Last spring I did a post on former Ambassador Dan Kurtzer's book, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace, that argued that it was a coded assault on the Israel lobby–that in vague criticisms of "Jewish-American interest groups" and "absence of Arab expertise," it hinted at the true problem: too many Jews, not enough Arabs in the process. That book is why I continue to hope that between Ross/Indyk/Kurtzer as Obama's Mideast guy (yes it's always Jews who are considered, because of the Christian Zionist lobby), Kurtzer gets the nod (notwithstanding the fact his brother moved to a settlement).
Ira Glunts disagrees with me. I'm not completely persuaded. Politics is the art of the possible. Kurtzer seems much fairer to me than Ross and Indyk, and he speaks Arabic, was the ambassador to Egypt. But here's what Glunts, a former IDF soldier, now a bookseller in N.Y., has to say:
I have listened to a Kurtzer
lecture at Princeton in 2006, [link: rtsp://128.112.130.84:554/wws/lectures/20060426kurtzerlectureTAPE56K.rm], heard him at a
panel discussion with Afif Safieh, and read his 80 page advertisement for
himself as the future Middle East envoy, Negotiating Arab-Israeli
Peace.
My opinion is that Kurtzer is
smart and articulate, but he ain't good. Both Ron
Kampeas at JTA and Jerry Haber, who are not critics of Kurtzer, say he is not
that much different than Dennis "Big Sticks" Ross. Actually, Haber is a
supporter of Kurtzer and a critic of Ross.
Compare his attitude toward Hamas as clearly
expressed in the Princeton lecture with The
Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and
Coexistence by
Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, two Israeli professors. If you do, I
believe you will come to the conclusion that Kurtzer's view is incorrect.
Kurtzer's hard-line view on Hamas is contradicted by two years of reports that
have appeared in the Israeli and world press. The statement that Hamas has
never given any indication that it would be willing to compromise or peacefully
co-exist with Israel contradicts many published reports but conveniently
reinforces the Israeli and American spin.
Also,
this paragraph from Kurtzer's 2008 book struck me as particularly
offensive:
consistent theme that emerged in the study groups consultations is that domestic
politics [the lobby whose name he dare not speak] do not play the central role
that is often ascribed to them. Without a doubt they are influential, but
they are far from determining. As our consultations made clear,
presidential leadership is the most decisive factor. When presidents lead
in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, Congress and public opinion will follow; as
legislators from both parties told the study group, Congress especially will
line up behind a president provided the administration's strategy is sound and
Israel's security is protected. But this truism is sometime lost even
among U.S. negotiators as the so-called anticipatory reflex sets in and policy
choices are pre-emptively contrained. [In other words, even though the lobby
does not have a big influence, many people in power think it does, so they act
as if it does have influence. Is this an interesting attempt to refute
Mearsheimer and Walt?]
Finally, Kurtzer is currently not throwing the "out pitch" for peace that he
employed with some success in his 2006 Princeton lecture. The pitch
is a proposal that Israel recompense the Palestinians for the settler
blocks annexed by employing a 1:1 land swap. Kurtzer calls this "returning 100% of the land to the Palestinians
using land swaps." The pitch has some movement break and can be
used effectively in the academic leagues. In the Bigs, however, it is no
better than a hanging curve, thus he has currently dropped it from his
repertoire. (Israel has consistently rejected the idea of 1:1 land
swaps.)
I note that Kurtzer does criticize Clinton and
Ross, and apparently has criticized the Israeli government in the past.
However, I think that if our goal is to have even a modest change
in American policy in I/P, bringing Kurtzer in for relief is not going to help
get the job done.
