The Reuters headline on Wednesday read, “Iran’s Khamenei dismisses U.S. nuclear proposal, vows to keep enriching uranium.”
Reading that, anyone might believe that the region was gearing up for war and that talks between Washington and Tehran had collapsed. But on the very same day, the New York Times ran a story headlined, “U.S. Proposes Interim Step in Iran Nuclear Talks Allowing Some Enrichment.”
This continued a stream of contradictory news stories that have been flying back and forth for days. That shouldn’t be all that surprising, given that one side, the United States, lacks a clear vision or a deep understanding of the issues involved and is led by a man, Donald Trump, who sways to the various noises he hears around him and has no principled or even pragmatic stake by which to steer.
On the Iranian side, there is a clear position, even if the rhetoric sometimes veers into bombast. They are willing to submit to significantly intrusive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that would verify that it is enriching uranium only to low levels for civilian needs. They are not willing to abandon uranium enrichment on Iranian soil completely, and they, quite reasonably, insist on clarity about the time frame and scope of the lifting of American and international sanctions that have crippled their economy.
Iran has even signaled its willingness to cooperate on a regional “consortium,” cooperating with Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on enriching uranium for civilian purposes for plants the United States would help the Arab states construct. Such cooperation would also have the added incentive of American contact with the enrichment process, giving Washington another layer of monitoring and reassurance.
Iran is willing to do this despite the fact that it was Trump who abrogated the old nuclear deal, one which Trump’s own staff confirmed Iran was adhering to. Tehran is aware that they have acted in good faith while the West, especially Washington, hasn’t. But they are also pragmatic enough to recognize what getting a deal done is going to require, whether that is fair or not.
Competing pressures and incoherent policy in Washington
Pragmatism and coherence are qualities in exceedingly short supply in the Trump administration.
Trump initially put the United States into this position by abandoning the 2015 Iran nuclear deal for no reason other than the fact that it was Barack Obama’s signature foreign policy achievement. In his second term as president, Trump is now faced with the potential of a war over the issue thanks to his recklessness and Joe Biden’s unwillingness to undo the damage Trump did.
Though Trump’s foreign policy has never been truly “isolationist,” as some have said, much of his “American First” movement does hold such views. That camp is led, within the administration, by Vice President JD Vance.
Trump himself has staked much of his appeal in foreign affairs on a purported anti-war stance, an irony since his own recklessness brought the U.S. close to war on more than one occasion during his first term. That was most notable in the wake of his assassination of Iranian Revolutionary Guard leader Qasem Suleimani.
But Trump 2.0 has shown real desire to keep the United States out of a direct conflict with Iran. Even his aggressive mobilization of forces in the region can be interpreted as an attempt to look tough and threatening in pursuit of a diplomatic resolution. This is not very different from Iran’s rush to enrich more and more uranium well past the point necessary for civilian use. It’s both a bargaining chip and a way to prepare in case talks do collapse. U.S. deployments in recent months in the Gulf and Indian Ocean can, and probably should, be seen in a similar light.
The fact is, Trump has put the brakes on Israeli plans to engulf the region in a major new war. He has also excised many hawkish voices on Iran, including many rabid supporters of Israel, from his administration.
Yet, on the other side, the administration has sent mixed messages to Iran about crucial issues.
Iran will not agree to give up the right, which it has as a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, to civilian nuclear energy. Although the NPT doesn’t explicitly guarantee the right to enrich uranium, Iran interprets the right to civilian nuclear power to imply that it does. This is crucial for Iran, because without control over its own enrichment, any civilian nuclear program it has would be at the mercy of outside powers, almost certainly the United States. Given the history of the past four decades, it is unreasonable to expect them to allow that.
But the Trump administration has waffled between agreeing that Iran could enrich for civilian purposes under IAEA supervision (which is not unusual; the IAEA maintains inspection routines on many countries’ facilities, although the kinds of inspections that Iran has already signaled it would submit to are much more stringent) and an insistence on “zero enrichment.” The latter is a non-starter for Iran. All parties understand that this is a dealbreaker.
