In Gaza this week, we’ve seen yet another bloody demonstration of Israel’s odd definition of “ceasefire.” In Israel’s view, it means the other side ceases while Israel continues to fire. If the opposition “behaves” according to Israeli diktats, Israel’s firing will be lessened, though not eliminated. If the opponents take even the slightest action outside of Israel’s orders, the firing increases very quickly and by many orders of magnitude.
Gaza and the West Bank are prime examples. But another is Lebanon, where a year-old “ceasefire” is maintained despite near daily Israeli military attacks.
Since the ceasefire was implemented in November 2024, the level of violence between Israel and Lebanon has been reduced sharply, but ongoing Israeli attacks and Israel’s occupation of five key points in southern Lebanon have complicated Lebanese government efforts to disarm Hezbollah and, with support from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), establish itself as the sole legitimate military force in the country.
Donald Trump’s administration took over during the initial phase of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire, and has largely ignored the dire economic situation in Lebanon as well as the complications Israel’s ongoing bullying causes in the effort to disarm Hezbollah. The U.S. under Trump has focused its aid to Lebanon on military assistance—which itself has not been all that significant—and conditioning further support on disarming Hezbollah.
The ceasefire agreement
After nearly a year of exchanging fire across Israel’s northern and Lebanon’s southern border, Israel escalated the fighting that Hezbollah had initiated in support of the people of Gaza. With northern Israel largely evacuated, heavy fire rained down, harming mostly Lebanese in the south of the country for nearly two months as Israeli troops invaded Lebanon.
The agreement that ended the escalated fighting called for Israel to leave Lebanon in 60 days, for all fighting to end, and for Hezbollah and any other non-governmental militias in Lebanon to be disarmed.
Neither Israel nor Hezbollah has fully implemented the deal. Israel, as noted, has continued its attacks in Lebanon and has maintained control over five “key areas” in southern Lebanon. While Israel claims, dubiously, that the agreement’s mention of the inherent right of self-defense for both countries allows it to act against Hezbollah operatives and bases, there is no interpretation of the ceasefire agreement that can excuse Israel’s ongoing occupation of southern Lebanon. Yet this seems not to trouble the self-appointed arbitrators in Washington (there is a committee including the U.S., France, and the UN, but in practice, it’s the U.S. that rules).
Meanwhile, Washington is raising pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025. No one doubts that the new Lebanese government has been trying very hard to do just that. Indeed, they have found and destroyed so many Hezbollah bases and weapons caches that they have run out of explosives to destroy them and are waiting for Washington to restock their supply.
Hezbollah, for its part, evacuated the area south of the Litani River, which was the line Israel demanded they pull back to. They have not resisted government or UNIFIL forces when they move to disarm them or confiscate their bases. But they have also refused to disarm their forces north of the Litani River until Israel completely halts its attacks and withdraws its remaining forces from southern Lebanon.
Lebanese government boxed in
Lebanon had gone without a government for more than two years before Joseph Aoun was elected in January of 2025. Hezbollah, although not enthusiastic about Aoun, did not stand in his way and cooperated with him, hoping that his government would be open to their participation.
But Hezbollah was severely weakened by Israel, not only militarily but politically as well. It had always been a divisive party, not only along religious lines (Hezbollah represents the Shi’a in Lebanon, who make up about half of Lebanon’s Muslim population), but political ones as well. It retains significant support in Lebanon, but remains controversial for what some perceive as its unilateral decisions to prioritize foreign concerns over Lebanese security and interests.
The new Lebanese government has made it clear that it plans to be, like most central governments, the sole legitimate user of military force in the country. But this goal is much more easily stated than accomplished.
The Lebanese military is very weak and has been for a long time. That is why Hezbollah established itself as the only realistic defender against Israeli aggression.
More importantly, in the short term, Aoun was wise enough to insist that the new Lebanese government try to work with Hezbollah toward disarming the group and absorbing at least some of their number into the Lebanese armed forces. He rejected the use of force against Hezbollah, a sensible decision given the ongoing divisions in the country.
Hezbollah may be viewed entirely negatively by Western governments, and of course, Israel, but it is seen more holistically in Lebanon as part of the fabric of the country, even by many of its opponents.
There is a real risk in raising tensions between Hezbollah and the government. Lebanon is a country all too familiar with internal strife, including civil war. No one wants to see that happen again. And it is not at all clear that the government’s forces are strong enough to disarm Hezbollah without the group’s cooperation.
But Lebanon’s economy remains in tatters. The new government desperately needs help from the international community, and that help has been conditioned on the government establishing itself as the lone arbiter of the use of force and questions of war and peace for Lebanon.
