would certainly like to see the Gaza operation end. He clearly did not anticipate it going on for this long, and has been thoroughly unprepared for the political problems it is causing him (the loss of Palestinian life, as he, Blinken, and most of the rest of his close advisers have repeatedly made clear, means absolutely nothing to him). 

But for all the mass slaughter in Gaza, it has been mostly civilians and civilian infrastructure that Israel has hit. Hamas, which has obviously suffered great losses, is still quite capable of functioning, even after all this time. Neither Netanyahu nor Biden want to deal with the reality that Israeli forces are continuing to face fierce fighting even in the northern and central parts of Gaza, where Israel claimed Hamas had been eradicated. 

Obviously, if Hamas is still capable of fighting, Netanyahu cannot afford to stop the onslaught. It would lay bare the reality that this entire genocide has not only destroyed Israel’s image and standing around the world, but it has utterly failed even on Israel’s own terms. Its operations have killed far more of the hostages than it has saved, and it has devastated civilians while leaving Hamas standing.

As much as Netanyahu cannot afford that outcome, although at this point it is already a fait accompli neither can Biden. But Biden needs something Netanyahu does not care much about: a path forward in Gaza post-genocide. 

While that does not concern Netanyahu, there are those in his government who are very much concerned with this question. It is no coincidence that Defense Minister Yoav Gallant chose this time, just days before Sullivan’s arrival to declare that he will refuse to help Netanyahu reoccupy Gaza.

“I will not agree to the establishment of Israeli military rule in Gaza. Israel must not establish civilian rule in Gaza,” Gallant said. 

This is, of course, the U.S. view as well. There has been much hand-wringing over the day after in Gaza, but there are few real options. The Palestinian Authority will have a task far beyond its capabilities if it tries to take over the running of Gaza. It will simply have no chance of keeping control over the various militant factions in the Strip, including Hamas. The PA would need enormous assistance from the U.S. and Israel just to maintain some semblance of control. 

The PA would not be capable of replicating what it does in the West Bank in Gaza. The militant factions are more powerful in Gaza, and much more deeply connected. Fatah doesn’t have nearly the presence or infrastructure in Gaza, even before the complete destruction of the Strip since October 7. And the PA has little legitimacy among Palestinians in general. It’s one thing to cling to power in a place where you already run the administrative bureaucracy and have networks set up. It’s quite another to have such small respect and try to establish those networks of support in a war-torn area.

Another idea that’s been floated about is a sort of international assemblage that would “temporarily” govern Gaza. The problem there is that no one wants to be part of it, and with good reason. The task is fraught with problems. Any country, including and perhaps especially, Arab countries, that takes on such a role will be seen, correctly, as working with Israel and the United States to stifle Palestinian aspirations. 

Moreover, the U.S. and Israel will see the role of whoever is governing Gaza primarily through the lens of “security,” and will insist that the first task is to ensure that militant groups, Hamas or otherwise, be hunted down. That would be prioritized far above reconstruction of the Strip and rebuilding the Gaza economy. In other words, they would essentially be treated like the PA. There is no good reason for other countries to do that.

Israel has, in the past, floated the idea of selecting Palestinians not tied to either Hamas or Fatah to run Gaza. But, again, they are likely to find this exceedingly difficult. The idea of gathering disparate individuals from all over Gaza and expecting them to form even the most technocratic, but still cohesive, unit is folly. Plus, Israel would certainly be talking about Palestinians who could be bribed or extorted into serving the occupation rather than opposing it. That is obviously not a recipe for stability, much less for healing the people and rebuilding the infrastructure of Gaza.

All of this, of course, is based on a single principle: that Palestinians never be allowed freedom or self-governance, much less self-determination. Reparations in the form of funds, equipment, and any other assistance Palestinians should request, and the very self-governance that Israel and the U.S. so passionately oppose is the only practical way forward, but this will not even be thought of in Washington or Israel. 

Instead, Sullivan will be debating Netanyahu, who will argue for indefinite Israeli control of Gaza. It’s just more of the same delusional discussion that undergirds Biden’s strategy for normalization. There is no chance normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia will solve or even mildly mitigate the problem. Nor will changing the form of colonial governance in Gaza. Recognition of Palestinian rights is the only way forward, but that is simply not something Joe Biden is capable of considering.