Anger in the GCC spreads as Iran retaliates over U.S.-Israeli strikes

As a collection of foreign ministers from GCC and other nearby countries gathered in Riyadh on Wednesday to discuss the war Israel and the United States launched against Iran and its attendant economic fallout, four Iranian missiles were intercepted by Saudi defenses over the outer edge of the city.

Saudi Arabia was visibly angered at the latest attack, deeming it an intentional display of force at a time ministers from so many countries would be there to see it. 

Iran also infuriated Qatar by attacking a major natural gas facility in that country. Qatar expelled two Iranian diplomats in response, a major step for a country that prides itself on its status as a mediator of conflicts. 

Iran took these actions after Israel had bombed the South Pars gas field, the region’s largest, which is divided between Qatar and Iran. The attack apparently angered Donald Trump, who blamed it entirely on Israel and said neither he nor the Qataris had anything to do with it. 

These are signs of the growing impatience of Iran’s Arab neighbors with Iran’s tactic of striking at them in response to Israeli or American attacks. 

The six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain— as well as Jordan and Lebanon have been forced into the middle of a war they did not want. It is, inevitably, going to alter the strategic trajectory of the region, in ways that can only be partially predicted.

Arab anger

The meeting in Riyadh brought together all of the GCC countries along with Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Syria. The ministers issued a statement that condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes, called for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, condemned Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, but did not address the attacks on Iran by the U.S. and Israel. 

There is no doubt that Arab anger at Iran is growing. Speaking after the ministerial meeting Wednesday, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan struck a furious tone regarding Iran. Trust in Iran, he said had been “shattered,” and he indicated that the growing rapprochement, including the agreement that had been brokered by Iraq and China was dead. 

“The Kingdom sought sincerely to create a more stable regional environment, but Iran’s actions show that its priority is not development, but managing crises and exporting tensions,” he said.

This marked a sharp increase in Saudi rhetoric against Iran. From the start of the war, the GCC states strongly objected to Iran’s method of retaliation, even though they had expected it and were prepared with interceptor missiles to counter it. 

But until now, there had been little indication that the Arab states were seriously considering taking any action beyond saber rattling and asserting their right to defend themselves in a casual manner.

Prince Faisal’s tone at this press conference departed from that implication, into one that was much sterner and much more harshly critical of Iran.

Yet, even while Arab anger at Iran seems to be growing, there remains little outright support for American, much less Israeli, actions. When Prince Faisal was asked directly about how he felt about the United States starting this war and putting Saudi Arabia in the middle of it, he sidestepped the question. He insisted on separating the issue of Iran’s attacks on Saudi territory from the broader question of the war.

Obviously, Prince Faisal knows this is absurd as the attacks are only happening because of the war. But, given their current position, Saudi Arabia needs what American support it can get in defending against Iran. The alternative is Riyadh getting actively involved in the war, an escalation they very much want to avoid. 

Yet the Saudi tone regarding the United States is far from universal. On Tuesday, an unnamed senior Qatari official was not at all reluctant to express his dismay at his country being thrust into this war without even asking the U.S.’ Gulf allies what they thought of the idea.

“We’ve never been consulted on this war, and we have to live through the results,” the Qatari official said.

Indeed, the Gulf states and the entire region are caught between Iran and Israel, both of which they perceive to have hegemonic ambitions which the Gulf states are terrified of. 

“Israel is attacking Iran, but it’s also invading Lebanon. It has forces inside Syria. The situation is not getting any better in Gaza. [Israel is] effectively annexing the West Bank,” the Qatari official said, adding that “nobody else’s security concerns are of any interest to the Israelis right now. This is not a reality we can live in. The same goes for Iran.”

The concern over the United States’ reliability as a security partner is at an all-time high in the Arab world, and it goes beyond Donald Trump recklessly starting the war. The fact that Trump tried—and fortunately, has thus far failed—to enlist and arm various regional minorities such as Kurds, Balochi, Azeri, and other groups has largely been either ignored or mocked in the west. But in the Arab world, where they’ve seen a level of horror from armed militant groups in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere that is many times greater than anything the west has experienced, it was terrifying.

Ultimately, the Arab states have to find some way to live with Iran, trust or no trust. Geography can’t be changed. But they only need the United States as a business partner if American security guarantees are as worthless as they have clearly become. 