Yet with every Israeli attack, the question of Lebanon’s ability to defend itself without Hezbollah becomes sharper. In October alone, according to Lebanon’s Ministry of Health, Israel killed more than 20 Lebanese.
The United States has been pushing the Aoun government hard to disarm Hezbollah despite Israel making it more difficult to do so.
Over the weekend, Israel killed several prominent figures in Hezbollah. None were actively engaged in hostilities at the time of Israel’s attack, nor did Israel claim that any of them were about to engage in an attack.
Israel justified its actions by noting the individuals’ high rank and important roles in Hezbollah. The United States and the rest of the ostensible monitors paid this no notice. Yet the definition of a ceasefire is that, unless there is reason to believe an attack is imminent, such targeted killings are most certainly out of bounds.
The Deputy U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, arrived in Lebanon on Monday, after these attacks. Yet her mission was to push Lebanon to act more aggressively against Hezbollah, not to restrain Israel.
A fork in the road?
Israel got that message and launched another deadly attack on Thursday in the town of Blida, near the Lebanon-Israeli border. But this attack may have triggered something Israel did not intend.
Israeli forces entered the town hall in Blida and encountered a municipal worker, Ibrahim Salameh, who was sleeping in the building. They gunned him down in his pajamas, under circumstances that remain unclear. It isn’t known if Salameh was targeted or in the wrong place at the wrong time. At least initially, there is no evidence of his being connected to Hezbollah or any other group, though even if he was, this would justify nothing that Israel did. The Lebanese army found no evidence of any military equipment or infrastructure in the building in their investigation of the incident.
The killing sparked outrage in Lebanon, and Aoun was finally moved to take a stand.
Aoun instructed the Lebanese army to confront any future Israeli incursions. Hezbollah threw its support behind the president, stating, “Hezbollah urges full support for the army with all available capabilities to enhance its defensive strength and provide it with the necessary political cover to confront this savage enemy.”
This is a sharp change in Lebanese policy. Lebanese armed forces have always stayed out of confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah or other armed groups, wishing to avoid direct conflict with Israel.
Aoun surely does not believe Lebanon has the firepower to repel an Israeli attack, but that isn’t the goal. A confrontation between Israel and Lebanon really doesn’t serve anyone’s agenda. Yet Israel, ever the bully, responded to Aoun’s order by flying warplanes provocatively over the presidential palace in Beirut.
Lebanon is split between its government’s more or less Western orientation and the significant connections of sectors of Lebanese society—including, but not limited to Hezbollah—to Iran and Syria. With the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the new Syrian government is making every effort to ingratiate itself with Israel and the West, and with the severe weakening of Iran’s military power and political influence, the West sees an opportunity to fully integrate Lebanon into the pro-Western camp.
Aoun is hoping that the United States will hold Israel back from further attacks in Lebanon.
This circles back to the effort to disarm Hezbollah. Aoun’s stance provides an opportunity in that regard. If the U.S. holds firm on Israel’s leash, Aoun can say to Hezbollah that this shows that the government can, with strength and allies with common interests, stop Israel from attacking. He can then argue that Hezbollah itself, as well as Lebanon, would be best served by disarming, channeling the group’s efforts fully into its political work, and helping unify the country under a single government.
If the U.S. is serious about disarming Hezbollah and removing it from the field as a fighting force, then it should order Israel to completely cease its attacks and to withdraw from the positions it is holding inside Lebanon, as the ceasefire agreement demands.
Aoun would then not only have a case to make to Hezbollah, but would also have increased public support within Lebanon for his goal of unifying Lebanon’s defense under the government.
The United States would have a stronger relationship with Lebanon as a result and—because this is very important to him—Donald Trump could have a very significant win on his resume.
Even Israel would benefit, with Hezbollah being permanently removed as a fighting force. Benjamin Netanyahu, who thrives on Israelis being as fearful as possible, would not be happy. Endless war is Netanyahu’s goal, but most Israelis, even in Likud, would be delighted to see a reliable end to hostilities in the north of the country.
The U.S. backing Aoun to the fullest in this regard would be a win-win for just about everyone. It would even strengthen the case for Palestine advocates who argue that stopping Israeli aggression should be U.S. policy. That would more than make up for losing Hezbollah as a fighting force.
The only question is whether the Trump administration will see it that way.
Re the last sentence. Unfortunately Trump won’t. The Israelis started to advertise Lebanese plots of land in the South for American settlers. The Trump administration is full of Israel first advocates. And international law is no where to be seen. Alas.