Before He Gained Power, Khalilzad Said Israel Lobby “Paralyzed” Our Foreign Policy

I wrote about U.N. Ambassador-to-be Zalmay Khalilzad's ideological peregrinations before. From radical to neocon. Well, turns out there was a stop in Realism.

Ten years ago, Khalilzad deplored the Israel lobby's role in our foreign policy. In a 1997 paper for the Rand Corporation titled "The Implications of the Possible End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict for Gulf Security," Khalilzad (and 2 co-authors) described all the good things that would redound to the U.S. if we could only bring about peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

The "fate of the Palestinians" was a "rallying cry throughout the Arab and Muslim world," he wrote. Again and again our special relationship with Israel had been "a hindrance to the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf." It had been "an impediment" to our effectiveness in the Gulf War of '91, limited our alliances with Gulf states, "limited the U.S. ability to rely on the facilities of its NATO allies." And  it had given Saddam Hussein stature in the Arab world, notwithstanding his crimes.

Khalilzad attributed the special relationship with Israel to several factors:  "shared cultural bonds, U.S.-Israeli strategic ties [dwindling in the aftermath of the Cold War], and the well-organized pro-Israel sentiment in the United States." The lobby. "Many observers consider the pro-Israel lobby to be one of the most powerful and effective lobbies in the United States... A large proportion of America's six million Jews support Israel staunchly."

The paper's tone was strategic, not moral. Yet Khalilzad was frequently judgmental of the lobby. The Reagan Administration "fear[ed]" the lobby's power in Senate elections.  "By the mid-1980s lobbying on behalf of Israel had virtually paralyzed the Reagan administration's effort to modernize even the smaller [Gulf] states." Khalilzad showed respect for Arab concerns. These states were afraid of Israel's ambitions to become a "regional superpower." Indeed this was one reason Saddam was trying to get nukes, to counter Israeli ambitions. And the Saudis saw the festering Arab-Israeli conflict as spurring radicalism throughout the region. (Osama bin Laden...)

Khalilzad wasn't blaming people, but he made his point of view clear when he said of American leadership that "institutional changes are... necessary to encourage cooperation" between Israeli and Arab. He means, the lobby.

No, solving I/P wasn't going to make things perfect.  "Peace will not eliminate hostility toward the United States in the region." But "the interruptions and uncertainties that have plagued Gulf-U.S. cooperation in the past should diminish.."

One comment. The paper demonstrates the tragic role that the Israeli/Palestinian situation has assumed in our politics. Ten years ago the issue was hugely important in a smart  guy's world view. Since then the slippery Khalilzad has gained power--and mum's the word. Yes, this was pre-9/11. And no, Israel/Palestine isn't everything. But the tragedy is that powerful Americans can't talk about it.