Where the Gulf and Arab world goes from here

The one Gulf state that stands apart in its reactions to all of this is, unsurprisingly, the UAE. Speaking to the Israeli daily Haaretz, Dr. Anwar Gargash, the senior political adviser to the president of the UAE tried to reassure the Israeli public that Iran would be seen as the great enemy of the Gulf instead of Israel after the war.

This is nonsense. Iran was always seen as an adversary by the Gulf states, particularly by Saudi Arabia. It is only in the past few years that this relationship began to thaw. Doubtless, that progress has all been undone, and, at the moment, the relationship between not only Riyadh and Tehran, but all of the Gulf States and Iran is at its lowest ebb in recent memory.

But that does not mean that the Gulf states will simply ignore reality. They may be angry at Iran’s response, but they are disappointed in the United States for failing to show even a modicum of concern for their interests regarding an attack on Iran. And they absolutely see Israel as a far greater threat than Iran, rightly identifying Israel as a country that, unlike Iran, has little stake in regional stability unless it is completely on Israel’s terms.

That will be even more true after this war, with Iran’s capabilities significantly diminished, at least for a good while. Israel will have no significant adversary, but will continue to be isolated for its aggression and its appalling treatment of both the Palestinians and Lebanon.

Qatar and Saudi Arabia are looking at the lavish gifts and sweetheart business deals they have cut with Trump and his family, and they are realizing that, for all their money, they cannot buy the sort of influence in Washington that Israel has spent decades developing. 

That may change in the coming years as Israel feels the effect of its behavior on American perceptions. But for now, all that Gulf oil revenue still can’t buy the good will Israel has generated among the powerful in Washington with its multiple and diverse business ventures, tech advancement, intelligence sharing, massive propaganda campaigns, powerful and efficient lobbying, and strategic cooperation over many decades.

A potential widening of the UAE-Saudi rift

The UAE stands apart from most of the rest of the Gulf in its unabashed embrace of not just the U.S., but also Israel. 

Gargash displays this even in his conversation with Haaretz, where he declared the UAE prepared to join the U.S. in an effort to “secure” the Strait of Hormuz and supported the American criticism of Europe’s reluctance to join such a dangerous mission. 

Gargash is an adviser, and has no personal authority. But he has had a long career in the upper echelons of Emirati politics and diplomacy and is very close to the president, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ). His statements may not be official, but they likely indicate the direction MBZ is leaning toward, or perhaps what MBZ has already decided.

That strategy is very different from Saudi Arabia’s. Riyadh has been working hard on regional alternatives to diminish dependence on American security support. The defense pact with Pakistan stands in stark contrast to Israel’s recent efforts to upgrade its relationship with India. And the UAE is clearly edging toward even deeper partnership with the U.S. and Israel.

Given the fact that the UAE and Saudi Arabia already have very tense relations over issues such as Yemen and Sudan, among others, this could signal a sharper rupture between the two countries. That relationship will be tested further as Saudi Arabia explores deepening its strategic partnership with Türkiye as well, a country that many think, with good reason, could be the next to see heightened tensions with Israel. 

Given Türkiye’s status as a NATO member, Israel will be very careful about how far it will go to antagonize Ankara, but if it sees Iran as less of a threat, there would be no country Benjamin Netanyahu would see in a more negative light.

The UAE is very likely to see a great need to deepen its military relationship with Israel and the U.S., but the rest of Gulf states are much less likely to follow suit. There will instead be quiet efforts to upgrade some of the partnerships with Europe, but mostly Saudi Arabia will take the lead and open up more to countries like Türkiye and Pakistan, bringing in more Arab partners, and strengthening mutual defense agreements, backed by strong economic ties, as it has done with Islamabad.

Two blocs, connecting the Middle East to South Asia, seem to be coalescing, and this war is likely to spur that on. An Israeli-Emirati-Indian bloc and a Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani bloc are forming, and given the animosities and competitions contained between those two groupings, it is not a recipe for peace.

The United States will remain a key partner, and a major source of weapons. It will also retain some influence in the region, and, of course, the American and broader western markets are always going to be key for any country trying to grow its economy. 

But the dependence on the U.S., and by extension, American influence in the region, is going to diminish. Regardless of who succeeds Trump in 2029, and regardless of the outcome of this war, the American role in the region will shrink significantly over the next ten years.