The other day Weiss posted an anonymous friend’s analysis of the U.S. role in the Iranian revolution of 1979. He then asked this friend whether the U.S. could have done anything to prevent a theocratic outcome in Iran. We wish we could say more about this person’s gold-plated bona fides, but we can’t. The answer:
You know it’s an interesting question whether the US could have affected things or not. We’ll never know but here are some angles to consider:
1. Many of the young revolutionaries were US educated – they were smart kids from poor/traditional/lower middle class families that benefited from generous gov’t scholarships to come abroad for education. They have PhDs from Berkeley, Stanford etc. These guys were not anti-American; but they were anti-American hypocrisy vis-a-vis Iran . Because they saw what freedom of speech/Human Rights/opportunities etc meant and could not understand why the US did not promote this in Iran too. These are the same issues that we see Arabs complaining about – the hypocrisy is the problem not the actual ideals! So I think that if the story of the Shah’s illness/visit to the US/hostage crisis had not happened, the US and the new Iranian regime could have reached some accommodation perhaps.
2. HOWEVER – The clerics/Khomeini etc. were paranoid about US interference (b/c of the Mossadegh days) so there was also huge mistrust of the US and a compulsion to define/show their independence. The narrative of US/Western Interference in Iran is hard wired into Iranian DNA …many Iranians living in the US (older generations) still probably think that Carter caused the revolution or it was b/c of him that the Shah let go. Many of these folks are Republicans btw. The clerics in Iran have this paranoia too, and even 30 years after their own seemingly clear all out victory they still behave as if they need to prove their independence and justify themselves and their existence by their anti-US stance… So these guys would have still taken a strong anti-US stance I think…The US would have had to play a very different game (for example accept equality of status (god forbid!) or express apologies for the Mossadegh years etc – and also demonstrate willingness to engage, e.g unblocking frozen Iranian assets etc. – a bunch of demands (many legit) that the IRI (Islamic Republic of Iran) has had from 1979 onwards. If the US had done this, I think the relationship could be different and the nature of the regime could be different – BUT…
3. Hostage crisis got in the way. Khomeini used it to his advantage and it really hardened US reactions to the new Iranian regime. Iranian regime always had two competing strands: the hardlne clerics (and new generation Ahmadinejad types) v. the educated/student revolutionaries (who also multiplied in number because post-revolution, many young people got scholarships to study abroad and they saw that west is not all bad. US policy (thanks to our friends in the lobby) has consistently undermined the already weaker moderate/reformists, and strengthened the hardliners. But beyond the lobby I think there are many in the US gov’t (with strong memories of hostage crisis) who cannot accept idea of detente with Iran… Even tho’ detente would be beginning of the end. I think there are many in US circles that want to pay back Iran for the humiliation caused by the hostage crisis and these emotions get in the way of rational policy making. The irony is that US/Israel like to claim IRI is irrational but Wikileaks shows that Israeli leaders think of Iranians as ‘chess rather than backgammon players’ – so they know that the leadership is not crazy. But it’s an easy narrative to sell in DC.
4. Re U.S. fear of Islam. This depends what we care about. US seems to be getting into bed with Islamic groups in Iraq, even Afghanistan where they seem to be willing to negotiate with the Taliban. The question is what sort of deal are you making? what do they want and what do we want? Saudi is most fervent Islamic state of all (exporting its wahhabism far and wide)– and US deals with it. The problem arises when you have a state that wants to assert independence. The IRI has dealt with the US on many fronts in very pragmatic ways, but it is unwilling to bend to US demands (that are often Israeli demands really) all the time. Where interests merge–as in Afghanistan–it was willing to play ball, and even carry the load more. But I think from Iranian perspective the US is not trustworthy and has often failed to keep its promises (see “Man without a Gun – by Giandomenico Picco about Bush 1, Iran and Lebanon hostages as example; or Amb Dobbins on Iran’s aid to US in Afghanistan in 2001/02). Also as you know better than I, the demonization of Islamic groups is bread and butter for the lobby here. An aside – Israel and Iran were doing arms deals in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war b/c they had a common enemy. Israel’s anti-Iran stance got stronger in 1990s b/c Iran was emerging as a regional powerhouse again. Trita Parsi has written about this.
I don’t know what the MB’s attitude to the US would be – what would they want/what is US willing to give/say. My guess is that if US demonizes them, they will (or some part of them) will respond in kind but that there is probably some room for mutually acceptable relations. Engagement is better than isolation. MB/Hamas etc, when in government, have to respond to public’s needs and be part of world community. The more we engage them, the more they have to adjust and respond (Iran’s reformists were heavy duty revolutionaries until they saw that ideology alone doesn’t make a country run and the constituents’ demands and aspirations shift/change too). Having said that, I also fear that the US would throw out all universal principles of human rights (especially anything to do with women’s rights) if it meant finding a political solution. This might be a short term gain but it’s bad news long term….Obama should be thinking “I’m an Egyptian and I support the universal human rights and dignity of all Egyptians – men, women, boys and girls.”
5. Re Iran, the saddest thing is that the sanctions policy that came into force under Clinton (and has ratcheted up ever since) may offer short term political wins but could have very serious negative consequences long term. First, IRI hardliners thrive on isolation. Sanctions are benefitting them economically very nicely thank you. Second, the Iranian public does not associate its current social, political, economic ills with the West. It blames its own regime (which is clearly independent of western influence). In 2009 post election violence (PEV) they were shouting ‘down with Russia’ b/c they believe Russia has trained and armed the riot police. BUT if the sanctions start to hurt and isolation kicks in badly, the new generation of young people (those now in early teens) can legitimately blame the US for their poor economic conditions and that’s what the IRI wants, because that might/most likely would give it a longer lease on life. The Iranian public now – very young – is not anti-western like many in the region, but they don’t want the west to dictate to them. They are also turned off by Islam in politics. They just want decent lives and connectivity and dignity. If sanctions contribute to erosion of livelihoods – a) more people will become dependent on the gov’t as source of income and b) more of the young will turn against the west. So if Iran implodes like Egypt in 10 or 15 years time – it could be another big anti-western wave. Something that was not the case in 2009.
6. I think Israel is the one that needs to wake up now… if they start demonizing Islamic groups and ElBaradei and anyone that is not Mubarak in Egypt they are just asking for trouble.
