What the U.S. attack on Venezuela means for the Middle East

In the wake of the United States’ invasion of Venezuela, countries around the world are asking what this means for them.

Certainly the most immediate questions regard Venezuela itself and other Latin American countries, especially Colombia, Mexico, and Cuba. But the American aggression is going to have an effect on the rest of the world, and the Middle East is no exception. 

While Israel could hardly contain its glee at the U.S.’ action and Iran quite nervously condemned it, most of the region’s state leaders stayed silent. 

But that silence should not be taken as indifference. Every country in the region knows that this action, and whatever follows it, will have profound implications for the entire world, a world that is now even more lawless than it was before.

The U.S. strategy

In considering the implications for Mideastern countries, particularly for Israel, Palestine, Iran, and Lebanon, we must first understand U.S. strategy, or lack thereof, in its action.

At the time of this writing, little has actually changed in Venezuela. While Maduro and his wife have been kidnapped and brought to a sham trial in the U.S., Maduro’s government continues to run Venezuela. Trump can claim that the U.S. runs it, as he did, but that is not the truth.

The U.S. abandoned opposition leader and disgraceful Nobel Peace prize winner, Maria Corina Machado, despite her repeated kneeling before Donald Trump. To install her, they would have had to topple the whole government, which would have meant an extended military operation and likely an occupation to defend her. But that abandonment sends a message to potential collaborators in other countries: the U.S. is not a reliable co-conspirator.

Trump launched this attack in line with the National Security Strategy (NSS) his administration published in November. The NSS boldly declared an extreme revival of the Monroe Doctrine, implied a return to the idea of spheres of influence for powerful states, and asserted American dominance over the entire Western Hemisphere. The invasion of Venezuela is a dramatic step in that direction. 

The implication of the idea of “spheres of influence” as expressed in the NSS is enhanced by the overwhelming focus on the Western Hemisphere in the document. The corollary to this is that China, in particular, is unwelcome on this side of the world, but would be respected in exerting its own dominance over its sphere of influence. The same would hold true for Europe, Russia, and any other country that has the power to exert such influence. That’s the thinking that undergirds the NSS. 

Of course, that is not a rigid doctrine. Should Trump, or his successors, see U.S. interests as being concerned with matters on the other side of the world, they will certainly act. It’s not like these are principled matters or like they care about being deemed hypocritical.

Obviously, that is where the Middle East comes in. Both Trump’s personal concerns and American global economic and strategic interests are deeply invested in the Middle East. So they are not about to simply ignore the region.

Yet they are also unlikely to risk getting drawn into extended engagements in the region either. The quick attack Trump launched last June was both typical of what are likely the limits of the military engagements he would like to engage in so far from U.S. shores and, even at that, something he would like to avoid. 

That, of course, is where Israel comes in. 

Israel

Benjamin Netanyahu immediately congratulated Donald Trump on Trump’s blatantly illegal action in Venezuela. But he saw profit for his own country’s ambitions in it.

“I must say that across Latin America right now we are seeing a transformation in several countries that are returning to the American axis and, not surprisingly, also to a connection with the state of Israel,” he told a meeting of the Israeli cabinet on Sunday. “We welcome this.”

Netanyahu was premature in his glee. Maduro’s United Socialist Party (PSUV) remains in control and their alienation from Israel remains intact. Acting President Delcy Rodriguez has shown no inclination to change the country’s stance toward Israel, and even implied—without evidence—that the American operation had “Zionist undertones.” It didn’t and she didn’t pursue the allegation. 

While one of the characteristics of Latin American countries shifting rightward has been an embrace of a radical pro-Israel rhetoric, and sometimes even provocatively moving embassies to Jerusalem, such demonstrative embraces have meant little in terms of tangible benefits for Israel.

Some have commented that Venezuela is a key Iranian ally and that Hezbollah has used the Venezuelan financial system to help launder its money. But these are, at this point, minor considerations. Hezbollah will, if it so desires, find other means to launder money and Iran’s connection to Venezuela, though real, is a small tactical concern, especially given both countries’ weakened state in 2026.

But as Trump’s America consolidates its declining empire on its own side of the planet, it will need Israel more than ever to be the “cop on the beat.” 

Trump is hoping that the Gaza “ceasefire” will eliminate the bulk of Palestinian militancy, leaving just a few small armed groups to contend with. It’s a vain hope, but it is what Washington’s strategy in the bogus ceasefire and its indifference to Israel’s actions on the West Bank indicate.

The design of the so-called “peace plan” for Gaza is aimed at crushing Palestinian resistance and establishing a Palestinian rump entity, whether called a “state” or not, and then cementing an alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia which, along with support from Egypt, the UAE, and possibly Türkiye, can safeguard American interests in the region without direct American military involvement.

The fact that this plan is unrealistic means little to either Trump or Netanyahu. Trump probably believes it can work, and Netanyahu sees in it an opportunity to keep Israel at perpetual war, keep Palestinian rights far at bay, and maintain his own political position.

