Another mainstream voice challenges idea of war on Iran

Andrew Exum

This is significant if you care about mainstream discourse, and I do. You may have noticed that Leon Panetta got  whipsawed by the neocons for the mistake of suggesting on December 2 that we should not go to war over Iran. Now he is saying war is a perfectly good idea. (His Dec. 2 comments are reproduced below). Well, here is Andrew Exum, the counterterrorism guy who is wired in the establishment, issuing a challenge to the Iran war drumbeat:

If Iran gets the bomb, I have heard all kinds of worries about what would then happen in terms of regional security. But in conversations with leaders around the region, I have heard very few specifics. Why, exactly, would a nuclear Iran be so much worse than a non-nuclear Iran? Bear with me here: Let’s say Iran gets a nuclear weapon. What happens next? Would other states bandwagon? What would that bandwagoning behavior look like in real terms? (For the record, I have never heard any compelling answer to this question in travels around the region.)

Would other states seek nuclear weapons? How, exactly? Let’s pick one example: Saudi Arabia. Why, first off, has Saudi Arabia not already begun a nuclear energy program? (And don’t say “oil,” because there is an opportunity cost to Gulf states using oil for their own energy rather than selling it on the open market for $100 a barrel.) Does Saudi Arabia have the technical expertise to start a nuclear program? If so, how long would it take them? Would Saudi Arabia instead buy a bomb? From where? From Pakistan, perhaps? Why would the Pakistanis sell one to them? Why might the Pakistanis not sell one to them? You can see where I am going here: once you start trying examine the second and third order effects and their various branches, it’s tough to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be that much more dangerous than a non-nuclear Iran. I am not saying it would not be more dangerous — I am saying it is very hard to explain how, exactly, a nuclear Iran would be more dangerous. And I think those arguing for war with Iran have an obligation to sketch out those specifics to both policy makers and to the public.

On the flip side of the equation, what might be the adverse second and third order effects of a U.S. strike on Iran? I agree with Matt [Kroenig]’s critics that he gives us the best-case scenario. But how does the situation look if we work through the effects of a U.S. strike on Iran country-by-country? How might another war affect U.S. security and economic interests elsewhere in the region? How might such a war affect U.S. interests outside the region? How might Iran respond?

Panetta’s December 2 comments that he has had to walk back:

Frankly, some of those targets are very difficult to get at.  

            That kind of, that kind of shot would only, I think, ultimately not destroy their ability to produce an atomic weapon, but simply delay it – number one.  Of greater concern to me are the unintended consequences, which would be that ultimately it would have a backlash and the regime that is weak now, a regime that is isolated would suddenly be able to reestablish itself, suddenly be able to get support in the region, and suddenly instead of being isolated would get the greater support in a region that right now views it as a pariah.  

            Thirdly, the United States would obviously be blamed and we could possibly be the target of retaliation from Iran, striking our ships, striking our military bases.  Fourthly – there are economic consequences to that attack – severe economic consequences that could impact a very fragile economy in Europe and a fragile economy here in the United States.  

            And lastly I think that the consequence could be that we would have an escalation that would take place that would not only involve many lives, but I think could consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret.  

            So we have to be careful about the unintended consequences of that kind of an attack.