If Trump insists on zero enrichment, as administration hawks and Israel want him to, there is no prospect for a deal. But that doesn’t seem to be where they are headed.
While lead negotiator Steve Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have both stated publicly that they are sticking to the zero enrichment stance, the proposal they recently sent to Iran reflects the idea of the regional consortium and at least temporary permission for Iran to enrich uranium for civilian use for a period of years. This won’ t meet Iran’s conditions, but neither does it preclude more talks.
The flexibility on the enrichment issue that proposal contains reflects the competing pressures on Trump. He is not willing to completely disregard hawks remaining in his administration, at least in part because he continues to view Iran as a threat that he needs to act tough towards.
But he also prefers a deal to war. If an accommodation can be found on enrichment, they can work on other issues, a possibility that both sides seem to believe is real, given that they are now thinking in terms of a temporary agreement to lower tensions while a permanent solution is worked out. This is very much like what Obama did over a decade ago.
But enrichment is not the only issue. Once an agreement, temporary or permanent, on that issue is reached, the next big issue is sanctions relief. There has been little discussion on that point, so it’s not clear how big a problem it might be. Trump’s unpredictability makes this worrisome, especially if an interim deal is the next big step. Will Trump be willing to offer significant, if far from complete, sanctions relief in exchange for an interim deal?
Schumer leads the hawks
On Monday, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer released a video blasting what he called a “side deal” by Trump with Iran. He accused Trump of “caving in” to Iran.
It was a blatant effort to undermine diplomacy between the United States and Iran. Schumer was being consistent here; he led the Democratic opposition that nearly derailed Obama’s efforts back in 2015.
This time around, Schumer seems intent on reinforcing the Democratic Party’s reputation as the party of war. In this case, Schumer is obviously acting in cooperation with Israel’s U.S. lobby, but there is also a more basic political element at work here.
Schumer was setting out to undermine Trump’s effort at diplomacy, and did so in a ham-handed way. Rather than speak against a deal with Iran that would avert a Middle East war that would devastate the region, kill untold thousands—perhaps millions—of people, and significantly harm an already teetering global economy, Schumer framed his attack as criticism of a purported capitulation to Iran by Trump, and one that is being done in secret.
This tactic echoes a Republican talking point from 2015, where Obama was attacked for negotiating a “secret side deal” parallel to the main Iran nuclear deal. It turned out, the side deal was a more detailed roadmap of tackling outstanding complaints against Iran by the IAEA. It was eventually made public, and it reflected a desire by Obama to move past the outstanding issues of the past, so the terms were relatively favorable to Iran. It was, though, a real “side deal.”
But that’s not what is happening now. The U.S. and Iran are engaging in talks to hammer out the basic contours of a deal and the details that will then be needed to flesh out the agreement. That is not something to be done publicly. Schumer knows this very well. It’s not a “side deal.” It’s the deal itself that Schumer wants to torpedo.
Fortunately, there doesn’t seem to have been a lot of impact from Schumer’s statement. Other than the irrelevant and clownish John Fetterman, who praised Trump for breaking the Iran deal years ago but then called on him to drop diplomacy and help Israel bomb the Islamic Republic, no Democrats have prominently echoed Schumer’s attacks.
Still, it’s worth keeping an eye on this. Democrats are flailing badly, unable to score points politically against Trump even while his keystone policies like attacks on migrants and tariffs are crashing. The mainstream of the party is apparently unwilling to engage in substantive attacks on Trump from a progressive position, so they are trying to attack him from the right. It’s an obviously failed strategy, especially on this issue, as a strong majority of Americans want to see the tension with Iran resolved diplomatically. But Democrats rarely miss an opportunity to shoot themselves in the foot, especially when it comes to an issue that Israel has such a consuming interest in. And, in this case, their short-sightedness and political cowardice have the potential to cause unprecedented destruction.
