The ceasefire agreement announced Wednesday in Doha, Qatar, between Israel and Hamas, due to enter into effect on Sunday, is on the lips of every major news agency.
But soon after celebrations erupted in Gaza, major confusion seems to have set in, following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s delaying of the cabinet and parliament plenum vote. The vote, initially scheduled to take place on Thursday, was paused by Netanyahu, who claimed Hamas was attempting to alter terms at the last moment – an allegation Hamas vehemently denied. Finally, early Friday morning, Netanyahu confirmed that a deal was reached, and the security cabinet passed a vote around 3pm local Israeli time. The deal will now go on to the full Israeli cabinet for a vote. At the time of publicaiton, the cabinet had began its meeting as of Friday night local time.
Despite reports that the cabinet is expected to ratify the deal, the drama in the Israeli political scene is not over. Far-right Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir is still threatening to quit the government if the agreement is passed, urging other ministers to vote against it, saying “everyone knows that these terrorists will try to harm again, try to kill again.”
Ben-Gvir has openly called on far-right minister Bezalel Smotrich to do the same. Smotrich is Finance Minister and de-facto “governor” of the occupied West-Bank through a special ministerial post. Ben-Gvir’s call on Smotrich to resign if the deal is passed indicates that Smotrich may be in a softer position, possibly due to incentives surrounding more resources for the accelerated colonization and annexation of the West Bank. As per Israeli media reports, Ben-Gvir was reportedly threatened that there will be no “extras” for him if he doesn’t play ball. Although Smotrich called the deal a “disaster”, it seems that he will let it pass.
Netanyahu’s concern is naturally to survive politically, and he needs to do so also through this hurdle. It is important to note, that after having gotten Gideon Sa’ar into the government with his faction New Hope of 4 seats in late September (he has received the prestigious Foreign Minister post), Netanyahu has amassed a majority of 68 seats, well over the 61 (out of 120) needed for a majority rule. Ben-Gvir’s Jewish Power party, although having gotten into government in a technical bloc under Religious Zionism (14 seats), has only 6 seats in itself. Thus, Ben-Gvir exiting on his own with his Jewish Power faction would not break the government – and Netanyahu has no doubt made this calculation and shored up that it holds in these past two days. These calculations are crucial for him, and this is probably the main reason for the delay.
Even if the deal passes, will Israel follow through?
But what does the deal really propose as a prospect? This seems to be a simple matter, as it is written in terms of three phases, with gradual release of captives(initial stage 33 Israelis and about 1,000 Palestinians), with an incremental release that also entails gradual and partial withdrawal of the Israeli army, until an eventual “end to the war” after phase three.
And yet, the reading of the deal seems to vary greatly in Israel. It varies so greatly, that Amir Tibon in Haaretz opined that “Netanyahu just agreed to a hostage deal with Hamas… But it’s not the deal he’s selling his supporters”. Tibon cites Netanyahu’s chief of staff, Yossi Fuchs, who wrote on Wednesday that the deal “includes the option to resume the fighting at the end of phase 1 if the negotiations over phase 2 don’t develop in a manner that promises the fulfillment of the war’s goals: military and civil annihilation of Hamas and a release of all hostages.”
“Read these lines again”, Tibon writes “and ask yourself: how can phase two of the deal – during which Israel is supposed to completely withdraw from Gaza in return for the release of all remaining hostages – lead to the ‘military annihilation’ of Hamas? Obviously, it can’t, and Netanyahu’s top aide is basically saying that if this is the result, the war will be renewed”.
Tibon also cites Amit Segal, “Netanyahu’s mouthpiece on Channel 12, [who] wrote a long post explaining that phase 1 of the deal is necessary to provide President-elect Donald Trump with an achievement ahead of his return to the Oval Office, but that Trump doesn’t truly care about ending the war and will not object to Israel walking away from phase 2”.
In other words, not a literal “other document” as it were, but more an under-the-table deal that says that only phase 1 of the deal is to be implemented, and that Israel returns to the active genocide in Gaza.
According to reports from Israeli media, Smotrich threatened that his party would leave the government if it did not “receive assurances in advance” that the Israeli army would return to its military operations in Gaza after the first phase of the deal.
On the U.S. side of things, Jeremy Scahill of Drop Site News has pointed to an interview with Trump’s National Security Advisor Mike Waltz where Waltz says that while Hamas “would want to believe” that Israel’s “work in Gaza is done for the foreseeable future”, the reality is that “Hamas has to be destroyed”.
Hamas has of course not been destroyed. So the picture that is forming here is quite clear, and not very secret at all – there is intent both in Israel and in the U.S. to let Israel ditch the deal after its initial phase 1.