Palestine

For Palestinians, the American action in Venezuela means little will directly change, but its ideological and long term implications could be meaningful.

Palestinian factions were some of the only voices in the Arab world to immediately condemn the American action and voice support for Venezuela. They had good reason for that, beyond the ethical and legal issues.

A system of “might makes right” is obviously not conducive to revolutionary movements for freedom and justice. Such a system only feeds oppressive structures that deny liberty and human rights. 

Beyond that, the acquiescence of Europe and the Democrats—the ostensible guardians of the “rules-based order”—essentially eliminates what little hope remained that some kind of international order might stop, or at least deter, Israel’s behavior. 

While the international system was always attacked and undermined by the United States and Israel when it suited their purpose, the all-out destruction of that system began in earnest with Israel’s genocide in Gaza and is likely reaching its crescendo with the U.S.’ aggression in Latin America.

Yet there is also some hope here in the attempt to subdue Venezuela by the most brazen thuggery. The U.S. had no stomach for a major, lengthy operation to replace Venezuela’s government. They’ve settled instead on kidnapping Venezuela’s president and trying to get what it wants from his replacement through threats. That’s not an efficient or effective way to spread your empire, and it is not going to succeed. As grim as the current situation looks, Palestinians can still take some hope from the fact that the thuggery from both the U.S. and Israel is a sign of weakness and imperial decline, not strength.

It is a sign of bleak days now, but also of hope for the future.

Iran and Lebanon

Prior to the U.S. invasion of Venezuela, Netanyahu asked for Trump’s blessing for a large scale operation in Lebanon. Trump, meanwhile, threatened to attack Iran to “defend the protesters” that have been calling on the government to do more to end the country’s economic crisis.

Trump publicly gave Israel a green light to invade Lebanon again, but according to reports also told Netanyahu to wait for a bit ostensibly to give the Lebanese government a little more time and to try to give himself more cover to bring his sham “ceasefire” in Gaza to its second phase. 

While Israel has continued to launch airstrikes against Lebanon intermittently since the “ceasefire” there was instituted, this plan is for an invasion and is likely to materialize in the coming weeks or even days. 

Trump is less likely to follow through on his Iran threat, but if he is serious about fortifying the American military in the western hemisphere, it makes an Israeli attack a virtual certainty.

We can easily dispense with the idea that there is any desire to aid the protesters in Iran. These protests have been spontaneous and, although they are much more grounded in working class and small business owners than previous, elite-led protests, there is no organized effort behind them aiming at toppling the current government. 

These protests might turn into a real threat, and the Iranian government seems to realize that, which is why they have been much more accommodating of the protests than they have been in the past. Nonetheless, their response has been growing more violent as the protests continue, so it is worth watching to see where this goes.

The problem for Netanyahu is that even if these protesters topple the Islamic Republic, it won’t change Iran’s posture toward Israel. While some in Iran certainly disagree with the kind of resources the Iranian government has expended on regional matters and confronting Israel, there is little love even among those sectors for the Israeli state.

That’s not quite the same as the attitude toward the U.S., although the government, especially the Trump administration, is not all popular. Still, a regime change war, as many in Israel and Washington want, won’t bring the result the hawks think it will. 

But Netanyahu doesn’t want to eliminate regional threats. They keep him in power. So, he is eager to attack Iran again. Keeping the Islamic Republic in power, but reducing it to toothlessness is ideal for him. 

Trump is more inclined to see regime change in Tehran and has made it clear that Iran is in the crosshairs. Ironically, this reflects both Netanyahu’s whisperings to the president at the end of 2025 and the increased presence of hawks like Lindsey Graham around Trump. 

A U.S. attack on Iran doesn’t fit well in the scheme to control all of Latin America and push China out. But an Israeli attack does, and so that is likely what’s coming. 

Netanyahu has been warning that Iran is rebuilding its defenses. The question of Iran’s nuclear capabilities is, for the time being, even more of a scare tactic than it was before. Assuming that Iran is trying to rebuild its nuclear capacity, which is unclear at the moment, it would take years to do so. 

But rebuilding its air defenses and missile capabilities is a simpler process. In the nearly seven months since the American and Israeli attacks on Iran, the Islamic Republic could have started to rebuild its defenses. But it is surely still very vulnerable to a renewed attack, especially if Israeli intelligence, as is likely, has maintained its extensive network within the country.

Aggression like the ones that are now likely to be on the horizon in both Lebanon and Iran were already fairly simple matters as far as the U.S. and Israel were concerned. But in the wake of the invasion of Venezuela the impunity with which they can be conducted has grown measurably. That is especially true in light of the weak responses from Europe and the Democrats.

Indeed, given the concerns in Europe over the U.S. potentially claiming Greenland for its own and the dwindling support from Washington for aid to Ukraine, Europe is unlikely to expend any political energy at all over attacks on Lebanon or Iran, let alone on Palestine. Israel and the U.S. have never been freer to wreak havoc.