The interest in realizing phase 1 is clear – the release of captives. And here, Trump’s “America first” motto does play a significant part, for there are seven American captives in Gaza, four of whom are reportedly killed. Two of the three living Americans would be among those released in the first phase, while one, who is a soldier, is set to be released in phase 2 (which would also include return of bodies).
One could rightfully ask, why the first phase would be sufficient for the coming Trump administration to allow Israel to violate the rest of the deal? Here the answer would be that they would have two of the three the living captives back, and perhaps care less about the one alive remaining and the bodies still there.
Hannibal logic
As to Israel – why would they be willing to see only phase 1 realized, and risk the lives of over a dozen soldiers still presumed alive in a return to bombings that could risk their lives? The answer here might well lie in what is known as the Hannibal Directive.
Israel implemented the directive on October 7 2023 – it allows for a massive, indiscriminate bombing of a target which is assumed to also contain one’s own , risking their life in order to eliminate the risk of having to negotiate a captive-exchange. Before October 7, the directive was reserved for military personnel. But on that day, it was implemented against Israeli civilians too. The subsequent genocide of Gaza included the logic of risking one’s own through indiscriminate bombings, as well as a loose-trigger policy, which resulted in the deaths of perhaps around 50 captives.
Israeli society has become used to this heightened Hannibal-mindset, where the destruction of the enemy – in this case the Palestinian people (often euphemized as Hamas), is more important than the lives of the captives – even the civilians. For many, the sacrificing of their own, if they are civilians, is a terrible thing, and they will push against it, which is why there have been demonstrations in Israel for the “release of the kidnapped” as they say, but these have not urged a stop to the genocide in general. While Israelis conflate soldiers and civilians under that one notion of “kidnapped”, still, there appears to be a greater societal tolerance for the sacrificing of soldiers than of civilians. This is why, after phase 1 of the deal is implemented, there could be a considerably greater societal permission in Israel to break the ceasefire and return to the onslaught in Gaza. And there is much to indicate that the Trump administration won’t stop that from happening.
We are thus entering very dangerous times, and they will become ever more dangerous as the first phase of the ceasefire deal is implemented.
It is not clear what Mister Trump expects or hopes for regarding Israel. If the expansion of the Abraham accords to include Saudi Arabia are truly on his mind, there has to be a path to reach that goal and a specific set of circumstances in Gaza would need to be reached within say a year for there to be any real chance of the prize of Saudi-Israeli rapprochement. The descent of Gaza back into the war situation might be tolerable (to him) for a few months, but I can’t see Trump tolerating it, without an end in sight without clarity about what can be achieved in a few months’ time. Of course there will be a lot of activity taking attention away from Gaza: Ukraine, Iran, China/Taiwan and of course domestic deportation of illegals and it’s easy to see the Gaza war not being on the top of his “to do” list, so it’s tough to predict, especially the future.
Re Israel’s plans to break the deal, here’s a New Yorker interview with Aaron David Miller**:
“…Netanyahu’s recent military successes in Gaza and in Lebanon, and in strikes against Iran, have persuaded him that he could do a deal that, in his judgment, would not get beyond the first phase, and that he could assure [his right-wing coalition partners] Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir that he could eventually resume the war after the first phase of the deal….Netanyahu, on the other hand, is simply not prepared to end the war, let alone withdraw Israeli forces from Gaza, under any circumstances.”
And to the question of why now?
“The reality is that Netanyahu believes it is harder to play with and say no to Donald Trump than it was to say no to, and manipulate, Joe Biden…..he wants currency with Trump in order to focus Trump on what Netanyahu’s real agenda is, which is getting the Americans to support or acquiesce to Israeli military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.”
And what’s Trumps real interests?
“Maybe Trump’s true motivation, the one I think is strategic, is that when he looks at the entire Middle East, there’s only one area he really cares about, and that’s the Gulf. Because the Gulf is stable, the Gulf represents financial interests. The Gulf has hydrocarbons. The Gulf has emirs, crown princes, and kings who flatter him. And the Gulf represented his major foreign-policy success during his first term, which was the Abraham Accords.” [ editorial comment: really? ]
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https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-the-israel-hamas-ceasefire-is-happening-now
**
a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department official who has been involved in peace negotiations in the Middle East for decades.
After so many letdowns we should know this: CAN’T TRUST THE ZIONISTS!!!
The bet is best on Trump’s ego, not his goodwill.
By taking credit for the ceasefire and its terms, he stands to look incompetent if he comes to be seen as his deal not having integrity.
Hopefully Hamas, and reasonable people, have understood Trump’s desire to get credit for making the deal of the century. He just discussed IP with the President of China… a good sign.
Hamas, a year ago, agreed to stand down from leadership and called for elections ASAP.
Let us hope for some sanity and political insight.
If anyone comes across any discussion about a reasonable deal, pleas post the link.. Mondoweiss should be in this game.